Opinion
No. CR 05-0206401
November 8, 2007
Excerpt Adopted as the Memorandum of Decision of the Court
THE COURT: Mr. Schipul, I'm not going to call on you for rebuttal because I have considered this matter quite thoroughly. I want to hear Mr. Satti out, but I have had several days to think about this matter. And although I'll willingly and readily admit that this is a matter on which rational jurists could no doubt disagree, I believe that the motion to suppress in this case must be granted as to the statements of October 6th and October 15th, and I want to briefly first set forth my factual findings and then my legal analysis in terms of the facts found.
The State alleges criminal conduct by Mr. Jordan in a motor vehicle incident that occurred in Stratford on May 2nd, 2004. At least from what appears from the evidence, no immediate or on-site arrest was made. On June 25, 2004 Mr. Jordan was sentenced by the Superior Court, Judge Damiani, to a sentence of eighteen months to serve for the crime of possession of narcotics and on October 6th, 2004 Mr. Jordan was confined by the Commissioner of Correction in the Osborn Correctional Facility in Somers, Connecticut. The Osborn Correctional Facility was, and for that matter is, a level three facility, which is medium security. However, the evidence introduced by the State, and I am referring to State's exhibit 5, is that at the time Mr. Jordan was a special management inmate. The exact nature of his security status has not been explained by the evidence, but I think it is fair to assume, and the Court does so assume based not only on the evidence here, but on its hearing of many, many cases involving the security status of inmates, that special management inmates are more closely managed than typical medium security inmates are. On October 6th, Mr. Jordan appeared in an interview room in the Osborn Correctional Facility where he was interviewed by two detectives from the State Police, Walter Melfi and Mario Rosa. Detectives Melfi and Rosa openly admit that they did not give him the Miranda warnings. Instead, they had presented to them after the interview, in fact perhaps long after the interview, exhibit A, a voluntary interview statement that was purported to be signed by Mr. Jordan. The Court will assume for purposes of this decision that it is actually Mr. Jordan's signature, although the Court realizes that assuming is arguably incorrect. But I'll assume for purposes of this decision that it is Mr. Jordan's signature. However, Detectives Melfi and Rosa did not have the voluntary interview statement at the time and, as I said, only acquired it at some time later from the Department of Correction. In terms of the interview process in the room, Detective's Melfi and Rosa informed Mr. Jordan that he was free to talk to them and to terminate the interview at any time and Mr. Jordan proceeded on October 15th to make some statements which the police — or which the State, excuse me, now wish to use in evidence against him. On a subsequent occasion, and that is October 15th of 2004 when Mr. Jordan was still in the Osborn Correctional Facility, Detective Rosa saw him again and essentially asked him to sign a waiver for certain medical information and Mr. Jordan declined to sign it. And the State wishes to introduce evidence as to that announcement that he would decline to sign the form. So those are the facts presented by the evidence.
The Court's legal analysis is as follows:
The Supreme Court of the United States has not been entirely clear as to the circumstances under which in a correctional facility Miranda warnings should be given. An early decision in United States v. Mathas indicated that essentially they should always be given. Subsequent cases, such as Perkins v. Illinois, indicate that there are exceptions. Lower courts have been united in the proposition that there is no bright line test in this area. That instead it's a case-by-case determination. And in Connecticut that law is established by State v. Ledbetter, in 41 Conn.App. 391, a 1996 case. It was affirmed under Brown, 241 Connecticut 247. That's a 1997 case. Quoting from 41 Conn.App. at 397, a number of circuits have concluded that the fact of incarceration does not in itself make the prisoner's statement involuntary. Quoting from page 398. The question is whether there's something in the circumstances that suggest a measure of compulsion above and beyond that confinement. And it seems to the Court that, in brief, that is the factual or, excuse me, that is the legal analysis that should be used in this case, whether there was a measure of compulsion above and beyond that of the confinement in the correctional institution itself. Nothing in life is simple, however, and the problem in this case is that there is no evidence on the circumstances in which Defendant's exhibit A, the voluntary interview statement, came to be signed and, indeed, about the circumstance under which the defendant came to be in that room. One can imagine any of a spectrum of possibilities from the defendant's willing and indeed enthusiastic entry into the room to circumstances involving real compulsion by the correctional officers. And, of course, the fact of life is in any correctional facility inmates are subject to the direction of the correctional authorities. And I suppose the immediate question before the Court is what inference should or should not be drawn from this unhappy factual or evidentiary vacuum. The Court has studied this question as thoroughly as it can and taken in to account the excellent briefs submitted by the State. And it's found most helpful the analysis of New York Court of Appeals in the case of People v. Alls, spelled A-L-L-S, 629 Northeast 2nd at page 1018. New York Court of Appeals 1993 cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1090. That's in 1994. Alls says on page 1022 of 629 Northeast 2nd that at the hearing the