Opinion
Nos. 109,406 109,407 109,408 109,409 109,410 109,432 109,433 109,434 109,435 109,454 109,499 109,500 109,520 109,521 109,522 109,523 109,524.
2014-10-24
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Leo JOHNSON, et al., Appellants.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Eric A. Commer, Judge.Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, for appellants.Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Eric A. Commer, Judge.
Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, for appellants. Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., STEGALL, J., and HEBERT, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This appeal consists of 17 consolidated cases. Each individual defendant filed a motion challenging the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 22–4901 et seq. , as they applied to them individually. For simplicity purposes, Leo Johnson will be used as the primary representative for all the other parties (the defendants) referenced in this opinion.
Johnson appeals the trial court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider his filings which challenged the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to the KORA. On appeal, Johnson maintains that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of his claims as a motion to correct an illegal sentence. He further argues that the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA is punitive and violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Because we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the merits of Johnson's and the other defendants' claims, we dismiss this appeal.
Leo Johnson 99 CR 2019/109,406
On July 30, 1999, Johnson was charged with attempted rape. Johnson pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery. On January 6, 2000, the trial court sentenced Johnson to 41 months in prison and imposed 36 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court placed Johnson on probation for 60 months. The trial court also certified Johnson as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register under KORA.
Johnson filed a pro se motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Johnson also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in State v. Ward, 99 CR 1751, in Sedgwick County District Court, that raised the same argument.
George Martinez, Jr. 05 CR 1403/109,407
On June 10, 2005, George Martinez, Jr., was charged with rape in two alternative counts. Martinez pled no contest to attempted aggravated sexual battery. On February 7, 2006, the trial court sentenced Martinez to 12 months in prison and imposed 12 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court placed Martinez on probation for 24 months. The trial court also certified Martinez as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On April 18, 2012, Martinez, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Martinez also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Samuel Mullins 06 CR 2618/109,408
On November 3, 2009, Samuel Mullins was charged with aggravated indecent liberties. Mullins pled guilty to attempted aggravated indecent liberties. On May 16, 2007, the trial court sentenced Mullins to 31 months in prison and imposed 24 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court granted Mullins probation for 36 months. The trial court also certified Mullins as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On July 24, 2012, Mullins, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Mullins also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Arlen Pepperd 99 CR 105/109,409
On January 21, 1999, Arlen Pepperd was charged with indecent liberties with a child. Pepperd pled guilty as charged. On July 16, 1999, the trial court sentenced Pepperd to 34 months and imposed 36 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court also certified Pepperd as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On April 18, 2012, Pepperd, through counsel filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Pepperd also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Yolanda B. Perales 02 CR 1248/109,410
On May 3, 2002, Yolanda B. Perales was charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a child and criminal sodomy. Perales pleaded guilty as charged. On August 14, 2002, the trial court sentenced Perales to 74 months in prison with 36 months of postrelease supervision on the aggravated indecent liberties charge. The trial court also imposed a 55–month sentence on the criminal sodomy charge and ran it concurrent with her other conviction. The trial court granted Perales probation for 60 months and certified Perales as a sex offender and informed her of her duty to register.
On April 12, 2012, Perales, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Perales also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Derek Kercher 07 CR 1/109,432
On January 3, 2007, Derek Kercher was charged with unlawful voluntary sexual relations. Kercher pled guilty as charged. On June 28, 2007, the trial court sentenced Kercher to 7 months in prison with 12 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court granted Kercher probation for 18 months. The trial court also certified Kercher as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On April 20, 2012, Kercher, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Kercher also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Reginald Pickett 98 CR 558/109,433
On March 17, 1998, Reginald Pickett was charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a child and indecent liberties with a child. In an amended information, Pickett was charged with attempted indecent liberties with a child, attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and furnishing alcoholic beverages to a minor for illicit purposes. Pickett pled guilty to all counts in the amended information.
On October 29, 1998, the trial court sentenced Pickett to 32 months in prison with 36 months of postrelease supervision on count 1. The trial court imposed the same sentence on count 2 and a 6–month sentence on count 3 and ran them concurrent with count 1. The record does not indicate that Pickett was required to register.
On August 8, 2012, Pickett filed a pro se motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Pickett also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Reginald Pickett 05 CR 1888/109,434
On July 21, 2005, Reginald Pickett was charged with one count of failure to register. Pickett pled guilty as charged. On September 27, 2005, the trial court sentenced Pickett to 9 months in prison with 12 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court granted Pickett probation for 12 months.
On August 8, 2012, Pickett filed a pro se motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Pickett also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Steven Ray 01 CR 2749/109,435
On November 1, 2001, Steven Ray was charged with one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Ray pled guilty to the amended charge of indecent liberties with a child. On April 3, 2002, the trial court sentenced Ray to 34 months with 24 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court granted Ray probation for 60 months. The trial court also certified Ray as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On April 20, 2012, Ray, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Ray also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
John Whitney 05 CR 2538/109,454
On September 26, 2005, John Whitney was charged with two counts of criminal sodomy. Whitney pled guilty to one count of attempted criminal sodomy. On September 7, 2006, the trial court sentenced Whitney to 32 months in prison with 36 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court gave Whitney probation for 24 months. The court also certified Whitney as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On July 24, 2012, Whitney, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Whitney also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
James Singleton 00 CR 542/109,499
On March 1, 2000, James Singleton was charged with two counts of rape, one count of aggravated criminal sodomy, and one count of domestic battery. Singleton entered an Alford/Brady plea to the amended charges of aggravated sexual battery and domestic violence. On November 21, 2000, the trial court sentenced Singleton to 114 months in prison with 24 months of postrelease supervision on count 1. On the domestic battery count, the trial court imposed a 12–month jail sentence that ran concurrent with count 1. The trial court also certified Singleton as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On April 12, 2012, Singleton, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Singleton also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Damion C. Williams 02 CR 2028/109,500
On August 1, 2002, Damion C. Williams was charged with rape and aggravated criminal sodomy in an amended information. Williams pled guilty to aggravated criminal sodomy.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court sentenced Williams to 109 months in prison with 36 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court placed Williams on probation for 36 months. Williams was required to do 60 days in jail scheduled on the weekends for 30 consecutive weekends as a condition of his probation. The trial court also certified Williams as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On April 24, 2012, Williams filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Williams also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Steven D. Manuel 09 CR 2202/109,520
On August 11, 2009, Steven D. Manuel was charged with three counts of sexual exploitation of a child. Manuel pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a child. On December 1, 2010, January 4 and January 26, 2011, the trial court sentenced Manuel to 34 months in prison with lifetime postrelease supervision. The trial court granted Williams probation for 36 months. The trial court also informed Manuel that he had to register as an offender under KORA for 10 years.
On April 12, 2012, Manuel, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Manuel also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
One distinction in Manuel's case, as compared to the other defendants, is that the order denying Manuel's motion did not decline jurisdiction. The order simply denied Manuel's request to join in a “class action” type suit with Ward, and it instructed Manuel to pursue his motions with his preassigned sentencing judge. There is no indication in the record that Manuel ever pursued any further motions with his preassigned sentencing judge.
Sarah Oliver 99 CR 3242/109,521
On April 7, 2000, Sarah Oliver was charged in an amended information with two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, felony theft, misdemeanor theft, criminal use of a financial card, and 14 counts of forgery. Oliver pled no contest to the attempted aggravated sexual battery charges and guilty to the remaining charges.
On June 28, 2000, the trial court sentenced Oliver to 14 months in prison with 12 months of postrelease supervision on count 1. The trial court placed Oliver on probation for 24 months. The trial court sentenced Oliver on the remaining 18 counts and ran all sentences consecutively. The trial court certified Oliver as a sex offender and informed her of her duty to register.
