Opinion
Cr.A. No. IN97-05-1762R2, IN97-05-1763R2 ID# 9705011087
Date Submitted: August 5, 2002
Date Decided: August 30, 2002
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief: DENIED.
ORDER
Upon review of Movant Phillip Jones III ("Movant")'s Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court:
1. On July 8, 1997, Movant pled guilty to Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substance and Conspiracy Second Degree. The Rule 11(e)(1)(c) plea agreement provided that the State would recommend five years at Level V, suspended after three years for Level III, and include substance abuse evaluation and treatment while in custody. The Court sentenced Movant to five years Level V. After successful completion of the Key Program, this sentence was suspended for two years at Level III. Movant did not appeal his sentences to the Delaware Supreme Court, but he did appeal to the Supreme Court from a Superior Court order denying his motion for correction of sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). The Superior Court's judgment was affirmed.
2. Movant filed a Rule 61 motion on March 28, 2000, asserting two grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The first contention was that the Court violated the plea agreement because the drug treatment was not part of the plea offer, and his counsel should have objected to this violation of the plea agreement. Second contention was that his counsel failed to advise him of his right to appeal his sentence. On September 19, 2000, the Superior Court denied the Defendant's Rule 61 motion, concluding that Movant's claims for postconviction relief lacked merit. This Superior Court decision was later affirmed by the Supreme Court.
3. Defendant filed his second motion for postconviction relief, which was essentially the same as the first motion filed by the Defendant on March 28, 2000, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of jurisdiction. On October 22, 2001, the Superior Court denied the Defendant's second Rule 61 motion, and this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court on March 15, 2002.
4. Defendant filed his third postconviction relief motion on July 17, 2002.
5. Under Delaware law, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of the postconviction relief claim. Under Rule 61(i), claims for relief must be brought within three (3) years of the conviction becoming final. Any ground for relief not asserted in a prior postconviction motion is thereafter barred unless consideration of the claim is necessary in the interest of justice. Similarly, grounds for relief not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction are thereafter barred, unless the movant demonstrates: (1) cause for the procedural default, and (2) prejudice from the violation of the movant's rights. Additionally, any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in a proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, or in a postconviction proceeding, is thereafter barred.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990); (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 225 (1989)).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
6. Here, the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(1) is applicable because the original conviction became final more than three years ago, in November 1997, thirty days after sentencing. Also, Defendant previously filed motions for postconviction relief on March 28, 2000 and September 10, 2001. Therefore, the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(2) is applicable as to any ground for relief not asserted by Defendant in the earlier motions for postconviction relief, and any ground for relief that was asserted in those motions is barred by Rule 61(i)(4).
7. Defendant's motion for postconviction relief must be denied as it is procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1), and (2). To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court will not consider the merits of the postconviction claims where a procedural bar exists.
State v. Gattis, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN90-05-1017, Barron, J. (Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d. At 554; Saunders v. State, Del. Supr., No. 185, 1994, Walsh, J. (Jan. 13, 1995) (ORDER); Hicks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 417, 1991, Walsh, J. (May 5, 1992) (ORDER)).
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.