Haigh v. Haigh, 50 Conn. App. 456, 717 A.2d 837 (1998), quoting Second Injury Fund v. Lupachino, 45 Conn. App. 324, 343, 695 A.2d 1072 (1997)." A juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction separate and distinct from the Superior Court. State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 331, 537 A.2d 483 (1988). To the contrary, a juvenile court's jurisdiction is codified in Connecticut General Statutes 51-164s. That statute provides:

State v. D.R., supra, 109 N.J. at 360, 537 A.2d 667. As a matter of comity, we declined to adopt a new Rule, id. at 375-76, 537 A.2d 483, and instead proposed a Rule, see id. at 378, 537 A.2d 483, that the Legislature adopted verbatim. The Rule provides:

" (Emphasis added.) State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 328-29, 537 A.2d 483 (1988). Thus, "the legislature adopted a uniform court system, vesting in the Superior Court the power to entertain all actions except those in which the Probate Court had original jurisdiction.

At this point the habeas court's decision noted: "It is well established that, an unconditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, intelligently and voluntarily made, operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings. . . . Therefore, only those issues fully disclosed in the record which relate either to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court or to the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea are ordinarily appealable. . . . State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92, 97-98, 503 A.2d 136 (1985). State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 537 A.2d 483 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Our Supreme Court considered the issue of "whether provision for a separate juvenile docket reflects a legislative judgment that the juvenile docket is vested with subject matter jurisdiction over juvenile cases that is separate and distinct from the subject matter jurisdiction otherwise vested in the Superior Court." State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 331, 537 A.2d 483 (1988). The court in Kelley concluded that the juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction separate and distinct from the Superior Court.

Connecticut case law demonstrates that the legislature's objective in enacting section 51-164s "was 'to combine the trial jurisdiction which [was then] spread between the Superior Court, the Court of Common Pleas and the Juvenile Court into one Court . . . the Superior Court.'" In re Shonna K., 77 Conn. App. 246, 254-55 (2003) (quoting 19 H.R. Proc., Pt. 7, 1976 Sess., p. 2862, remarks of Representative James T. Healey); see also State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 328 (1988) (stating that section 51-164s "merged the Juvenile Court and the Superior Court in order to maximize the efficiency of scarce judicial resources"). Section 51-164s cannot be, and was not, intended to limit the adjudication of foreclosure actions to the state courts.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Matthew F. , supra, at 690, 4 A.3d 248, quoting State v. Kelley , 206 Conn. 323, 328, 537 A.2d 483 (1988). A plain reading of § 46b-121 (b) (1) in its current form quite apparently grants the Superior Court comprehensive authority to issue orders in juvenile matters.

"Rather than implicating subject matter jurisdiction, issues relating to transfer between the juvenile and the regular criminal docket involve considerations that are analogous to those of the law of venue." State v. Kelley , 206 Conn. 323, 332, 537 A.2d 483 (1988). In this appeal, the defendant does not claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the state does not dispute the defendant's ability to raise his claim regarding his age at the time of the offenses through a motion to dismiss.

In any event, it is a matter of common sense, as well as a firmly entrenched principle throughout the law, that an express reservation of rights precludes a contrary finding that a party has waived his or her rights by implication. See, e.g., RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. SKF USA, Inc., 318 Conn. 737, 767, 123 A.3d 417 (2015); Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 445, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002); State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 333-35, 537 A.2d 483 (1988); Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 772, 463 A.2d 242 (1983); Jones v. Civil Service Commission, 175 Conn. 504, 511-12, 400 A.2d 721 (1978); American Woolen Co. v. Maaget, 86 Conn. 234, 241, 85 A. 583 (1912). The majority in Kitchens also worried that "such a ploy could open up a 'Pandora's box,' flooding Connecticut courts with cases alleging improper jury instructions on every conceivable issue and making a mockery of the trial court's attempt to query and solicit counsel's input on the jury instructions."

In any event, it is a matter of common sense, as well as a firmly entrenched principle throughout the law, that an express reservation of rights precludes a contrary finding that a party has waived his or her rights by implication. See, e.g., RBC Nice Bearings, Inc . v. SKF USA, Inc ., 318 Conn. 737, 767, 123 A.3d 417 (2015) ; Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 260 Conn. 435, 445, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002) ; State v. Kelley , 206 Conn. 323, 333–35, 537 A.2d 483 (1988) ; Olean v. Treglia , 190 Conn. 756, 772, 463 A.2d 242 (1983) ; Jones v. Civil Service Commission , 175 Conn. 504, 511–12, 400 A.2d 721 (1978) ; American Woolen Co . v. Maaget , 86 Conn. 234, 241, 85 A. 583 (1912). The majority in Kitchens also worried that “such a ploy could open up a ‘Pandora's box,’ flooding Connecticut courts with cases alleging improper jury instructions on every conceivable issue and making a mockery of the trial court's attempt to query and solicit counsel's input on the jury instructions.”