circumstances under which the correctional officers take the defendant to the interview room for his questioning should be fully explored, particularly in light of prison regulations which, I assume, are similar in Connecticut and New York, require an inmate to comply with the directions of a correctional officer relating to movement within the facility or face severe disciplinary sanctions. The Court then addresses the question of burden of proof on this particular subissue. Says the People could only have dispelled the inference of the defendant's compulsion to accompany the correctional officer by evidence the defendant was actually offered a choice. And that is, unfortunately, our situation, that the defendant has proven that no Miranda warnings were given. The Court — this is under circumstances in which the Court is convinced that the defendant was a suspect. There is — the police, obviously, knew he had operated the motorcycle in the matter. This wasn't a case of who done it. The question was under what circumstances had the event happened and they went far out of their way to go up to Osborn to talk to him about it. And as I said, the defendant has proven that there was no Miranda warnings given. And then it is also, of course, clear that he was in a correctional facility. So the question is did the State or has the State dispelled the inference of his compulsion to accompany the correctional officers to this interview room by evidence that he was actually offered a choice. And in the absence of any evidence as to how this voluntary interview statement produced, as I said, some period of time long after the interview, how it came to be signed, how the defendant — the whole correctional context in which the defendant got there to the interview room, the Court cannot find that the law has been complied with. I believe that that is sufficient for the Court's decision. But I want to end on a more general policy note. Miranda warnings are important not just to criminal defendants, but to the State itself. And this Court is convinced that Miranda has been retained over the last forty plus years not just because it is on occasion of assistance to criminal defendants, but also because it's of considerable assistance to the State, as I believe the United States Supreme Court notes in Edwards v. Arizona. It provides a type of bright line test and, frankly, if the Miranda warning is given, which is quite easy to do, most constitutional problems are sufficiently addressed and why the very experienced state police detectives in this case who were obviously investigating potentially criminal events involving a fatality did not give Miranda warnings in this particular context is just beyond the Court. And this is because it would have been very easy to do and it would have solved all sorts of problems. And on this philosophical level I think it's important I again turn to People v. Alls, which I found very helpful. On page 1020 on 629 Northeast the New York Court of Appeals says that Miranda warnings are in many circumstances not required because they would seriously undermine other important social values. Many cases in correctional institutions it's very clear Miranda warnings are not required. A correctional officer addressing some incident that has taken place in the institution has plenty of other things to do besides give a Miranda warning and if a correctional officer had to give Miranda warnings every time he investigated some contraband, say, in an inmate's cell, the correctional system would be seriously impeded. But this is different. This is an investigation of an alleged crime that occurred outside the correctional institution some months ago, some month previously. The investigatory process here was quite deliberate. That is that two experienced state troopers or state police detectives were sent up to the Osborn Correctional Facility on a fairly long trip to specifically interview the defendant and in circumstances in which he was clearly a suspect and, with respect, was on both occasions clearly interrogation. That is, I believe in each case the police were asking questions or making statements likely, in an objective view, to elicit an incriminating response and they didn't give Miranda warnings as required. A Miranda warning in this case would not at all undermine other important social values. In fact, it would assist the police, criminal defendants, and society in general in the important social value of assuring that constitutional rights are afforded to all individuals by requiring the Miranda warning. In this particular context I want to emphasize I'm not emphasizing there should be a bright line rule, but in this particular context the Court feels very confident in saying that important social values were hindered rather than advanced by the lack of Miranda warnings in this case. So using what I believe is the correct legal standard under Ledbetter, that is whether there's something in the circumstance that suggest a measure of compulsion above and beyond that of confinement itself, and using both the particular factual analysis People v. Alls and the overarching constitutional concern also expressed in State v. Alls, this Court is persuaded that the motion to suppress as to the defendant's statement of October 6th and October 15th, 2004 must be granted and it is so ordered. I will just hasten to add that I believe there is an entirely separate witness who also will obtain the allegedly incriminating or incriminating statements or statements that the State wishes to use in the course of some other subsequent encounter. The Court has not heard that particular matter. Of course, will address that when the time comes.
CERTIFICATION
I, Renas Mattei, a certified court reporter for the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription to the best of my ability of the stenographic notes taken by me in the above-entitled case.