Opinion
No. 110,153.
2014-12-5
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Chico KELLEY, Appellant.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. Dexter Burdette, Judge.Richard P. Klein, of Olathe, for appellant.Shawn M. Boyd, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. Dexter Burdette, Judge.
Richard P. Klein, of Olathe, for appellant. Shawn M. Boyd, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before BUSER, P.J., HILL and BRUNS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Chico Kelley appeals his convictions for two counts of attempted first-degree premeditated murder and one count of criminal possession of a firearm. Kelley complains of several trial errors and contends there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of premeditation with regard to one of the attempted first-degree premeditated murder counts. We conclude, however, that Kelley has not shown reversible error and, as a result, we affirm the convictions.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns events which occurred outside two houses located near each other in Kansas City, Kansas. One house was the residence of Kelley's girlfriend, Laprayshia Burgin, and the other house was the residence of one of the victims, John M. Jones, who had the nickname “Mississippi.” The other victim was Jones' friend, Dennis Manuel Henderson.
On the evening of September 5, 2011, Kelley was visiting Burgin at her residence. They were on the front porch with, among others, Jealoni Daniels and Leon Granger, Jr. Kelley was armed with a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol, and Daniels had both a .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol and a .38 caliber revolver. Kelley and Daniels were passing their weapons around so that those in attendance could examine them.
Granger testified that Kelley was angry at Jones and wanted to “fight” him, which Granger understood to mean a fist fight. Jones apparently knew Burgin from the neighborhood and had some sort of conflict with her. Kelley did not testify at trial, but he was interviewed by Clayton Bye, a detective with the Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department. According to Detective Bye, Kelley admitted that he and Daniels
“were looking for an individual that he knew as Mississippi. [Kelley] said that Mississippi had struck his girlfriend Laprayshia Burgin sometime in the fairly recent past. I don't know that we ever established when it was, but he said at some point Mr. Jones hit his girlfriend, he was upset about that. He was looking for him.”
At about midnight, Jones and Henderson drove by Burgin's residence. Kelley recognized Jones, or at least the van he was driving. Kelley, Daniels, and Granger ran after the van.
Jones and Henderson stopped at Jones' residence and stepped from the van. Kelley, Daniels, and perhaps Granger approached without brandishing their handguns, and Daniels asked “Mississippi” to identify himself. Kelley and Daniels were wearing gloves although the temperature was moderate. When Jones identified himself as Mississippi, Kelley and Daniels drew their handguns. Jones, who like Henderson was unarmed, shoved Daniels and ran. Kelley opened fire, as did Daniels, who was now standing behind Kelley.
Jones testified that he saw Kelley shoot at him. Kelley also told Detective Bye, “I shot at where Mississippi was running.” Jones was struck, and a surgeon removed a .45 caliber slug from the wound.
Henderson testified that he ran as soon as he saw Daniels and Kelley were armed. Henderson was also shot and wounded, but he did not know who shot him, and the bullet could not be removed during surgery.
Clinton Swan, an officer with the Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department, found 11 cartridge casings (7 .380 caliber and 4 .45 caliber) in the area of Jones' residence. Greg Burris, an officer with the Crime Scene Unit of the Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department, recovered and catalogued the physical evidence. Officer Burris testified regarding photographs of Jones' residence which showed markers where cartridge casings or bullet fragments had been found. The officer further testified from a “Bullet Casing/Fragment Map,” which laid out the entire scene.
Several 911 calls were recorded, but like the rest of the trial exhibits they were not included in the record on appeal. Detective Bye testified that one of the voices on a call was Burgin's, but the content of the calls was not repeated during the testimony. The prosecutor asserted in his closing argument that Burgin had said: “They shot the wrong person,” and, “They wasn't [sic] supposed to shoot him.”
The State charged Kelley with one count of attempted first-degree murder of Jones, one count of attempted first-degree murder of Henderson, and criminal possession of a firearm. Kelley stipulated to his criminal record supporting the third charge, and he offered no arguments against that charge at trial. With regard to the charge of attempted murder of Henderson, the State argued the victim “was hit by either ... Kelley or ... Daniels,” and it relied on an aiding and abetting instruction and a transferred intent instruction to establish Kelley's culpability. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all of the charged crimes. Kelley appeals.
Sufficiency of the Evidence for Attempted Premeditated Murder of Jones
Kelley concedes the trial evidence was sufficient to show he “fired a handgun at ... Jones,” and that he “shot ... Jones.” Kelley argues, however, that “no rational factfinder could have found ... [he] attempted premeditated first degree murder.” Of note, Kelley argues this issue as it relates to Jones but not as to Henderson. As a result, Kelley waives or abandons any challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting his premeditation with respect to Henderson. See State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 116, 125, 284 P.3d 251 (2012).
In considering this issue, we have a well-established standard of review:
“When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations.” State v. Quails, 297 Kan. 61, Syl. ¶ 1, 298 P.3d 311 (2013).
Our Supreme Court has also interpreted the term, premeditation. “Premeditation does not necessarily mean an act is planned, contrived, or schemed beforehand; rather, premeditation indicates a time of reflection or deliberation. Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the established circumstances of a case when the inference is reasonable.” State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620, Syl. ¶ 4, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014).
“Factors to consider when determining whether the evidence gives rise to an inference of premeditation include: (a) the nature of the weapon used; (b) lack of provocation; (c) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing; (d) the defendant's threats and declarations before and during the occurrence; and (e) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless.” 299 Kan. 620, Syl. ¶ 5.
Moreover, the analysis of premeditation is “not driven simply by the number of factors present because in some cases one factor alone may be compelling evidence of premeditation.” 299 Kan. 620, Syl. ¶ 5.
The record provides support for a finding of premeditation. Kelley indicated a desire to “fight” Jones in retaliation for Jones' alleged abuse of Burgin. Kelley argues “the undisputed evidence was that fighting meant a fist fight,” but it was only undisputed that Granger believed that was Kelley's intent. Kelley made his declaration while displaying a .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun. A deadly weapon can indicate a premeditation to kill. See State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 499, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014); State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 134, 262 P.3d 285 (2011); State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 503, 513, 996 P.2d 321 (2000). Moreover, there was no immediate provocation before the shooting. Kelley chased the van and approached Jones and Henderson in a purposeful manner. Similarly, in State v. demons, 273 Kan. 328, 335, 45 P.3d 384 (2002), evidence that the defendant chased one victim and waited outside a store for another supported a finding of premeditation.
The omission of the trial exhibits in the record on appeal frustrates our further analysis. The State presented inculpatory evidence through a 911 recording which apparently included statements by Burgin which were strongly indicative of premeditation. We know of these statements only because the prosecutor highlighted them in closing arguments. We also do not know what the jury could have inferred from the photographs and maps admitted below, which should have shown a pattern of firing or even pursuit. Kelley bore the burden to designate a record affirmatively showing error, and his failure to include the trial exhibits in the record on appeal hinders our review and results in the failure of this claim of error. See State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 999, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012).
“ ‘Unless a person actually communicates his or her reasons for taking another's life, ... premeditation must be proved by circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation omitted.]” Cosby, 293 Kan. at 134. The evidence here, although limited by an incomplete record, was sufficient, circumstantial proof that Kelley premeditated his acts. As a result, Kelley's claim is without merit.
Failure to Give a Unanimity Instruction
For his second issue on appeal, Kelley contends the trial court should have given the jury a unanimity instruction. “When multiple acts jury unanimity is at issue, the threshold question for an appellate court is whether it is presented with a multiple acts case. This is a question of law subject to unlimited review.” State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, Syl. ¶ 4, 322 P.3d 334 (2014).
“In a multiple acts case the State alleges several acts, any one of which could constitute the crime charged, and the jury must be unanimous as to which act the defendant committed.” 299 Kan. 102, Syl. ¶ 3. Kelley argues: “Although there was sufficient evidence to establish that [he] shot ... Jones, there was no evidence presented to establish who shot ... Henderson.” As a result, we must decide whether the trial featured multiple acts for the shooting of Henderson.
While in another case, multiple acts might relate to multiple shots fired, that was not the factual circumstances here. The trial court's elements instruction on attempted first-degree murder with regard to Henderson incorporated multiple shots:
“To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: “1. That the defendant, or another for whose conduct he was criminally responsible, performed an overt act, to wit: did fire multiple shots at Dennis Henderson, seriously wounding him, towards the commission of Murder in the First Degree—Premeditated.”
This instruction also incorporated the fact that Henderson was shot and seriously wounded. Although seriously wounding a victim is not necessarily an element of attempted first-degree murder, it was presented to the jury as an element in this case. Since Kelley does not challenge this jury instruction or any of the others, he has waived or abandoned claims of instructional error on appeal. See Holman, 295 Kan. at 125.
Kelley argues as follows:
“There were at least three separate acts that could have caused the shooting of ... Henderson. First, there is a possibility that ... Kelley shot [Henderson] purposefully. Second, there is a possibility that [Daniels] shot [Henderson], which would make [Kelley] culpable under an aiding and abetting theory. Third, there is a possibility that [Kelley] hit [Henderson] while firing a shot at ... Jones.... The [trial] court instructed the jury on each of those theories, but did not provide a multiple acts instruction. The [trial] court's failure to properly instruct the jury denied [Kelley] a fair trial and he requests that the Court reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial.”
