State v. Jobe

12 Citing cases

  1. VETA v. RYAN

    No. CV 05-336-TUC-CKJ (D. Ariz. Mar. 1, 2010)

    Moreover, a due process violation based on a misapplication of state law results only if the sentence is arbitrary and capricious. Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992). Here, the appellate court found that Veta had notice of the DCAC enhancements, see State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 757 P.2d 604 (App. 1988) (actual notice prior to trial of sentence enhancing allegation ensures a defendant will not be misled, deceived or surprised), Veta's counsel was aware of the DCAC allegations when arguing about the lesser included instructions, Veta did not object to the DCAC enhancement at trial or sentencing, and the statute under which Veta was charged specifically provided for sentencing pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01 (the DCAC statute).

  2. State v. Davis

    206 Ariz. 377 (Ariz. 2003)   Cited 137 times
    Holding there was no "compelling reason" in a sentence proportionality challenge to "interpret Arizona's cruel and unusual punishment provision differently from the related provision in the federal constitution"

    Because Arizona has adopted harsh sentencing laws, many other examples of extremely long sentences exist, both in cases involving crimes against children and in cases involving other crimes. See, e.g., State v. Jonas, 164 Ariz. 242, 792 P.2d 705 (1990) (forty-six years for trafficking in stolen property and sale of one marijuana cigarette to a minor under fifteen); State v. Hummer, 184 Ariz. 603, 911 P.2d 609 (App. 1995) (three consecutive life sentences and three concurrent twelve-year sentences for convictions of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor, three counts of furnishing obscene materials to a minor, and one count of molestation of a minor, with two prior felony convictions); State v. Freeland, 176 Ariz. 544, 863 P.2d 263 (App. 1993) (life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years for aggravated assault while on probation); State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 757 P.2d 604 (App. 1988) (fifty-five years for two counts of child molestation). IV.

  3. State v. Hawk

    1 CA-CR 23-0514 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2024)

    And she failed to address the litany of cases the State cites to show that strict statutory compliance was unnecessary to notify Swift Hawk of the State's intent to enhance her sentence as a repetitive offender. State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 330 (App. 1988) (permitting sentence enhancement despite the state's filing error because the defendant had actual notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment); State v. Cropper, 205 Ariz. 181, 185, ¶ 17 (2003) ("Because [the defendant] had actual, although oral, notice of the prosecutor's intent to use the aggravated assault conviction as a prior serious offense aggravating circumstance and the delay caused him no prejudice, the State adequately noticed the prior serious conviction aggravating circumstance."); see also State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360, 366, ¶ 25 (2005) (finding lack of formal notice was not fundamental error because the defendant "had actual notice of the aggravating circumstance before trial" and admitted "he suffered no prejudice").

  4. State v. Meza

    No. 1 CA-CR 20-0287 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    "The salient purpose for requiring notice of the [S]tate's intent to seek enhanced punishment prior to trial is to ensure a defendant will not be misled, deceived or surprised." State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 330 (App. 1988). When the State's communications and filings are sufficient to provide the defendant with actual notice despite such procedural defects, due process is satisfied, and such error is harmless.

  5. State v. Sanders

    No. 1 CA-CR 20-0110 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2021)

    ¶13 The State's pretrial actions, viewed collectively, gave Sanders adequate notice of the specific grounds on which it would ask the court to impose enhanced sentences under § 13-703 based on both prior felony convictions and aggravating circumstances. See State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 330 (App. 1988) (holding State's failure to formally file all operative pleadings was harmless error because defendant had actual, constitutionally adequate notice prior to trial); State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 481 (1989) (finding no error when State's allegation of the dangerous nature of the offense was untimely but defendant had notice based on the nature of the crime alleged); but see Benak, 199 Ariz. at 337-38, ¶¶ 16-19 (remanding for resentencing when State failed to refer to the relevant sentencing statute or mention "violent crime" in asking the court to rule defendant ineligible for probation based on a previous violent crime conviction). ¶14 Sanders' knowledge of the State's intentions is also illustrated by the fact he did not object when the superior court proceeded to address his historical prior felony convictions.

  6. State v. Harms

    No. 1 CA-CR 17-0217 (Ariz. Ct. App. May. 17, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    To be sure, due process requires that the defendant have notice before trial that the state intends to seek an enhanced sentence. State v. Waggoner, 144 Ariz. 237, 239 (1985); State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 330 (App. 1988). But the state need not identify which age-related subsection of § 13-705 applies for purposes of enhancement — it is enough if the indictment cites the statute generally and alleges the under-fifteen cutoff age.

  7. State v. Salazar

    No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0139 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2015)   Cited 1 times

    He also contends he could not be convicted based on barricading the victim in the bathroom because there was no evidence that he personally did so. Salazar ignores, however, that the jury was instructed on accomplice liability, and an accomplice and a principal are held equally liable under the law. State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 331-32, 757 P.2d 604, 607-08 (App. 1988). "'[A]n accomplice is one who knowingly and with criminal intent participates, associates, or concurs with another in the commission of a crime.'"

  8. State v. McMurray

    No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0189 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2014)

    ¶10 McMurray overlooks that the jury was instructed on a theory of accomplice liability with respect to the burglary charge. See A.R.S. §§ 13-301, 13-303; see also State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 331-32, 757 P.2d 604, 607-08 (App. 1988) (noting accomplice and principal held equally liable). As the state points out, the evidence showed McMurray facilitated a theft in the store by (1) loading coins into a change dispenser before the crime; (2) locking the store's door in anticipation of the staged robbery so as to ensure no one else was inside, then unlocking it the minute before Andrews entered; and (3) delaying her report to law enforcement in order to provide him more time to vacate the premises and avoid detection. Under the circumstances, the jury could have found McMurray guilty of first-degree burglary as the accomplice of Andrews, who had entered or remained unlawfully in the store to commit a theft while armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.

  9. State v. Williams

    No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0038 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    ¶17 Additionally, under the state's theory of the case, accomplice liability, each defendant is criminally accountable for the other defendants' acts. See A.R.S. § 13-303(A); State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 332, 757 P.2d 604, 608 (App. 1988). Thus, even if severed, the evidence against Soto and Valenzuela, including their roles in the robbery and positions in the car, would have been admissible at Williams's trial.

  10. State v. Dillon

    No. 1 CA-CR 13-0190 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2013)

    Under Arizona statutes, "all participants are criminally accountable as principals, regardless of whether a participant was the accomplice in fact." State v. Jobe, 157 Ariz. 328, 331-32, 757 P.2d 604, 607-08 (App. 1988). ¶6 At the conclusion of the State's case, Dillon moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule").