Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 17-0740
04-30-2019
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. VICTOR ZHAQUIS JONES, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Jennifer L. Holder Counsel for Appellee Bain & Lauritano, Glendale By Amy E. Bain Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR 2013-435224-001
The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Jennifer L. Holder
Counsel for Appellee
Bain & Lauritano, Glendale
By Amy E. Bain
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
BROWN, Judge:
¶1 Victor Jones appeals his convictions and sentences for kidnapping, two counts of sexual conduct with a minor, and first-degree burglary. He argues the superior court erred by allowing testimony that mentioned he was held in jail before trial, which he contends caused him unfair prejudice and deprived him of due process. Because the court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The State filed criminal charges against Jones after he broke into a house in his neighborhood, used a gun to force the victim to accompany him to the backyard of a nearby vacant house, and forced her to engage in sexual conduct. While Jones was in jail awaiting trial, jail personnel intercepted letters and postcards he wrote to family and friends. The correspondence described in some detail the circumstances surrounding the assault supporting Jones's defense to the charges and instructed recipients of the letters to memorize the contents in preparation for their trial testimony.
¶3 At trial, the State briefly referenced the correspondence in its opening statement, explaining to the jury it would learn that Jones had written letters to potential witnesses, instructing them what to say when they testified. Before the State called the jail employee who intercepted the letters to testify, Jones objected to the State referencing that he had been in jail, suggesting it should be up to the defense to decide whether that information should be revealed. After discussion with counsel, the superior court ruled that the State would be able to lay a foundation as to how and where the jail employee obtained the letters, but that no other mention of Jones's custody status would be permitted. The court reasoned that allowing such testimony would not alert the jury that Jones "is in custody now," but would be merely a "piece of evidence in the case in terms of an admission."
¶4 The jury found Jones guilty and the superior court sentenced him to presumptive terms for each count. Jones timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶5 Jones argues evidence that he was in jail before trial was highly prejudicial under Arizona Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 403 because it "undermined the fairness of the fact-finding process." He also asserts that although the letters were relevant to show a "consciousness of guilt," prejudice from evidence that they were written from jail outweighed their probative value.
¶6 We review the superior court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion but review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Smith, 215 Ariz. 221, 228, ¶ 20 (2007). We view "the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect." State v. Castro, 163 Ariz. 465, 473 (App. 1989) (quoting United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983)).
¶7 Admissible evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice." Ariz. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice may exist "if the evidence has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, such as emotion, sympathy, or horror." State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 545 (1997). Before proceeding to a Rule 403 analysis, the court must determine if the evidence is "relevant to prove a proper purpose." See State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, 563, ¶ 32 (App. 2007). The superior court is "in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice." State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 28, 33, ¶ 21 (App. 1998).
¶8 We disagree with Jones's assertion that the superior court did not properly determine whether the probative value of the evidence was outweighed substantially by the danger of unfair prejudice. At trial, Jones asserted that if his jail status was to be mentioned to the jury, he should be the one to present that information instead of the State. The court responded that the State needed the information admitted "to lay the foundation as to where they got the letter from" and that mentioning Jones's jail status "complet[ed] the story" for the jury. The court also noted that defense counsel seemed more concerned about "trial strategy" than prejudice in objecting to the State's reference that Jones wrote the letters while in jail. Defense counsel did not request any further explanation from the court; thus, we presume that the court implicitly found the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect of mentioning how the letters were
discovered. See State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 337, ¶ 15 (App. 2003) (explaining that explicit Rule 403 findings are not required "when it is clear the necessary factors were argued, considered, and balanced by the trial court as part of its ruling"). On this record, the court acted within its discretion in allowing jail personnel to testify that Jones was in custody at the time they intercepted the correspondence.
¶9 Jones also asserts he was denied due process because the evidence that he was in jail before trial created a risk that the jury would improperly consider his custody status in deciding whether he was guilty. Jones argues that allowing the jury to hear that his letters were intercepted while he was in custody is equivalent to compelling him to stand trial before the jury in jail clothing, thus denying him a fundamental right.
¶10 The government cannot compel an accused to appear at trial before a jury in jail clothing. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976). The rationale behind this rule is that compelling a defendant to wear jail clothing at trial could impair the fundamental presumption that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Id. at 504. The Supreme Court explained in Estelle that a defendant's jail clothing would be a constant reminder to the jury that the defendant is in custody, thereby undercutting the presumption of innocence. Id. at 504-05.
¶11 We reject Jones's argument that mention of his jail status was equivalent to him standing trial in jail clothing. At issue are two brief references from a jail employee who lawfully intercepted letters Jones wrote while in the county jail awaiting trial. Jones fails to cite any authority that allowing the jury to hear that a defendant was in jail at one time before trial, for the purpose of laying the foundation required to allow admission of relevant evidence, is tantamount to forcing him to wear jail clothing throughout his trial. Evidence showing a defendant has been in custody at some point before trial does not implicate the same concerns as forcing a defendant to wear jail clothing at trial because such evidence is not a "constant reminder of the accused's condition." See id. at 504. Furthermore, courts have reasoned that a jury is "certainly" aware that defendants spend some time in custody prior to trial and that knowledge is not prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 35 (1995).
¶12 The superior court did not err in refusing to exclude the State's reference to Jones having written the intercepted letters when he was in jail. The jury was aware that Jones was arrested and thus reasonably understood that he spent at least some amount of time in custody prior to trial. We therefore conclude that no violation of due process occurred.
CONCLUSION
¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jones's convictions and sentences.