Opinion
No. CR23-3996
June 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
The defendant, Carvaughn Johnson, was convicted on February 23, 2004 of murder and a weapons charge in connection with the shooting death of Markieth Strong on October 10, 2001.
The State's key witness was Ralph Ford who had given statements to the New Haven Police shortly after the shooting in which he implicated the defendant. At an earlier trial which resulted in a mistrial, Mr. Ford had testified in a manner consistent with the statements to the New Haven Police.
At the trial that resulted in the defendant's conviction, however, Mr. Ford recanted his prior statements and testimony and testified that such statements and testimony were not truthful. Since Mr. Ford was the only witness directly linking the defendant to the shooting, it is logical to conclude that the jury was called upon to determine whether Mr. Ford was being truthful either when he gave his prior testimony and statements, when he testified at this trial, or not at all.
The defendant has now moved for a new trial on the basis that the jury considered extrinsic evidence during their deliberations. The defendant claims that during the testimony of Ralph Ford, some or all of the jurors observed a number of individuals who were present in the audience section of the courtroom, on the defendant's side and that many jurors formed the opinion that those spectators were there to compel Mr. Ford to recant his earlier statements and testimony.
The defendant claims that consideration by the jury of the above circumstances would constitute consideration of "extrinsic evidence" which would be presumptively prejudicial to the defendant.
Pursuant to the dictates of State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502 (1995), the court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant's motion on May 6, 2004 and May 21, 2004. During the hearings held on those days, the court asked questions of each of the jurors which questions were essentially agreed upon by the attorneys for the parties as being reflective of the proper scope of the inquiry.
The only objection was by the State which objected to the court inquiring as to whether certain things were discussed at a tine other than during deliberations.
As a result of the above proceedings, the following information was obtained. During the testimony of Ralph Ford, each of the twelve jurors observed a number of individuals on the defendant's side of the courtroom. Six jurors testified that they drew no conclusions from the presence of those individuals. One juror concluded that they were there to watch Ralph Ford, a second wondered if they were family members of the defendant or Ralph Ford, a third believed that they were "people from the neighborhood," a fourth thought they were friends of the defendant, a fifth said he had no idea who they were but assumed that they were here for the defendant, and a sixth wondered why they were there for only that one day.
This juror stated that "it seemed they were altering the testimony of Ralph Ford."
This juror stated that "[M]aybe that Ralph Ford was afraid, intimidated."
All but two of the jurors questioned testified that the presence of those individuals was discussed during deliberations. One juror recalled no discussions and a second recalled such discussions but not when they took place. No juror testified that any such discussions took place at a time other than during deliberations.
The court also inquired of the jurors as to the extent of any such discussions. Two jurors stated that there was a lot of discussion, five jurors indicated that there was a little or minimal discussions and the rest stated that the extent of such discussions was in between a little and a lot.
One juror stated for example that the presence of the individuals was more than just mentioned, but not dwelled upon.
Some jurors either saw Mr. Ford during a recess or were aware that another juror or jurors may have seen him but those jurors testified that there was either no discussion concerning that subject matter or any discussion was minimal.
It is fair to conclude therefore that each of the jurors observed individuals seated in the courtroom on the defendant's side during the testimony of Ralph Ford, and some drew the conclusions noted above. There was some discussion of the presence of these individuals during deliberations, the extent of which is unclear.
As a threshold issue, the court is not at all convinced that the record as related above indicates jury misconduct. Certainly a jury is charged with the obligation to assess the credibility of witnesses based upon many factors including their demeanor and circumstances which might affect this credibility. The question becomes whether it is impermissible for a jury to evaluate the testimony of a witness as to credibility by considering factors such as demeanor, motive, bias, etc. but also the circumstances under which he testifies including whether he is facing a courtroom containing people who they reasonably may infer are somehow associated with the defendant.
This is not a situation where a juror or jurors went outside the evidence to do research, conduct an experiment or visit a crime scene, nor has there been any improper communication to or by any juror. The jurors in this case observed what was there to be seen during the testimony of Mr. Ford.
However, even if it were to be conceded for the sake of argument, that the jury engaged in "misconduct" by considering "extrinsic evidence," under the circumstances present, the court does not believe that the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Connecticut Practice Book § 42-33, "Impeachment of Verdict," provides as follows:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror nor any evidence concerning mental processes by which the verdict was determined. Subject to these limitations, a juror's testimony or affidavit shall be received when it concerns any misconduct which by law permits a jury to be impeached.
As was done in this case the court may inquire of the jurors as to the existence of a condition or a happening of an event but may not receive evidence of the actual effect of any such extraneous matter upon the juror's minds, as such implicates their mental processes. Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 551 (1975); Turk v. Silberstein, 48 Conn. App. 223, 228 (1998). In determining whether the "misconduct," as it is determined to be, affected the jury's deliberations, the court must "use an objective standard in which the focus is on the nature and quality of the misconduct, rather than the mental processes of the jurors." Speed v. DeLibero, 19 Conn. App. 95, 102 (1989).
Where "the trial court was in no way responsible for the juror misconduct . . . a defendant who offers proof of juror misconduct bears the burden of proving that actual prejudice resulted from that misconduct." State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 435-36 n. 19 (1984). The defendant has been prejudiced if the juror misconduct is such to make it probable that the juror's mind was influenced by it so as to render him unfair and prejudicial. State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588, 628 (1996).
It appears that the jurors did observe people in the courtroom a number whom associated those people with the defendant and the presence of these individuals was discussed during deliberations. What impact, if any, such events or circumstances had upon the ultimate outcome of this case has not, however, been removed from the realm of speculation.
The defendant's position is that the jury improperly considered the presence of those individuals in assessing the credibility of Ralph Ford. Whether they did so, and if they did, the impact thereof is pure speculation. It must be remembered that there were a number of instances where Ralph Ford's own testimony indicated that he was in fear of the defendant and/or his friends to the point where he moved from the neighborhood. (Testimony of Ralph Ford trans. pp. 103-04, pp. 179-80.)
The defendant has simply not sustained his burden of proving that he was prejudiced by any improper conduct on the part of the jury.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion for a new trial is denied.
Bruce W. Thompson, Judge