Opinion
Decided December, 1889.
An injunction decree under c. 77, Laws 1887, cannot be impeached collaterally.
ATTACHMENT, for violation of an injunction decree made with the defendant's written consent, under c. 77, Laws 1887. The defendant took exceptions, based on a claim that his consent was obtained by duress, intimidation, and threats of criminal prosecution, and that the petition for the injunction was defective.
Dodge Caverly, for the defendant.
J. Kivel, solicitor, for the state.
The decree rendered by a court having jurisdiction is not void. It call be impeached only in a direct proceeding seasonably instituted by a party asking that it be reversed, quashed, or vacated. State v. Richmond, 26 N.H. 232, 237, 242, 243, 246; Wingate v. Haywood, 40 N.H. 437; Horne v. Rochester, 62 N.H. 347; Charles v. Davis, 62 N.H. 375; Blanchard v. Webster, 62 N.H. 467; Fowler v. Brooks, 64 N.H. 423; McDonald v. Drew, 64 N.H. 547; Kittredge v. Martin, 141 Mass. 410; Freeman Judg., cc. 6, 13, 21, and ss. 134, 135, 285-287; High Inj., ss. 1416-1418, 1425. If the validity of a judgment could be contested collaterally, a second judgment, avoiding the effect of the first without a direct and express annulment of it, would be subject to a like attack, and there would be no termination of litigation by a final decision.
Exceptions overruled.
CARPENTER, J., did not sit: the others concurred.