Opinion
No. 2-968 / 02-0959
Filed January 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel, District Associate Judge.
Gary Jones appeals claiming the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant him a deferred judgment. SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Rod Reynolds, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Gary Jones appeals claiming the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant him a deferred judgment. We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Background Facts and Proceedings. On March 14, 2002, Jones was charged by trial information with the offense of operating while intoxicated, first offense. Jones, pursuant to a plea agreement, entered a plea of guilty to said charge. Under the terms of the agreement, the State would not make any recommendation at sentencing. The district court, however, was not bound by the terms of this agreement.
Jones, when arrested, had a blood-alcohol content of .109. He was fifty-six years of age and he had no prior criminal record. Although he was employed full-time prior to his arrest, he was only able to work part-time thereafter because of the loss of his driver's license.
The district court refused to grant Jones a deferred judgment. Instead, he was ordered to spend two days in the county jail and to pay a fine of $1000. He was further ordered to undergo a substance abuse evaluation and complete a course for drinking drivers. Jones appeals.
Abuse of Discretion. We will disturb a sentence only upon a showing the district court abused its discretion. State v. Garrow, 480 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1992). Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor, and an abuse of discretion will not be found unless the defendant shows such discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995).
In determining the proper sentence, the district court should weigh and consider all pertinent matters, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and propensities and chances of reform. State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (quoting State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979)). It is also equally essential that the sentencing judge apply those sentencing factors appropriately and not arbitrarily establish a fixed policy to govern every case, as that is the exact antithesis of discretion. State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973). The courts owe a duty to the public as much as to defendant in determining a proper sentence. Id. The punishment should fit both the crime and the individual. Id.
The district court in refusing to grant Jones a deferred judgment stated:
Mr. Jones, I think specially on charges of operating while intoxicated, that deferred judgments are appropriate if I am faced with a young, immature person who doesn't understand the effects of alcohol and doesn't understand the dangers of drinking and driving and it is pretty tough to make that determination about a person fifty-six years of age.
The statement made by the district court certainly expressed the notion that the court has a fixed policy of not granting deferred judgments on this charge to older defendants. The court's statement that deferred judgments are appropriate "for a young, immature person" could certainly be read to indicate the court has concluded deferred judgment are inappropriate for a person of the defendant's age. The effect of this perceived policy is to deprive Jones of one of the opportunities available in the law for resolution of his criminal act. While age is a legitimate factor for the district court to consider, age cannot be the sole factor the court considers when determining an appropriate sentence. See State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa 1979) (stating "each decision must be made on an individual basis, and no single factor, including the nature of the offense, will be solely determinative.").
We do note that the district court had several legitimate factors upon which to base its sentencing decision. However, the court appears to have impermissibly selected only one factor which triggered the court's perceived previously-fixed sentencing policy. See Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d at 396. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the district court to reconsider Jones's sentence allowing for the inclusion of a deferred judgment as one of the options for resolution available to Jones. We are not suggesting by this decision what the appropriate resolution for sentencing should be.