This court has recently had occasion to consider the constitutionality of HRS § 771-1, albeit in another context. In State v. Jordan, 53 Haw. 634, 636, 500 P.2d 560, 563 (1972), this court adopted the analysis of Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704, 709 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd sub. nom., Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277 (1970), which construed a remarkably similar provision of Massachusetts statutory law. In Hurley v. Hinckley, supra, and State v. Jordan, supra, defendants were convicted of criminal trespass after failure to depart from the premises "of another" after having been given oral notice to do so.
(In fact, this is apparently what cross-defendant Mr. George had in mind in his letter of April 25, 1980.) In any event, "`[t]he State acting through an agency thereof is readily distinguished from any particular member of the general public,'" ( State v. Jordan (1972) 53 Haw. 634 [ 500 P.2d 560, 563], quoting from Hurley v. Hinckley (D.Mass. 1969) 304 F. Supp. 704, 709, affirmed, 396 U.S. 277 [24 L.Ed.2d 469, 90 S.Ct. 603]) and therefore it would not be just to excuse what was otherwise a trespass based upon an easement owned by the County of Fresno. Cross-defendants' reference to Streets and Highways Code section 8306, which deals with the vacation of public street, highway and service easements, is totally inapposite to the present discussion.
People v. Johnson, 6 N.Y.2d 549, 552, 161 N.E.2d 9, 10 (1959). See also State v. Jordan, 53 Haw. 634, 500 P.2d 560 (1972). Thus, we are of the opinion that HRS § 727-24 cannot be deemed unconstitutionally overbroad and for that reason both the defendant's arrest and the search incident thereto are valid.