The district court implicitly weighed the credibility of this evidence and found that burglaries were likely to occur in the evening, not at the time of morning when this incident occurred. See State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 348-49 (Minn.App. 2008) (recognizing that "the district court made an implicit credibility finding"), aff'd, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009). "Deference must be given to the district court's credibility determinations."

"[C]ircumstantial guarantees of [a statement's] trustworthiness" include whether questions were non-suggestive, whether the content was recorded, whether the declarant had a motive to lie, and whether the statement was based on the declarant's personal knowledge. See State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 352-53 (Minn. App. 2008), aff'd, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009).

It is waiver by conduct.'" State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 350 (Minn.App. 2008). We will only over-turn a "finding of a valid waiver of a defendant's right to counsel if that finding is clearly erroneous."

The district court implicitly credited this statement by the deputy. See State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 348-49 (Minn.App. 2008) (recognizing that "the district court made an implicit credibility finding"), aff'd, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009). More specifically, in determining that Deputy B.G. acted reasonably by conducting a protective search of Dahlin's vehicle, the district court adopted "all of the facts recited by" the state in its brief opposing Dahlin's motion, including that the deputy planned to return Dahlin to the vehicle.

But "an exception exists when a criminal defendant makes the issue of witness credibility a central focus of his case." State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 353 (Minn. App. 2008), aff'd, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009); see also State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 233-34 (Minn. 2005) (stating that in some cases, the state may question a witness about whether evidence is wrong); State v. Leutschaft, 759 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. App. 2009) (stating that district courts "should allow 'were they lying' questions only when the defense expressly or by unmistakable insinuation accuses a witness of a falsehood"), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2009). In Morton, the supreme court clarified that simply asking a witness if the information is "wrong" does not comment on whether the source of information "intended to perpetuate a falsehood."

However, "an exception exists when a criminal defendant makes the issue of witness credibility a central focus of his case." State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 353 (Minn. App. 2008), aff'd, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009).

-------- Appellant argues that the district court erred by not appointing him standby counsel, but "[t]here is no state or federal constitutional right to standby counsel," State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 351 (Minn. App. 2008), and there is no such requirement in the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rules expressly leave it to the district court's discretion whether to appoint standby counsel. Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). Under the facts and circumstances of appellant's case, we conclude that the district court did not err in upholding appellant's waiver of counsel as knowing and intelligent.

Moreover, the district court's later jury instruction prevented any improper speculation by the jury. See State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 352 (Minn.App.2008) (noting the presumption under Minnesota law that the jury follows the district court's instructions), aff'd, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn.2009). Accordingly, we conclude that the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and Banks is not entitled to relief on this ground.

Had Machacek testified that he is a peaceful or nonviolent man, the prosecutor properly could have rebutted that testimony using specific instances of conduct—including the 1997 assault conviction—to show the contrary character trait of a tendency toward aggression or violence. See State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 353 (Minn. App. 2008) (concluding that "it was proper for the state to rebut . . . evidence [of defendant's nonthreatening character] with . . . testimony concerning" defendant's "prior criminal acts, including an order for protection filed against him and a prior assault conviction"), aff'd, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009). But Machacek did not testify about his character; instead, he testified about the particulars of his suicidal ideation "[a] couple days" before the crash.

Although D.P.'s statements were not against his penal interests, his statements were made against the interest of his safety and his fear of being labeled a "snitch." See State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 353 (Minn. App. 2008), aff'd, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009) (holding that "statements do not have to be directly against [that person's] own penal interests").