On April 12, 2012, Oliver, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Oliver also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Kyle Payne 07 CR 1358/109,522
On April 19, 2007, Kyle Payne was charged with rape, aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Payne entered an Alford plea of guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated indecent liberties. On October 4, 2007, the trial court sentenced Payne to 34 months in prison with 24 months of postrelease supervision on each count and ran them consecutively. The trial court placed Payne on probation for 36 months. The court also certified Payne as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On April 12, 2012, Payne, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Payne also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Steven Shamasko 06 CR 2025/109,523
On August 18, 2006, Steven Shamasko was charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Shamasko pled guilty as charged. On March 22, 2007, the trial court granted a downward departure and sentenced Shamasko to 36 months in prison with 36 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court certified Shamasko as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On June 26, 2012, Shamasko, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Shamasko also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
Trenton Shelman 05 CR 2537/109,524
On September 26, 2005, Trenton Shelman was charged with two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and one count of criminal sodomy. Shelman pled guilty to attempted aggravated indecent liberties. On September 15, 2006, the trial court sentenced Shelman to 32 months in prison with 24 months of postrelease supervision. The trial court placed Shelman on probation for 36 months. The court also certified Shelman as a sex offender and informed him of his duty to register.
On April 18, 2012, Shelman, through counsel, filed a motion to challenge the retroactive application of the 2011 amendments to KORA. Shelman also moved to join all motions, exhibits, submissions, and assertions filed in Ward, 99 CR 1751.
After considering its rulings in Ward, the trial court similarly held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider each of the defendants' claims. As in Ward, the trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear or rule on the defendants' (except as indicated for defendant Manuel) constitutional challenges or motions in a criminal case because: (1) the trial was completed; (2) probation was completed or terminated or a felony sentence of imprisonment had been placed into effect; (3) appeal rights were exhausted or expired; and (4) the conviction had not been expunged. The trial court advised that this decision did not prevent the defendants from bringing their claims in a civil action,
Johnson and the other defendants timely appeal from the trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction over their claims.
Did the Trial Court Lack Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Address the Merits of Johnson's (and the Other Defendants) Claims?
Johnson's main argument is that amendments to KORA—which were enacted in 2011—violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Johnson notes that his conviction originally required him to register as an offender for 10 years, but the 2011 KORA amendments now require him to register for 25 years. Johnson contends that the effects of the 2011 amendments to KORA are punitive and therefore retroactive application is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The State disagrees, arguing that the trial court properly dismissed Johnson's motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
For the first time on appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the merits of his claim under K.S.A. 22–3504 as a motion to correct an illegal sentence. In response, the State maintains that the trial court properly dismissed Johnson's claims for lack of jurisdiction. The State contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over claims raised regarding Johnson's previously adjudicated criminal case and therefore, the case was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which appellate courts exercise unlimited review. State v. Charles, 298 Kan. 993, 1002, 318 P.3d 997 (2014). Moreover, an appellate court has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative. When the record discloses a lack of jurisdiction, an appellate court must dismiss the appeal. State v. J.D.H., 48 Kan.App.2d 454, 458, 294 P.3d 343, rev. denied 291 Kan. 1251 (2013). To the extent this case will require statutory interpretation, such interpretation is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. State v. Dale, 293 Kan. 660, 662, 267 P.3d 743 (2011).
We must first address Johnson's illegal sentence argument that was not raised before the trial court. Johnson maintains that this court can address his illegal sentence argument because “registration was a part of sentencing and ... the enforcement of the original sentence was raised by Mr. Johnson.”
Appellate courts may consider Johnson's illegal sentence arguments for the first time on appeal. Under K.S.A. 22–3504(1), Kansas courts have “specific statutory jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence at any time.” State v. Scherzer, 254 Kan. 926, 930, 869 P.2d 729 (1994); see also State v. Rogers, 297 Kan. 83, 93, 298 P.3d 325 (2013) (“This court may correct an illegal sentence sua sponte ”).
Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. Under K.S.A. 22–3504, an illegal sentence is defined as: (1) a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction; (2) a sentence that does not conform to the applicable statutory provision, either in the character or the term of punishment authorized; or (3) a sentence that is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served. See State v. Gilbert, 299 Kan. 797, Syl. ¶ 2, 326 P.3d 1060 (2014).
This court can quickly dispose of this argument based on this court's recent holding in State v. Simmons, 50 Kan.App.2d 448, 329 P.3d 523 (2014). In Simmons, our court held that offender registration is not part of a defendant's sentence. In reaching its decision, the Simmons court stated:
“Because an offender's statutory duty to register is imposed automatically by operation of law, without court intervention, as a collateral consequence of judgment with a stated objective of protecting public safety and not punishment, we necessarily conclude that the registration requirements—no matter when imposed—are not part of an offender's sentence.” 50 Kan.App.2d at 451.
Because offender registration is not part of Johnson's sentence his illegal sentence argument fails. Consequently, this court lacks jurisdiction to address Johnson's offender registration argument.
The Trial Court's Jurisdiction Finding
In the alternative, we will consider the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction holding.
In Ward, the trial court held that
“[t]here is no ... provision of state statute that would allow the defendant to file a motion of constitutional objection within his/her district court criminal case after the sentence has been satisfied and all requirements of parole have been satisfied. Therefore, the district court is without jurisdiction in this criminal case to entertain the defendant's motion....”
Following its holding in Ward, in this case the trial court held:
“[T]he district court does not have jurisdiction to hear or rule on such a constitutional challenge or other motion within a criminal case for which 1) the trial has been completed; and 2) probation has been completed or terminated or a felony sentence of imprisonment has been placed in effect; and 3) appeal rights have expired or been exhausted; and 4) for which the conviction has not been expunged.”
The trial court explained that this decision does not prevent Johnson from asserting his constitutional challenges in an appropriately filed civil action, such as a declaratory judgment.
Thus, we must decide whether the trial court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of Johnson's case as filed under his previously adjudicated criminal case.
“Subject matter jurisdiction establishes the court's authority to hear and decide a particular action. It cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel. Nor can parties convey subject matter jurisdiction onto a court by failing to object to the court's lack of jurisdiction. If the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, an appellate court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter on appeal.” Sleeth v. Sedan City Hospital, 298 Kan. 853, 868, 317 P.3d 782 (2014) (citing Kingsley v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390, 395, 204 P.3d 562 [2009] ).
In Kansas, trial courts “have general original jurisdiction of all matters, both civil and criminal, unless otherwise provided by law.” K.S.A. 20–301. Trial courts have “exclusive jurisdiction to try all cases of felony and other criminal cases arising under the statutes of the state of Kansas.” K.S.A. 22–2601.
“Subject matter jurisdiction lies in the district court and follows the defendant through the process of the issuing of the complaint, arrest pursuant to a warrant, initial appearance, the setting or denial of bond at the bond hearing, and the preliminary hearing, arraignment, and trial.” State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 757, 793 P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428, 78 P.3d 40 (2003).
The trial court retains jurisdiction over a case until its order becomes final. See Sanders v. City of Kansas City, 18 Kan.App.2d 688, 692, 858 P.2d 833 (“In Kansas, the district court retains jurisdiction until an appeal is docketed with the appellate court.”), rev. denied 253 Kan. 860 (1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1052 (1994). A judgment becomes final in a criminal case once the defendant is convicted and sentenced. State v. Howard, 44 Kan.App.2d 508, 511, 238 P.3d 752 (2010).
Our appellate courts have held that the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act does not give a trial court continuing jurisdiction after a sentencing proceeding is concluded. State v. Trostle, 41 Kan.App.2d 98, 102, 201 P.3d 724 (2009) (citing State v. Miller, 260 Kan. 892, 900, 926 P.2d 652 [1996] ). When a lawful sentence has been imposed under the sentencing guidelines, the sentencing court loses subject matter jurisdiction to modify that sentence except to correct arithmetic or clerical errors under K.S.A. 21–4721(i), recodified as K.S.A.2013 Supp. 21–6820(i). See State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 766, 267 P.3d 751 (2012).
