State v. Johnson

17 Citing cases

  1. State v. Shaw

    185 Conn. 372 (Conn. 1981)   Cited 61 times
    Noting that most jurisdictions have adopted the rule that there is no duty of retreat with cohabitants and unlawful intruders

    Precodification Connecticut precedent supports the view that a lodger has a duty to retreat from common areas of the dwelling as against his resident landlord. State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 90 A.2d 905 (1952). In State v. Johnson, the defendant was living in the basement of the house of his landlord, the victim.

  2. Asherman v. Meachum

    739 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1990)   Cited 5 times

    Lesser degree homicides constituted lesser included offenses of murder even prior to the enactment in 1969 of C.G.S. § 53a-45(c), under its predecessor, C.G.S. § 53-9 (Rev. to 1958). In fact, "[o]n a trial on an indictment for murder, it was felt desirable, as far back as 1830, to make sure that the petit jury, in accordance with the common-law rule, could return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter if the proof warranted even though only murder would have been charged in the indictment." McBrien v. Warden, 153 Conn. 320, 329, 216 A.2d 432, 435 (1966); see also State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 90 A.2d 905 (1952) (the court may give a manslaughter charge where defendant was indicted on murder); State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 75 A.2d 67 (1950) (the jury may find defendant indicted for murder guilty of a homicide of a lesser degree). Therefore, when indicted for murder, any defendant could anticipate a conviction for one of the lesser degrees of homicide.

  3. State v. Shabazz

    246 Conn. 746 (Conn. 1998)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that evidence is properly excluded where it concerns issue not in dispute and is cumulative of evidence already before jury

    In State v. Smith, supra, 222 Conn. 18, we held that "the deceased's violent character may not be established by evidence of specific violent acts, other than convictions." In State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 91, 90 A.2d 905 (1952), we noted the presence of alcohol in the victim's blood and the defendant's testimony that the victim was quarrelsome when under the influence of alcohol. This decision antedates State v. Miranda, supra, 176 Conn. 114, wherein we first articulated our adoption of the rule that the victim's violent character may be proved by reputation evidence regardless of whether the defendant was aware of that reputation.

  4. State v. Hines

    187 Conn. 199 (Conn. 1982)   Cited 69 times

    " State v. Mullings, supra, 275; see State v. Rose, supra, 687-88; Siladi v. McNamara, supra, 515. "The main charge and supplemental instructions are to be read and considered as a whole." State v. Edwards, 163 Conn. 527, 537, 316 A.2d 387 (1972); see State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 93, 90 A.2d 905 (1952). Individual instructions are, of course, not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.

  5. State v. Rodriguez

    180 Conn. 382 (Conn. 1980)   Cited 146 times
    Recognizing the jury's difficulty in determining the culpable state of mind of the defendant from among those required for various levels of homicide

    That definition focused on the presence of malice in murder and its absence in manslaughter. See State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 91-96, 90 A.2d 905 (1952). Thus, under the homicide statutes in effect prior to 1969, a person indicted for murder could be found guilty of a "wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing," or a killing perpetrated in the course of committing certain enumerated crimes (murder in the first degree, 53-9); "homicide committed with malice aforethought" (murder in the second degree, 53-9); see, e.g., State v. Shelton, 160 Conn. 360, 363, 278 A.2d 782 (1971); homicide without malice aforethought (manslaughter, 53-13); State v. Johnson, supra, 91-92; or, where applicable, homicide committed under circumstances set forth in 53-17 (Rev. to 1958) (wilful misconduct or gross negligence).

  6. DeLouise v. Clarke

    429 A.2d 839 (Conn. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    "The basic charge and the supplemental instructions are to be read and considered as a whole." Hanken v. Buckley Bros., Inc., 159 Conn. 438, 442, 270 A.2d 556 (1970); State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 93, 90 A.2d 905 (1952). The court was compelled to return the jury for further deliberations so that the verdict rendered would be clear and unambiguous.

  7. State v. Miranda

    176 Conn. 107 (Conn. 1978)   Cited 50 times
    In Miranda, this court rejected the approach taken in its earlier decision in State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 138 A. 456 (1927), which did not permit the admission of character evidence to prove that the decedent was the aggressor on the ground that "the result of an unlimited application of such a rule would be to interject the character of the deceased with the resulting temptation ‘to measure the guilt of the accused by the deserts of the victim’ into all such cases."

    This view was considered and rejected in State v. Padula, supra, 459. See also State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 93, 90 A.2d 905. We have not had occasion to reconsider the matter since.

  8. Maciejewska v. Lombard Bros., Inc.

    368 A.2d 206 (Conn. 1976)   Cited 16 times

    Szela v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Conn. 714, 146 A.2d 910. "`[A]n appellate court ought not to be expected to create substance out of shadows, to conjure up errors out of trifles, or to seek for judicial irregularity by microscopic processes, speculative imaginings, or refined reasoning.' [Citations omitted]." State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 93, 90 A.2d 905; DePaola v. Seamour, 163 Conn. 246, 303 A.2d 737. BOGDANSKI, J. (dissenting).

  9. DeMichele v. Vermilye

    365 A.2d 1062 (Conn. 1976)   Cited 3 times

    DePaola v. Seamour, 163 Conn. 246, 253, 303 A.2d 737. "The basic charge and the supplemental instructions are to be road and considered as a whole. State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 93, 90 A.2d 905." Hanken v. Buckley Bros., Inc., 159 Conn. 438, 442, 270 A.2d 556.

  10. Neal v. Shiels, Inc.

    166 Conn. 3 (Conn. 1974)   Cited 99 times
    Considering foreseeability of children being struck by cars in context of defendant selling ice cream from truck parked on public streets

    See Szela v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Conn. 714, 720, 146 A.2d 910. Although that portion of the charge relating to the presence of the ice cream truck being a proximate cause would be erroneous if taken by itself, the charge must be considered as a whole. State v. Raffone, 161 Conn. 117, 127, 285 A.2d 323; State v. Johnson, 139 Conn. 89, 93, 90 A.2d 905. In the context of the whole charge and its specific reference to paragraphs 6 (c) and 6 (e) of the complaint, it is clear that the jury could only construe this instruction to mean that if they believed the defendants' version that the truck did not stop at the area in question, then there could be no award of damages to the plaintiffs.