Calik, 195 Ariz. at 499 n. 1, ¶ 12, 990 P.2d at 1058 n. 1. Subsection (E) provides that probation violations must be addressed through additional conditions and sanctions "short of incarceration." See State v. Jones, 196 Ariz. 306, 307, ¶ 7, 995 P.2d 742, 743 (App. 1999) (holding that first- or second-time offenders on probation under Proposition 200 could not be sentenced to prison after violating intensive probation); see also State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314, ¶ 7, 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App. 1999) (indicating that the language of subsection (E) is "clear and unequivocal"). ¶ 6 A panel of our colleagues in Division Two has similarly interpreted the former version of § 13-901.
01 to dispositions for violations of intensive probation. See State v. Jones, 196 Ariz. 306, 307, ¶ 7, 995 P.2d 742, 743 (App. 1999); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 315, ¶ 10, 996 P.2d 113, 116 (App. 1999). Neither case, however, was comparable to this one.
It instead gives boards the authority to supervise those who are "charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or disbursing the public revenues." See State v. Jones , 196 Ariz. 306, 307 ¶ 7, 995 P.2d 742, 743 (App. 1999) ("Every provision of a statute must be read in conjunction with the other provisions, giving meaning, if possible, to ‘each word, clause or sentence, considered in the light of the entire act itself and the purpose for which it was enacted into law.’ ") (quoting Frye v. S. Phoenix Volunteer Fire Co. , 71 Ariz. 163, 168, 224 P.2d 651 (1950) ); cf. Hounshell v. White , 220 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 21, 202 P.3d 466, 470 (App. 2008) (interpreting § 11-251(1) as granting the board authority to supervise county officers "in some limited circumstances").
However, "[e]very provision of a statute must be read in conjunction with the other provisions, giving meaning, if possible, ‘to each word, clause or sentence, considered in the light of the entire act itself and the purpose for which it was enacted into law.’ " State v. Jones , 196 Ariz. 306, 307, ¶ 7, 995 P.2d 742, 743 (App. 1999) (quoting Frye v. South Phoenix Volunteer Fire Co. , 71 Ariz. 163, 168, 224 P.2d 651, 654 (1950) ). In its entirety, A.R.S. § 8–117(A) provides:
See e.g.,Calik, 990 P.2d at 1056 ("In 1997, David Peter Calik pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine weighing less than nine grams, a class 4 felony."), State v. Jones, 196 Ariz. 306, 995 P.2d 742, 743 (Ariz.Ct.App.2000)("In 1998 Tyrus Jones pled guilty to possession of narcotic drugs, a class four felony, ...."); Goddard v. Superior Court, 191 Ariz. 402, 956 P.2d 529, 530 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998) ("On November 19, 1997, Petitioner Cicero Goddard pled guilty to possession of narcotic drugs, a class 4 felony."). Because possession of narcotic drugs was and is a felony under Arizona law, the district court did not err in granting a sixteen level enhancement.
But when read in context, this language does not grant plenary power to supervise county officers; it instead gives boards the authority to supervise those who are "charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or disbursing the public revenues." See State v. Jones, 196 Ariz. 306, 307 ¶ 7 (App. 1999) ("Every provision of a statute must be read in conjunction with the other provisions, giving meaning, if possible, to 'each word, clause or sentence, considered in the light of the entire act itself and the purpose for which it was enacted into law.'")
But when read in context, this language does not grant plenary power to supervise county officers; it instead gives the board authority to supervise those who are "charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or disbursing the public revenues." See State v. Jones, 196 Ariz. 306, 307 ¶ 7 (App. 1999) ("Every provision of a statute must be read in conjunction with the other provisions, giving meaning, if possible, to 'each word, clause or sentence, considered in the light of the entire act itself and the purpose for which it was enacted into law.'") (quoting Frye v. S. Phoenix Volunteer Fire Co., 71 Ariz. 163, 168 (1950)); cf. Hounshell v. White, 220 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 21 (App. 2008) (interpreting § 11-251(1) as granting the board authority to supervise county officers "in some limited circumstances"). Indeed, if § 11-251(1) conferred broad authority to supervise all county officer functions, the Legislature would have had no reason to enact other subsections of § 11-251 that authorize the board of supervisors to direct the prosecution and defense of all actions to which the county is a party, permit the sheriff to offer rewards, or direct the sheriff to transport insane persons to the state h
¶12 Our interpretation of § 13-1404(A) is supported by A.R.S. § 13-1410. See State v. Jones, 196 Ariz. 306, ¶ 7 (App. 1999) ("Every provision of a statute must be read in conjunction with the other provisions . . . ."). That statute provides, "A person commits molestation of a child by intentionally or knowingly engaging in or causing a person to engage in sexual contact, except sexual contact with the female breast, with a child who is under fifteen years of age."