" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joseph R. B. , 173 Conn. App. 518, 536, 164 A.3d 718, cert. denied, 326 Conn. 923, 169 A.3d 234 (2017) ; see State v. Grant , 286 Conn. 499, 539, 944 A.2d 947 ("the jury would not necessarily have understood the prosecutor's statement that there was no evidence of an innocent explanation for the presence of the defendant's fingerprint on the tissue box or his DNA on the handkerchief as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify" because "the prosecutor was asking the jury to draw an inference from the defendant's statements, not from his refusal to testify"), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916, 129 S. Ct. 271, 172 L. Ed. 2d 200 (2008) ; State v. Walker , 206 Conn. 300, 309, 311, 537 A.2d 1021 (1988) (prosecutor's comment " ‘[d]id you hear anybody get up and say it was him’ " in reference to witness who "defense counsel had stressed ... had committed the murder" was "not of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify" (emphasis omitted)); State v. Joseph R. B.

A prosecutor also may comment on the failure of a defendant to support his factual theories." State v. Smalls , 78 Conn. App. 535, 543, 827 A.2d 784, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931, 837 A.2d 806 (2003) ; see also State v. Joseph R. B. , 173 Conn. App. 518, 531–34, 164 A.3d 718 (prosecutor's closing argument not improper where comments based on evidence and did not draw attention to defendant's failure to testify), cert. denied, 326 Conn. 923, 169 A.3d 234 (2017) ; State v. Colon , 70 Conn. App. 707, 713, 799 A.2d 317 (prosecutor's argument regarding lack of explanation for defendant's flight from crime scene not improper), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 933, 806 A.2d 1067 (2002). The record in the present case indicates that the prosecutor during his closing argument did not comment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial or on the burden of proof.

Jennifer F. Miller, deputy assistant state's attorney, in opposition.The defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 173 Conn.App. 518, 164 A.3d 718 (2017), is denied.

Our review of the relevant case law reveals that, as in Thompson , both our Supreme Court and this court frequently have considered whether a challenged remark of a prosecutor was responsive to a defense theory or argument in determining whether the remark was improper in the first instance. See, e.g., State v. Singh , supra, 259 Conn. at 716 n.22, 793 A.2d 226 (concluding that challenged comment of prosecutor was not improper because "comment was invited by defense counsel's argument"); State v. Burton , 258 Conn. 153, 166–69, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (rejecting claim that prosecutor improperly vouched for credibility of state's witnesses because challenged statements were made in response to defendant's attack on credibility of victim and victim's friend); State v. Joseph R. B ., 173 Conn. App. 518, 534, 164 A.3d 718 (challenged comment of prosecutor was invited by argument of defense counsel and, thus, was not improper), cert. denied, 326 Conn. 923, 169 A.3d 234 (2017) ; State v. Fasanelli , 163 Conn. App. 170, 176, 182, 133 A.3d 921 (2016) (certain comments by prosecutor that allegedly denigrated defense counsel were not improper because they were based on evidence and "attacked only the theory of defense," not defense counsel); State v. Morgan , 70 Conn. App. 255, 294–95, 797 A.2d 616 (remarks of prosecutor were not improper because they "were fair descriptions of the evidence presented and fair criticisms of the defendant's theory of defense"), cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919, 806 A.2d 1056 (2002). Indeed, the determination of a reviewing court as to whether a challenged statement is improper in the first instance cannot be made in a vacuum, without regard for the evidence, testimony and theory of defense presented by the defendant at trial.