Opinion
ID Nos. 93004183DI, 9705017127, 9710000097.
Date Submitted: September 19, 2000.
Date Decided: January 4, 2001.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief: DENIED .
ORDER
This 4 day of January, 2001, upon consideration of Movant Antonio D. Jones' Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Rule 61 on a guilty plea entered on December 3, 1997.
2. In this motion, Defendant asserts that his plea agreement was "non agreeable" because the reimposed sentence was Level III rather than Level II; that he received an excessive sentence due to "an error; "and his counsel was ineffective and inadequate because public defenders do not pursue information for minorities from the intercity with a low income.
3. In reviewing motions for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether a defendant's claims are barred by procedural requirements prior to addressing the merits of the underlying claims. Under Rule 61(i), claims for relief must be brought within three (3) years of the conviction becoming final. Any ground for relief not asserted in a prior conviction motion is thereafter barred unless consideration of the claim is necessary in the interest of justice. Similarly, grounds for relief not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction are thereafter barred, unless the movant demonstrates: (1) cause for the procedural default, and (2) prejudice from the violation of the movant's rights. Additionally, any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in a proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, or in a postconviction proceeding, is thereafter barred.
Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del.Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
Del.Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(1).
Del.Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(2).
Del.Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(3).
Del.Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(4).
4. Here, Defendant previously filed a motion for postconviction relief that was summarily dismissed on May 26, 2000. Therefore, the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(2) is applicable as to any ground for relief not asserted by Defendant in the first motion for postconviction relief, and any ground for relief that was asserted in that motion is barred by Rule 61(i)(4).
5. Defendant's motion for postconviction relief must be denied as it is procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(2) and (4).
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.