Opinion
2012 KA 0613
12-21-2012
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ANTONIUS LONDRE JONES
Hillar Moore, DA Dale R. Lee Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee State of Louisiana Lieu T. Vo Clark Slidell, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Antonius Londre Jones
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 06-10-0568, SEC. 5, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
STATE OF LOUISIANA
HONORABLE LOUIS R. DANIEL, JUDGE
Hillar Moore, DA
Dale R. Lee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
State of Louisiana
Lieu T. Vo Clark
Slidell, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Antonius Londre Jones
BEFORE: KUHN, PETTIGREW, AND McDONALD, JJ.
Disposition: CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
KUHN, J.
Defendant, Antonius Londre Jones, was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one); one count of armed robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64 (count two); and one count of illegal possession of stolen firearms, a violation of La. R.S. 14:69.1 (count three). He pled not guilty. The State later dismissed the charge on count three and proceeded to trial on counts one and two. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged on counts one and two. The trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal. On count one, defendant was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On count two, defendant was sentenced to sixty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently. Defendant now appeals, alleging that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and, therefore, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal. We affirm.
FACTS
Around 1:20 a.m. on May 3, 2010, Nashwa Hamed, Alonzo Howard, and Laci Kloss were working their shift at the Waffle House on Sherwood Forest Blvd. in Baton Rouge. Also present at the time was one customer, David Demersseman, who was stopping in Baton Rouge on business on the way to see family in Kansas. Demersseman was at the Waffle House to eat and to charge his laptop. Shortly after 1:20 a.m., a black male entered the Waffle House wearing a large white t- shirt, dark jeans, a dark-colored bandana over his face, and what appeared to witnesses to be socks on his hands. He ran into the restaurant carrying a gray and black semiautomatic pistol and ordered everyone to get on the ground. When the perpetrator shifted his attention in the direction of Hamed and Demersseman, Howard and Kloss took the opportunity to run out of the back door of the restaurant to a nearby fast food establishment, where they called 911. The perpetrator approached Demersseman and ordered him to take out his wallet. Demersseman initially appeared to comply, but he then lunged at the perpetrator in an attempt to take his gun. During the brief ensuing struggle, Demersseman was shot one time, and he died from his wound. The perpetrator then went to the restaurant's cash register and removed some money before fleeing the scene.
When the perpetrator exited the Waffle House through its front door, Hamed immediately began to run from the restaurant out of its back door. As she was running from the restaurant, she observed the perpetrator enter a white foreign vehicle, which had been parked across the street from the Waffle House by a nearby Red Roof Inn. The next day, Detective Phillip Chapman of the Baton Rouge Police Department ("BRPD") pulled surveillance videos from area businesses and developed a description of the suspect vehicle. That vehicle was described in flyers distributed to patrol officers as a white Mitsubishi Eclipse with either a tan or gray top, and a dark-colored, possibly black, hood.
Shortly after midnight on May 4, 2010, BRPD Officer Paul Brown was driving in his marked unit when he spotted the suspect vehicle from the flyer near the intersection of Interstate 110 and Harding Boulevard. He followed the vehicle until it pulled into the driveway of a residence on Godchaux Street. When backup officers arrived, they assisted Officer Brown in detaining the occupants of the vehicle and transporting them to BRPD headquarters for questioning. Defendant was one of the occupants of the vehicle, along with Ikey Washington and Larry Sterling.
In the first search of the suspect vehicle, investigators seized clothing, including socks, a bandana, and some loose currency. In a second search, which was conducted after detectives had received information about a hidden compartment in the vehicle, investigators discovered two handguns - a Glock .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun and a Taurus Millennium semiautomatic handgun. The Taurus Millennium was later positively identified by Jeff Goudeau, the firearms supervisor of the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab, as the weapon used in the shooting of Demersseman.
During an interrogation performed by Detective John Norwood, defendant admitted to taking part in the Waffle House robbery and the murder of Demersseman. However, at trial, defendant testified that he had only been near the Red Roof Inn and Waffle House area around 11:00 p.m. on May 2, 2010, to try to meet up with a girl. He further testified that he only made an inculpatory statement to the police because he was under the influence of ecstasy, Xanax, marijuana, and codeine at the time, and he was scared that he was going to receive the death penalty. Defendant stated at trial that he knew the details of the incident so well because he had heard about it on the news and because the detectives had told him everything.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In his only two assignments of error, defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for second degree murder and armed robbery and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal. Specifically, defendant claims that there was no physical or scientific evidence presented at trial to link him to the shooting and robbery, and also that his confession was given while under the influence of drugs and made out of fear.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates due process. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; La. Const, art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that in order to convict the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144. Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. It is the fact finder who weighs the respective credibility of each witness, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Hughes, 2005-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051; State v. Davis, 2001-3033 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 161, 163-64.
In this case, defendant does not dispute that the offenses of second degree murder or armed robbery were committed, so we need not discuss whether the elements of those offenses were sufficiently proved at trial. Instead, we consider only whether the State carried its burden in proving that defendant was the perpetrator of the second degree murder and armed robbery.
In his statement to Detective Norwood, defendant admitted to committing the second degree murder and armed robbery. He gave details about having to cross the street to enter the Waffle House, about which hand he held his gun in, and about dropping some money from the register onto the ground. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this inculpatory statement would clearly demonstrate defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Besides defendant's confession, the State introduced testimony from Hamed, Howard, and Kloss, the Waffle House employees at the time of the murder and robbery. Despite the bandana covering the perpetrator's face, all three described the perpetrator as a short, black male - approximately 5'3" or 5'4" - who appeared to be in his late teens or early twenties. Howard further described the perpetrator as having a dark complexion. All of these characteristics were consistent with defendant's appearance. Further, Hamed's description of the getaway vehicle was consistent with that of the suspect vehicle in which defendant was eventually found. Finally, upon his detainment, defendant was located in the same vehicle as the gun determined to be used in the murder of Demersseman.
At trial, defendant attempted to recant his previous confession through his testimony. He stated that he only confessed because he was under the influence of several drugs and because he was scared of receiving the death penalty. He explained that he was only aware of specific details of the offense because the interrogating detectives had shown him surveillance footage and spoke in depth to him about the crime. Defendant also said that he had watched news reports and read a newspaper article about the offense.
When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984). Based on the physical evidence, eyewitness testimony, and defendant's own confession, the jury's verdicts reflected the reasonable conclusion that defendant shot and killed Demersseman and robbed the Waffle House. Further, the jury clearly rejected defendant's testimony that neither he nor the suspect vehicle were near the Waffle House at the time of the shooting. On appeal, the reviewing court does not determine whether another possible hypothesis suggested by a defendant could afford an exculpatory explanation of the events. State v. Mitchell, 99-3342 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83. See State v. Juluke, 98-0341 (La. 1/8/99), 725 So.2d 1291, 1293 (per curiam).
We note as well that a finding of purposeful misrepresentation reasonably raises the inference of a "guilty mind," as in the case of material misrepresentation of facts provided by the defendant following an offense. Lying has been recognized as indicative of an awareness of wrongdoing. See Captville, 448 So.2d at 680 n.4. The evidence at trial indicated that defendant lied about the suspect vehicle not being in the area of the Waffle House at the time of the offenses. At trial, he testified that the suspect vehicle had broken down and been left at a gas station shortly after 11:00 p.m. on May 2, 2010, but time stamps from surveillance videos placed the suspect vehicle in the area of the Waffle House when the murder and robbery took place.
In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See Ordodi, 946 So.2d at 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam).
DECREE
For these reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences imposed against defendant, Antonius Jones.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.