"[T]he state may withdraw from a plea agreement at any time before a defendant enters a guilty plea and the trial court accepts the plea, unless the defendant has detrimentally relied upon the agreement." State v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. App. 2000). "A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a valid guilty plea."
The state argues that it had a right to withdraw from the plea agreement when it was merely executory in nature, before a plea had been entered on the record, unless respondent could demonstrate detrimental reliance or prejudice. See State v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn.App. 2000). In Johnson, this court affirmed the denial of a motion for specific enforcement of a plea agreement.
On June 14, 1998, appellant sexually and physically assaulted a young woman, D.L., and physically assaulted the young woman's boyfriend, A.H., in a St. Cloud apartment. State v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 440, 441 (Minn.App. 2000). In a bench trial following a stipulation of facts pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Minn.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). As the prosecutor candidly states before us, "[a] defendant may enforce a plea offer which has not been approved by the court when the defendant can make a showing of detrimental reliance upon the prosecutorial promise," citing e.g., State v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn.Ct.App. 2000); Reed v. Becka, 333 S.C. 676, 511 S.E.2d 396, 402-03 (1999). A defendant must, however, do something substantial to his disadvantage in reliance on the offer.
Until performance took place by [defendant], the government was free to withdraw its offer."); State v. Bogart, 57 Wn. App. 353, 788 P.2d 14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (the prosecution could withdraw a plea proposal after learning additional facts implicating defendant, where defendant had not yet entered guilty plea and had failed to establish that he detrimentally relied on the bargain in such a way that a fair trial was no longer possible). See also Shields v State, 374 A.2d 816 (Del. 1977); Springette, 614 F.2d at 360; Reed v. Becka, 333 S.C. 676, 511 S.E.2d 396 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
The state could have withdrawn from the plea agreement had the parties not reached agreement on the cooperation term. See State v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that "the state may withdraw from a plea agreement at any time before a defendant enters a guilty plea, unless the defendant has detrimentally relied upon the agreement"). The record supports the district court's finding that the state would not have agreed to any negotiated plea that did not contain a cooperation agreement.
1978) (stating that district court should have deferred accepting guilty plea until after PSI). Acceptance of a plea must occur on the record. See State v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 440, 442-43 (Minn.App. 2000) (declining to enforce agreement allegedly reached in chambers but never placed on record). But, even under the broader definition in Thompson, a "conviction" does not occur if the plea itself is accepted, but the court's decision on the negotiated sentence is postponed pending the PSI.
A prosecutor may permissibly withdraw from an actual plea agreement anytime "before a defendant enters a guilty plea and the [district] court accepts the plea, unless the defendant has detrimentally relied upon the agreement." State v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. App. 2000). It follows that absent abusive conduct, a prosecutor may withdraw from plea negotiations without committing misconduct.