Kelley's arguments are based on the instructions at trial, which presented the jury with two theories of culpability—as a principal and as an aider and abettor—and two theories of intent—direct and transferred. Starting with the aiding and abetting instruction, this instruction could not create multiple acts. An “act” is something ‘ “factually and legally sufficient to satisfy all of the elements of” the charged crime. Soto, 299 Kan. at 111. Since “the aiding and abetting statute simply extends criminal responsibility to a person other than the principal actor” it is not an element of a charged crime. 299 Kan. at 109. The instruction, therefore, cannot create two acts, each factually and legally sufficient to satisfy all of the elements of the charged crime. In Soto, for example, our Supreme Court held: “Regardless of whether the State proved Soto acted as a principal or an aider and abettor, this case cannot be a multiple acts case because there was only one killing.” 299 Kan. at 111.
The analysis for the transferred intent instruction is similar. Transferred intent establishes the intent element with respect to the victim in certain crimes when it is shown the defendant has the requisite intent with respect to another person. See State v. Jones, 257 Kan. 856, 859–60, 896 P.2d 1077 (1995). Thus, while the transferred intent instruction here provided a second way to satisfy the intent element, the State did not allege two separate acts, each factually and legally sufficient to satisfy all of the elements of the charged crime. Henderson was shot only once, and as instructed, the jury was not choosing between several acts, any one of which could constitute the crime charged. In sum, because this is not a multiple acts case, the trial court did not err by failing to give the jury a unanimity instruction.
Alternative Means
Kelley argues in the alternative, again with regard to the attempted first-degree murder conviction involving Henderson, that the aiding and abetting and transferred intent instructions created alternative means.
“Jury unanimity concerns arise when the court instructs the jury on alternative means of committing the crime charged but the State fails to present substantial evidence of both means.” Soto, 299 Kan. at 108. “Ordinarily, the first step in analyzing an alternative means case is to determine whether the case truly presents an alternative means issue.” State v. Rojas–Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 544, 285 P.3d 361 (2012). This is a question of law subject to unlimited review. See State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 534, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014); State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 193–94, 284 P.3d 977 (2012).
“The Kansas aiding and abetting statute does not create an alternative means of committing the underlying crime.” Williams, 299 Kan. 509, Syl. ¶ 6. In other words, “the State is not required to prove that the defendant was both a principal and an accessory or to elect between the theory that the defendant was an aider and abettor or the theory that the defendant was the principal actor in the commission of the crime.” Williams, 299 Kan. 509, Syl. ¶ 6.
As for transferred intent, this theory does not meet the definition of alternative means as “legislatively determined, distinct, material elements of a crime.” State v. Foster, 298 Kan. 348, Syl. ¶ 4, 312 P.3d 364 (2013). The State correctly points out that transferred intent is established by caselaw in Kansas rather than by the Kansas Legislature. See State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 535, 431 P.2d 879 (1967); PIK Crim. 4th 54.160, Notes on Use (citing Moffitt as authority for transferred intent instruction). Transferred intent is also not a distinct, material element of a crime but rather establishes “factual circumstances that would prove the crime.” Foster, 298 Kan. 348, Syl. ¶ 4. We also note that in an unpublished case from the State of Washington, the jurisdiction our Supreme Court cited when establishing its alternative means jurisprudence, State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 289, 875 P.2d 242 (1994), overruled on other grounds State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 317 P.3d 54 (2014) (citing State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 [1988] ), transferred intent was held not to create an alternative means. See State v. Adams, No. 2633–0–II, 2002 WL 374046 (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 147 Wash.2d 1012 (2002).
In summary, because this is not an alternative means case, there are no jury unanimity concerns and Kelley's claim of error is without merit.
Admission of Kelley's Statement
Kelley contends the trial court should not have admitted his pretrial statement to Detective Bye. He raises two concerns. First, Kelley argues he was improperly denied counsel during the interview. Second, he asserts that his statement was involuntary. Of note, the statement was originally omitted along with the rest of the trial exhibits from the record on appeal, but we granted Kelley's motion made after the oral arguments to add it to the record.
Our standards of review provide:
“When reviewing a district court ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, an appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the decision under a substantial competent evidence standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence.” State v. Littlejohn, 298 Kan. 632, Syl. ¶ 3, 316 P.3d 136 (2014).
