[1–5] The trial court’s order carries a presumption of correctness. See State v. Jones, 203 So. 3d 972, 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). We construe the evidence and reasonable inferences in a light "most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling."

To pat down an individual detained following a noncriminal traffic infraction, the officer must possess some information indicating that the detainee poses a threat to the officer's safety or to the safety of others. Compare State v. Jones, 203 So. 3d 972, 973–74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that neither the body position of Mr. Jones nor his effort to retrieve his identification from his bookbag created a reasonable suspicion that he possessed a weapon or "otherwise posed a reasonable concern for officer safety"), with Cole v. State, 190 So. 3d 185, 187, 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (concluding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to believe a driver posed a threat to the officer's safety where he "was sweating, bouncing his legs up and down, and looked afraid" and was tightly gripping a pen with his fists clenched), June v. State, 131 So. 3d 2, 7–8 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that the officer reasonably suspected that the bicyclist was "armed and potentially dangerous" where he acted nervous after admitting to having a pocketknife, and he continuously reached for the pocket containing that knife), and State v. Louis, 571 So. 2d 1358, 1358–59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (noting that the officer reasonably feared for his safety where the driver walked around the vehicle e

"A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness; we must interpret the evidence and draw reasonable inferences and deductions in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling." State v. Jones, 203 So. 3d 972, 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). With this caveat in mind, we conclude that M.B.W. had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room sufficient to confer standing, irrespective of who paid the bill.