Opinion
ID 0012003111, ID 0104000110, ID 9709019709, ID 0006001556, ID 9802005456,
April 15, 2004.
Upon Defendants' Motions for Modification of Sentence, DENIED.
Timothy H. Barron, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Wilmington, DE 19801.
Andrew J. Vella, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, DE 19801.
Dear Counsel:
These cases concern House Bill 210, which was enacted and took effect on June 30, 2003. Specifically, each defendant requests sentence modification, claiming that H.B. 210's sentences supersede the harsher sentences they are serving. All five defendants committed their crimes and were sentenced, however, before H.B. 210's enactment. The issue has been addressed in State v. Ismaaeel, which holds that H.B. 210 does not alter previously imposed sentences.
H.B. 210, 142nd General Assembly (Del. 2003).
840 A.2d 644 (Del.Super.Ct. 2004).
Although the cases are not consolidated, four of them involve the same offense as in Ismaaeel, 16 Del. C. § 4753A. And they are all governed by Ismaaeel. Consequently, none of the defendants is entitled to sentence modification. Only Seeney involves a different statute, 16 Del. C. § 4751. Section 4751, however, is functionally equivalent to § 4753A. And so, Ismaaeel's reasoning also controls Seeney. Ismaaeel makes clear that "H.B. 210 applies only to offenses that are committed after June 30, 2003." A specific savings clause is not mentioned in H.B. 210, but the General Assembly did not expressly provide that H.B. 210 is retroactive. So, the Delaware general savings statute, 11 Del. C. § 211(b), applies to these cases. Under § 211(b), the laws establishing defendants' sentences "remain in full force and effect" and the sentences are unaffected by H.B. 210.
Id. at 651.
This conclusion makes both legal and common sense. Courts do not favor applying legislation retroactively, especially absent clear and express language that the legislature intended that. Although it begs the question somewhat, the court observes that with the exception of Stewart, these cases were resolved by plea agreements. Both the State and defendants negotiated their plea agreements with the then existing sentence scheme in mind. Presumably, the State made concessions based, in part, on the law it assumed would control. Essentially, "[j]ust as the State will not surprise a defendant with greater punishment in an ex post facto fashion, neither should a defendant feign surprise about the penalties that accompanied his conduct at the time of offense." But again, the decision here turns entirely on Ismaaeel and stare decisis.
Id. at 654 (quoting State v. Nixon, 46 A.2d 874, 875 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1946)).
Ismaaeel, 840 A.2d at 655.
See Account v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 780 A.2d 245, 248 (Del. 2001) (quoting State v. Phillips, 400 A.2d 299, 308 (Del.Ch. 1979)) ( stare decisis applies where there is a judicial opinion on a point of law, expressed in a final decision).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' modification of sentence requests are DENIED.