The state filed an allegation that he was ineligible for probation under Proposition 200 because he previously had been convicted of aggravated assault on a peace officer. Lopez moved to dismiss that allegation, asserting that, pursuant to State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, 158 P.3d 263 (App.2007), the determination of whether a prior conviction was a violent crime was limited to the elements of the offense and that aggravated assault on a peace officer was not necessarily a violent crime as contemplated by A.R.S. §§ 13–901.01 and 13–901.03 because it could be committed without using a weapon or causing physical injury. ¶ 3 The state responded that Lopez previously had pled guilty to aggravated assault on a peace officer as a class five felony.
Further, even assuming arguendo that giving the instruction was fundamental error, Peraza would fail to establish any actual prejudice. See State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134 , ¶ 31, 158 P.3d 263 , 273 (App.2007). Peraza bears the burden to show he *150 was prejudiced by the instruction, and because “[fjundamental error review involves a fact-intensive inquiry ... the showing required to establish prejudice ... differs from case to case.”
We review the trial court's application of sentencing statutes de novo. State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, ¶ 5, 158 P.3d 263, 266 (App. 2007). Because Rubin failed to raise his objections below, however, he has forfeited any right to appellate relief absent fundamental, prejudicial error.
However, the imposition of an illegal sentence—that is, one that does not conform with our mandatory sentencing statutes—constitutes such error. State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, ¶ 5, 158 P.3d 263, 266 (App. 2007). ¶11 Under § 13-705(A), "[a] person who is at least eighteen years of age and who is convicted of a dangerous crime against children in the first degree involving . . . sexual conduct with a minor who is twelve years of age or younger shall be sentenced to life imprisonment."
Prejudice results only when, "but for the error, a reasonable fact-finder 'could have reached a different result.'" State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, ¶ 31, 158 P.3d 263, 273 (App. 2007), quoting Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 27, 115 P.3d at 609. ¶15 First, the record does not support Gaxiola's recitation of facts. Although the state argued accomplice liability in its rebuttal, it did not argue Gaxiola could be convicted for all crimes that took place at the victim's house regardless of whether he was aware of the final plan. Additionally, after State v. Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 46 P.3d 1048 (2002), the legislature expanded accomplice liability to include "any offense that is a natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable consequence of the offense for which the person was an accomplice."
¶ 15 Because Kasic did not raise this argument in the trial court, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, ¶ 5, 158 P.3d 263, 266 (App.2007). “To prevail under this standard of review, a defendant must establish both that fundamental error exists and that the error in his case caused him prejudice.” State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005).
However, the imposition of an illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error. State v. Joyner 215 Ariz. 134, ¶ 5, 158 P.3d 263, 266 (App. 2007). At oral argument, the state conceded that under the language of the statute, the CRO was entered prematurely.
Under Arizona law, a charging document is reliable evidence of the elements of a prior conviction only if it is incorporated by reference in the judgment. State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, 158 P.3d 263, 272 (App.2007); State v. Thompson, 186 Ariz. 529, 924 P.2d 1048, 1051 (App.1996). In Thompson the Arizona Court of Appeals held a judgment specifying “that the conviction was pursuant to Count I of the Information ... effectively incorporated Count I of the charging document by reference.”
¶ 15 But even assuming McGuire is correct that the intent of both § 13–501(A) and article IV, pt. 2, § 22 (1) is to require mandatory adult prosecution of juveniles only for violent offenses, we are not persuaded that armed robbery committed with a simulated deadly weapon is not a violent offense. McGuire relies on A.R.S. § 13–901.03 and this court's decision in State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, 158 P.3d 263 (App.2007), for that proposition. Such reliance, however, is misplaced.
¶ 19 Likewise, the court of appeals has on numerous occasions reviewed legal errors in sentencing for fundamental error.See, e.g., State v. Avila, 217 Ariz. 97, 99, ¶ 8, 170 P.3d 706, 708 (App. 2007) (reviewing sentencing argument not raised in the trial court for fundamental error); State v. McCurdy, 216 Ariz. 567, 574 n. 7, ¶ 18, 169 P.3d 931, 938 n. 7 (App. 2007) (noting that an admission does not constitute proof that the foreign conviction would have been a felony under Arizona law and that substantial prejudice inheres in an illegally enhanced sentence); Rasul, 216 Ariz, at 496-97, ¶¶ 20, 27, 167 P.3d at 1291-92 (reviewing unobjected to sentencing error for fundamental error); State v. Joyner, 215 Ariz. 134, 136 n. 1, ¶ 5, 137, 158 P.3d 263, 265 n. 1, 266 (App. 2007) (same); State v. Cox, 201 Ariz. 464, 467-68, ¶¶ 11-13, 37 P.3d 437, 440-41 (App. 2002) (same). The court below also recognized that decisions from that court reviewed sentences "imposed under an incorrect statute" for fundamental error.