Finally, defendant argues that our prior decision in Pierce should either be overruled or limited to cases in which felonious child abuse serves as the predicate felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule. In seeking to persuade us to uphold the Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to the issue of whether hands and arms can serve as deadly weapons for purpose of the statutory version of the felony-murder rule embodied in N.C.G.S. § 14-17(a), the State begins by noting North Carolina's lengthy history of leaving the issue of whether a particular weapon qualifies as "deadly" for the jury's consideration. SeeState v. Joyner , 295 N.C. 55, 64–65, 243 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1978) (holding that an instrument's "allegedly deadly character" is a question "of fact to be determined by the jury"). In addition, the State cites decisions, such as State v. Brunson , 180 N.C. App. 188, 636 S.E.2d 202 (2006), aff'd per curiam , 362 N.C. 81, 653 S.E.2d 144 (2007), for the proposition that this Court has long "recognized that under certain circumstances, hands and other body parts may be deadly weapons for purposes of proving the deadly weapon element of assault offenses perpetrated with a deadly weapon."
"The term `inflicts serious injury,' under G.S. 14-32(b), means physical or bodily injury resulting from an assault with a deadly weapon." State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 65, 243 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1978) (quoting State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 91, 128 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1962)). The Court in State v. Ferguson had earlier defined the term in this manner and noted that "`[f]urther definition seems neither wise nor desirable.'"
We allowed his motion for initial review by this Court in the other matters pursuant to G.S. 7A-31(a). Other cases arising out of the same facts as this one but involving different defendants are State v. Sylvester Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E.2d 367 (1978); State v. Curmon, 295 N.C. 453, 245 S.E.2d 503 (1978); and State v. Barnes, 297 N.C. 442, 255 S.E.2d 386 (1979). This case was docketed and argued as No. 24 at the Spring Term 1978.
However, our Supreme Court has previously rejected similar arguments. In State v. Joyner , 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E.2d 367 (1978), the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court had erred by denying his motion for nonsuit on the charge of armed robbery. He contended that the State failed to prove the victim's life was endangered or threatened because the victim did not show that she was "in fear for her life at the time she surrendered her [property]...."
North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-87 sets forth the elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon: "(1) the unlawful taking or attempted taking of personal property from another; (2) the possession, use or threatened use of `firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means'; and (3) danger or threat to the life of the victim." State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 63, 243 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1978) (citation omitted). "The essential difference between armed robbery and common law robbery is that the former is accomplished by the use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened."
The elements of the crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon are: (1) the unlawful taking or attempted taking of personal property from another, (2) the possession, use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, and (3) danger or threat to the life of the victim. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-87(a) (2005) ; State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 63, 243 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1978) . First, defendant argues that she could not be guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon because the evidence was insufficient to prove that “Melanie Leach had a dangerous weapon in her possession at the time she obtained the property."
Id. The elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon are set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87 (2003). Our Supreme Court stated in State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E.2d 367 (1978): [T]he essentials of the offense set forth in G.S. 14-87 are (1) the unlawful taking or attempted taking of personal property from another; (2) the possession, use or threatened use of `firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means'; and (3) danger or threat to the life of the victim.
The term "inflicts serious injury," as used in section 14-32(a), means "physical or bodily injury resulting from an assault with a deadly weapon." State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 65, 243 S.E.2d 367, 373 (1978); State v. Hensley, 90 N.C. App. 245, 248, 368 S.E.2d 208, 210 (1988). "The injury must be serious but it must fall short of causing death."
Defendant's argument to the contrary rests entirely on cases arising under G.S. 14-177 which proscribes and makes punishable "the crime against nature." The cases are State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55. 243 S.E.2d 367 (1978); State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961), and State v. Fenner, 166 N.C. 247, 80 S.E. 970 (1914). In Fenner, the act in question was fellatio.
We can find no case in which this Court has held or even implied that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is sufficient to support a charge of armed robbery. On the contrary, in the recent case of State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E.2d 367 (1978), we recognized that possession and endangering or threatening are separate elements of the crime: The essentials of the offense set forth in G.S. 14-87 are (1) the unlawful taking or attempted taking of personal property from another; (2) the possession, use or threatened use of "firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means"; and (3) danger or threat to the life of the victim.