The State filed a motion to admit Kelley's statement, but Kelley did not file a response or a motion to suppress. The trial court held a hearing on the State's motion pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). The State called Detective Bye as its only witness at the hearing.
Detective Bye testified that he had interviewed Kelley on September 15, 2011, at the Wyandotte County Juvenile Detention Center. Kelley was 17 years old and had undergone surgery 9 days earlier to treat a gunshot wound he sustained during the crimes. The bullet had fractured a bone in Kelley's forearm and caused vascular damage requiring surgery.
Detective Bye and another detective interviewed Kelley in a cell at the detention center. Neither detective was armed. The detectives told Kelley “he was a suspect in a shooting of two other individuals ... and we advised him of his Miranda rights, gave him the Advice of Rights Form.”
Before reviewing the advice of rights form, Detective Bye asked Kelley questions regarding his grades in school, whether he was under the influence of medication “legal or illegal,” and whether he could read and write English. Kelley said he had a 10th grade education. Detective Bye understood that Kelley was “on nothing stronger than ... ibuprofen.” The detective also testified Kelley appeared to know how to read and write, did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and seemed “to be above average intelligence for someone with his criminal history.”
Detective Bye reviewed the advice of rights form with Kelley. Kelley signed the form and told the detectives he would speak to them without an attorney. The form was executed at 1:09 p.m., and the interview lasted 45 minutes.
After some initial questions, the following exchange occurred:
“Q. Can you tell me what you remember about that incident?” A. Yeah there was me, [Daniels] and some other dude and like we seen [sic] Mississippi ['s] van pass by. Whatnot. And [Daniels] took off towards [the van] and I took off after him and [the] other dude he took off behind me, whatnot. And we get around the corner, [a] dude hopped out of the van, he like what's happening? I'm like what you mean? I'm like and he like what's up? And [Daniels] asked for Mississippi like where Mississippi at, I heard he been talking down on my name. Whatnot. And shit, Mississippi end up popping out of his truck, I mean out of the van, whatnot. And ... man, can I have a lawyer or something bro, I don't know. This shit, this seem kinda crazy.
“Q. Yeah. Like we said, you can have a lawyer any time you want. You want to tell us
“A. All right.
“Q. If you want to tell us the rest of your story now without an attorney present we'll listen to you; if you want to stop right now you can. It's up to you.
“A. Mm. Yes, it's like, Mississippi hopped out of the truck, or the van or whatnot....”
Kelley continued the interview without again inquiring about counsel.
The trial court found no violation of Kelley's constitutional rights:
“So in this Court's opinion, the defendant did not wish to cease talking to the authorities. Asked for clarification, which was given. You have to understand that he was also given his Miranda warnings during the informal conversation, which he indicated that he understood and then they did a second time for the formal statement. They put on the record all of the rights that the defendant had. And he, again, responded in the affirmative that he understood his rights and he wished to give the authorities a statement. Question was asked, ‘Do you still want to talk to us?’ And he said, ‘Yeah.’ They went then and explained to him the charges pending against him. There was some clarification on that, and he proceeded to talk to the authorities. So under the totality of the circumstances and this Court's opinion, the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated in any way.”
Kelley does not deny that Detective Bye asked clarifying questions about his request for counsel. Instead, Kelley claims his request for counsel was so “unambiguous that “all questioning must cease.” Because the questioning did not end, Kelley contends “any statement given after the request must be suppressed.”
“ ‘Under Miranda, a suspect must unambiguously request counsel so that a reasonable police officer in those circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.’ “ State v. Cline, 295 Kan. 104, 113, 283 P.3d 194 (2012) (quoting State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, Syl. ¶ 4, 102 P.3d 406 [2004] ). “Once the right to have counsel present during interrogation has been invoked, the courts impose a relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease.” State v. Cosby, 285 Kan. 230, 242, 169 P.3d 1128 (2007). “This rule provides a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel, designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving previously asserted rights. [Citations omitted.]” 285 Kan. at 242.
In addition, “an accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request for counsel.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). “This is as it should be, for otherwise police could disregard a defendant's invocation of his rights in the hope that subsequent interrogation would cast retrospective doubt upon it.” 2 LaFave, Israel, King and Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(g), p. 865 (3d ed.2007). For example, in Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 348, 698 S.E.2d 301 (2010), when police asked clarifying questions after an unambiguous request for counsel, the defendant's statements after the request were suppressed.
In contrast, “[w]hen a suspect makes a statement which might be ambiguous as to whether the suspect is asserting a right to remain silent or to confer with counsel, the interrogator may ask questions to clarify, but the interrogator is not required to clarify and may continue the questioning.” Holmes, 278 Kan. at 618.