K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–4908
The parties dispute whether K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–4908 applies in this case. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–4908 states:
“No person required to register as an offender pursuant to the Kansas offender registration act shall be granted an order relieving the offender of further registration under this act. This section shall include any person with any out of state conviction or adjudication for an offense that would require registration under the laws of this state.”
Initially, KORA allowed a registrant to petition for relief from registration obligations. See K.S.A.1993 Supp. 22–4908. Then, in 2001, the legislature amended this statute and explicitly made it clear that no registrant can be relieved of his or her registration obligations. See K.S.A.2001 Supp. 22–4908. In 2011, the legislature again amended this statute to include registrants with out-of-state convictions that would require registration in Kansas. See K.S.A.2011 Supp. 22–4908 (same as 2013 Supp.).
KORA is listed under the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure; thus, it is presumed that the statutes listed in KORA are applicable to criminal jurisdiction. Under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–4908, it is clear that a criminal court does not have the authority to relieve a registrant of his or her obligation to register. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the statute to prevent a registrant from challenging his or her registration obligations in a separate civil action. Moreover, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–4908 does not apply to Johnson's constitutional challenge to his registration requirement. Johnson is not seeking to simply be relieved of his registration duties early. Johnson seeks a declaration that the 2011 amendments are unconstitutional. Consequently, he argues a registrant's offender registration time period could not be extended after it was originally imposed.
Although not controlling authority, an Idaho court has addressed whether a criminal trial court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the Idaho sex offender registration act in a previously dismissed or fully adjudicated criminal case. In State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 266 P.3d 1146 (2011), an adult sex offender filed a petition in his previously dismissed criminal case seeking an exemption from his duty to register as a sex offender. The trial court denied his petition. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal because sex offenders seeking exemption from filing under the Idaho act must file their petitions as new civil actions if their criminal cases have been dismissed or fully adjudicated and the time for appeal had run. 152 Idaho at 48. The Johnson court found that the plain language of the statute made it “clear that the Legislature did not extend the district court's jurisdiction to entertain petitions as part of a criminal action.” 152 Idaho at 48. The court focused on the language in the statute that required an offender convicted out of state to file his or her petition in the county in which he or she resides. The Johnson court reasoned that a person convicted out of state could not petition for relief in the criminal proceeding that resulted in the conviction. 152 Idaho at 48. The court further found that the registration requirement was regulatory in nature rather than criminal; thus, it follows that it should be a civil proceeding. 152 Idaho at 48.
The reasoning used in Johnson applies to this case. For example, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–4908 states that “[n]o person required to register as an offender pursuant to the Kansas offender registration act shall be granted an order relieving the offender of further registration under this act.”
Also, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–4908 states that any person who has an out of state conviction or adjudication for an offense that would require registration under Kansas law is included under this statute for registration.
Here, Johnson filed this action in the 18th Judicial District of Kansas, where he was charged and convicted of aggravated sexual battery. If Johnson and the other defendants are correct and the 18th Judicial District of Kansas would continue to have jurisdiction over their cases because it involves a part of their sentence, what judicial district of Kansas would have jurisdiction over a person who has an out-of-state conviction that requires registration in Kansas?
It is obvious that a person convicted out of state of crime that requires registration in Kansas would be unable to petition in a Kansas criminal proceeding for relief concerning his or her out-of-state conviction. Thus, a person required to register in Kansas a result of an out-of-state conviction would be treated differently than a person convicted in Kansas. Moreover, KORA explicitly states that no registrant may petition the court for relief from registration.
Thus, from the plain language of K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–4908, it is clear that the Kansas Legislature did not extend to the 18th Judicial District of Kansas jurisdiction to entertain petitions challenging the registration requirements of KORA as part of a criminal action.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.