Opinion
No. 62424-5-I.
September 21, 2009.
Appeal from the Superior Court, King County, No. 08-1-01335-5, Palmer Robinson, J., entered September 3, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Grosse, J., concurred in by Dwyer, A.C.J., and Cox, J.
Proof of possession of a forged check together with corroborating evidence that the defendant knew it was forged is sufficient to prove the knowledge element of a forgery charge. Here, the evidence showed that Pheng Keopraseurt cashed a check for an amount she knew was not authorized and bore handwriting that she knew or should have known was different from the account holder's. Because a jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Keopraseurt knew the check was forged, her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2006, Deborah Skorstad hired Pheng Keopraseurt as a house cleaner. Skorstad agreed to pay Keopraseurt $100 per cleaning, twice a month. Keopraseurt worked for Skorstad for approximately a year and a half to two years.
Skorstad always paid Keopraseurt by check. Skorstad wrote the checks herself and either gave the check directly to Keopraseurt or left it on the table for her if she was coming to the house that day. Skorstad never gave her a blank check.
At times, Keopraseurt would ask for an advance on her payments. Sometimes Skorstad was able to accommodate these requests, but there were times when she was unable to give Keopraseurt advance payments. In the second or third week of November 2007, Keopraseurt requested an advance payment, but Skorstad told her she could not afford to give her an advance at that time. Keopraseurt pressed for an advance two more times, but Skorstad continued to deny the request. On November 26, 2007, Skorstad paid Keopraseurt for her services that month with a check in the amount of $200.
On December 2, 2007, Skorstad reviewed her bank account online and discovered a check for $700 that had been cashed on November 26, 2007 and was made out to Keopraseurt. She had not written the check and the check number was out of sequence from the rest of her checks. The check also came from a block of checks that Skorstad was not using at that time and were still in the mail packaging, kept in the house in a desk drawer.
Skorstad contacted the police and her bank to report the forged check. She also gave Keopraseurt a letter terminating her employment and asking her to return the key to Skorstad's house. According to Skorstad, Keopraseurt came to the house after receiving the letter and told Skorstad that she was sorry and would pay her back.
The State charged Keopraseurt with one count of forgery. At trial, Keopraseurt admitted that she cashed the $700 check, but claimed that Skorstad left that check for her on the table. Keopraseurt also testified that she did not apologize to Skorstad after receiving the termination letter, but told her she would pay her back by working without pay.
A jury found her guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced her to 13 days confinement, with one day credit for time served and the remaining 12 days converted to 96 hours of community service.
ANALYSIS
Keopraseurt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that the State failed to prove that she knew the check was forged, an essential element of the charge. We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether "`any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" We assume the truth of the prosecution's evidence and all inferences that the trier of fact could reasonably draw from it. We defer to the trier of fact to resolve any conflicts in testimony, to weigh the persuasiveness of evidence, and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence."
State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)).
State v. Wilson, 71 Wn. App. 880, 891, 863 P.2d 116 (1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 125 Wn.2d 212 (1994).
State v. Boot, 89 Wn. App. 780, 791, 950 P.2d 964, review denied, 135 Wn.2d 1015 (1998).
State v. Vermillion, 66 Wn. App. 332, 342, 832 P.2d 95 (1992), review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1030 (1993).
A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to injure or defraud, "[h]e possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he knows to be forged." Possession of a forged instrument alone is insufficient to support a forgery conviction. But proof of possession of a forged instrument "together with slight corroborating evidence" may be sufficient to prove knowledge.
State v. Scoby, 117 Wn.2d 55, 62, 810 Wn.2d 1358 (1991).
Scoby, 117 Wn.2d at 61-62.
Here, there was ample corroborating evidence that Keopraseurt knew the check was forged. Keopraseurt admitted that Skorstad had denied her requests for an advance payment and only wrote her a check at the end of the month for $200, the regular amount for her monthly service. Keopraseurt cashed this check on the same day she cashed the forged check. From this evidence the jury could reasonably infer that Keopraseurt knew she would not be receiving any advance payments in addition to her regular monthly wages of $200 and therefore knew the check for an additional $700 was not authorized by Skorstad.
The jury could also reasonably infer knowledge from evidence that the forged check contained handwriting that was different from that on other checks written by Skorstad. Keopraseurt had received legitimate checks from Skorstad in the past and therefore knew or should have known that the handwriting and signature on the forged check was not Skorstad's. Finally, Keopraseurt's knowledge could be reasonably inferred from Skorstad's testimony that when confronted about the forgery, Keopraseurt apologized and offered to pay Skorstad back. While Keopraseurt disputes that she apologized, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and defer to the jury's credibility determinations. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to establish the knowledge element of the forgery charge.
We affirm the conviction.
WE CONCUR.