Kelley does not cite, and our research did not locate, a Kansas case examining the particular question, “can I have a lawyer?” However, in State v. Bowlin, 43 Kan.App.2d 671, 680, 229 P.3d 402, rev. denied 290 Kan. 1096 (2010), this court treated the statement, “ ‘I think I'm going to have to get a lawyer,’ “ as equivocal. In Holmes, which considered an invocation of the right to remain silent under Miranda, a defendant said, “ ‘I think I'll just quit talking, I don't know.’ “ 278 Kan. at 619. Our Supreme Court held the statement was “an ambiguous invocation of rights” and that an officer had followed “proper procedure” by asking clarifying questions. 278 Kan. at 619.
The issue whether a defendant unambiguously requested counsel is decided under an objective standard. State v. Robertson, 279 Kan. 291, 301, 109 P.3d 1174 (2005). Considered objectively, we do not believe Kelley unambiguously requested counsel. At most Kelley asked whether he could have counsel, and like in Holmes, he immediately added, “I don't know.” 278 Kan. at 619. The overall impression is one of uncertainty and ambiguity, so Detective Bye reasonably asked clarifying questions. These questions were noteworthy for their neutral content and absence of coercion or persuasion. Accordingly, we hold that Detective Bye did not violate Kelley's constitutional rights as provided by the Miranda decision by asking him clarifying questions.
Next, Kelley maintains his statement was involuntary. Kelley asserts: “Here was a 17 year old who was a recent shooting victim. He was on medication, he was in a medical cell of the detention center, and he asked for an attorney. There is little doubt that these statements were not free and voluntary.”
Our Supreme Court recently and comprehensively summarized the standards which we apply to such a claim:
“When challenged, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of a defendant's inculpatory statements to a law enforcement officer.”
“In determining whether a defendant's inculpatory statements to a law enforcement officer were freely and voluntarily given, a trial court usually looks at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements and determines their voluntariness by considering the following nonexclusive factors: (a) the accused's mental condition; (b) the manner and duration of the interviews; (c) the accused's ability to communicate on request with the outside world; (d) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (e) the officer's fairness in conducting the interviews; and (f) the accused's fluency with the English language.”
“When the accused is a juvenile, Kansas courts must exercise the greatest care in assessing whether the juvenile's inculpatory statements to law enforcement were voluntary. A juvenile's inculpatory statements must be free from coercion or suggestion and must not be the product of ignorance of rights or adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair. In assessing the voluntariness of a juvenile's inculpatory statements to police, Kansas courts have articulated five nonexclusive factors for consideration: (a) the juvenile's age; (b) the length of questioning; (c) the juvenile's education; (d) the juvenile's prior experience with police; and (e) the juvenile's mental state.”
“When applying the appropriate factors to determine the voluntariness of an accused's inculpatory statements to police, the trial court is not to weigh one factor against another with those factors favorable to a free and voluntary statement offsetting those factors unfavorable. Instead, the situation surrounding the giving of inculpatory statements may dissipate the import of an individual factor that might otherwise have a coercive effect. Even after analyzing such dilution, if any, a single factor or a combination of factors considered together may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances an accused's will was overborne and the inculpatory statements were not free and voluntary.” State v. Gibson, 299 Kan. 207, Syl. ¶¶ 1–4, 322 P.3d 389 (2014).
Kelley points to his age, but he was less than 4 months from his 18th birthday. Kelley implies the surgery and medication affected his mental condition, but there was no evidence of this below. Detective Bye testified Kelley was taking standard analgesics, “nothing narcotic-type. It was over-the-counter type medications.” The detective also said Kelley “appeared normal to me.” Kelley asserts he was in a “medical cell,” but there was no evidence on the point. Detective Bye said he did not know whether the cell was a “designated medical cell.” The evidence regarding Kelley's question about an attorney was discussed earlier.
Looking at the other factors, the questioning occurred at a reasonable time of day and lasted less than 1 hour. Detective Bye said he and the other detective did not use threats and that they had no physical contact with Kelley. The detective said Kelley did not indicate a desire to stop the interview. The State also offered into evidence a “certified prior conviction ... to establish that [Kelley] had prior involvement in the criminal justice system.”
Having considered the manner of the interview, its contents, and the circumstances surrounding the interview, we believe the State proved voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. We see no coercion or suggestion by Detective Bye, nor do we see any indications that Kelley's statement was the product of ignorance or adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair. In sum, we hold the trial court did not err in admitting Kelley's statement in evidence at trial.
Affirmed.