Opinion
No. CR06-355760-S
December 19, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
For the reasons set forth below the Court denies the Defendant's Motions to Dismiss.
The Court has reviewed the defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed November 28, 2007, the Motion to Dismiss accompanied by a Memorandum of Law filed November 29, 2007 and an Amended Motion to Dismiss accompanied by transcripts of the defendant's plea canvass filed on December 4, 2007. The Court ruled orally as to the first two motions on November 29, 2007 prior to the commencement of trial. The following represents the corresponding Memorandum of Decision and addresses the third motion to dismiss as well. Although the Motions to Dismiss are entitled as such, the defendant failed to specify any Practice Book authority or other grounds upon which the court has authority to entertain or grant said motions. The defendant claims that the failure of the Court to advise him of his obligations to register as a sexual offender at the time of plea or at time of sentencing implicates "Profound due process rights, both procedural and substantive, come into play, implicating [T]he [sic] heart of the Criminal Justice System", he offers no analysis or specific claims of constitutional violations but relies on Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160 (2003). In support of his motions the defendant also cites Connecticut General Statute Section 54-252 claiming that the registration requirements must be made clear to the defendant at time of plea.
The sole issue before the court is whether the failure to canvass and advise the defendant as to his requirements to register as a sex offender is grounds for a dismissal of the charge.
Factual Findings
On November 6, 1995, the defendant entered guilty pleas under the Alford Doctrine to the crimes of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-71(a)(1) and risk of injury in violation of C.G.S. § 53-21. (T. 11/6/95, p. 1.) On March 8, 1996, the defendant was sentenced to six years suspended after three years and placed on probation for three years. Conditions of his probation included: psychological evaluation and/or treatment which would include sex offender treatment with CATSO or affiliated agency; no contact with any of the victims; and not to reside in the household with female children under the age of eighteen, no unsupervised contact with minors. (T. 3/8/96, pp. 10, 11.) The defendant served his sentence and was released from the Department of Corrections on March 27, 1998. The defendant concedes that as the defendant was subject to C.G.S. Section 54-102r, a predecessor to the current statutory provisions which provided in pertinent part:
(b) Whenever a person who has been convicted of sexual assault . . . is to be released from a correctional facility in this state . . . by the Department of Correction . . .
he shall comply with registry requirements. "Sexual assault" is defined as a violation of Connecticut General Statute Section 53a-71, of which the defendant was convicted. The statutory language at that time did not require a defendant to be advised or canvassed concerning the defendant's obligations to register as a sex offender.
The Court notes that the defendant is charged with omissions that occurred in November and December of 2002 and subject to Connecticut General Statute Section 54-252 as set forth in the amended substitute information.
A finding of probable cause was previously made by a judicial officer on March 6, 2006 charging the defendant with violation of 54-251. The Substitute Information filed by the State at time of trial alleged violation of Connecticut General Statutes 54-251 et seq. The court granted the state's motion to amend the information to reflect more specifically a violation of C.G.S. Section 54-252.
The language of C.G.S. Section 54-252(b) is plain and unambiguous. It provides:
Any person who has been subject to the registration requirements of section 54-102r of the general statutes, revised to January 1, 1997, as amended by section 1 of Public Act 97-183 shall, not later than three working days after October 1, 1998 register under this section and thereafter comply with the provisions of section 54-102q and 54-250 to 54-259 inclusive.
Accordingly, the Court finds the defendant was subject to the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes Section 54-252 in November and December of 2002.
Legal Basis for Denial CT Page 21812
The Court first finds that the defendant has failed to allege sufficient grounds for the court to grant a dismissal under Practice Book Section 41-8. Further, there is ample precedent that the effects of Megan's Law and its progeny are collateral effects of pleading guilty and are not punitive in nature. In State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 90-94, 770 A.2d 908 (2001) the Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded "that the registration requirements of Megan's Law, rather than being part of a criminal judgment of conviction is, instead a separate regulatory incident of that judgment." Further, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in State v. Waterman, 264 Conn. 484, 825 A.2d 63 (2003) rejected the defendant's claims of due process violations predicated on the punitive characterization of the registry requirements.The Court further relies on Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn.App. 654, 789 A.2d 502, cert denied 260 Conn. 912, 796 A.2d 558 (2002) wherein the defendant's guilty plea was not rendered involuntary due to the enactment of Megan's Law and the failure to canvass as to the possible requirements.
Accordingly, the defendant's Motions To Dismiss are hereby denied.