Opinion
No. COA10-1250
Filed 7 June 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 7 May 2010 by Judge Carl R. Fox in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 March 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Terence D. Friedman, for the State. James N. Freeman, Jr. for Defendant.
Wake County No. 09 CRS 14056.
Defendant appeals from judgments entered on his convictions of obtaining property by false pretenses and misdemeanor larceny. For the following reasons, we conclude there was no error.
On 21 April 2009, Defendant was indicted on one count of obtaining property by false pretenses and one count of misdemeanor larceny, arising out of allegations that Defendant had stolen certain goods from a TJ Maxx Home Goods store (TJ Maxx or store) in Apex, North Carolina. The matter came on for trial on 5 May 2010.
The evidence showed that on 15 February 2 009, Defendant caught the attention of a TJ Maxx loss prevention detective, Kristina Ruffin, when he came into the store with two empty plastic bags in his shopping cart. Ms. Ruffin testified that she "[kept] an eye on [Defendant] during his entire time in the store" by using the camera surveillance system, watching Defendant through binoculars in her office, and monitoring him in person on the sales floor. The State then introduced two videos that had captured Defendant's movements throughout the store and his transaction at the cash register. The videos were played for the jury as Ms. Ruffin testified to their contents and her own observations at that time.
The first video demonstrated that upon entering the store, Defendant had in his shopping cart two empty plastic TJ Maxx shopping bags and one TJ Maxx bag with merchandise-a star-shaped house decoration-inside. As Defendant walked through the store, he took various items of merchandise from the racks, removing their hangers and folding or rolling them up before placing them in his cart. After Defendant placed several other items on the top of his cart, including a wine rack from the housewares section, Ms. Ruffin went to the sales floor to observe him more closely. She was standing approximately five feet away from Defendant when she saw him transfer many of the items in his cart into the empty shopping bags. Ms. Ruffin explained, as the video showed, that the two shopping bags were now full and tied up. A t-shirt, a pair of pants, and the wine rack remained on top of the cart.
The second video showed Defendant at the customer service desk, and Ms. Ruffin testified that he had not made any other transaction in the store before approaching TJ Maxx employee Sharon Zimmer to check out. Defendant first sought to return three items and presented two different receipts. One item Defendant asked to return was the star decoration with which he had entered the store. Defendant proffered a receipt for the decoration, and Ms. Zimmer refunded him cash. Ms. Ruffin observed that the other two items he sought to return-a Duke t-shirt and a pair of pants-had not come into the store with Defendant. Nevertheless, Defendant handed Ms. Zimmer a second receipt, which was from a different TJ Maxx store, which he represented as being for the Duke t-shirt and the pants. To the contrary, having seen Defendant take them off the racks of the Apex store that day, Ms. Ruffin testified that this receipt was not, in fact, for the specific t-shirt and pants that Defendant claimed he had previously purchased and was now returning. To explain, Ms. Ruffin described TJ Maxx's price coding system, which assigns the same style number to items of the same type, so items of "the same color, same size, same logo, ha[ve] the same style number." Where only the style number appears on a purchase receipt, Defendant "could have bought those items, had the same style number, same size, pick it up off the floor and returned it." Thus, Ms. Zimmer would not have known if the Duke t-shirt and pants were those represented on the receipt when she gave Defendant cash back for the return of these items. Defendant then used that money to purchase the wine rack, another t-shirt, and a pair of pants.
Ms. Ruffin noticed that Defendant still had the two plastic bags filled with merchandise he had taken off the store's racks that day tied up in his shopping cart as he purchased these items and left TJ Maxx. As Defendant exited, Ms. Ruffin and members of the Apex Police Department asked Defendant to accompany them to the store's loss prevention office. Defendant obliged, and about twenty items were uncovered from the tied bags that had been in the bottom of his shopping cart, totaling $326.82 worth of TJ Maxx merchandise. Law enforcement later searched Defendant's car pursuant to a search warrant and found a wide array of new clothing; a large number of receipts from various stores, including a lot of returned receipts for items made both with and without purchase receipts; and two large shopping bags filled with other empty shopping bags, as shown in photographs introduced as exhibits by the State. One was a large plastic TJ Maxx bag full of other plastic empty TJ Maxx bags; the other large bag was from Marshall's and was full of empty plastic Marshall's department store bags.
Defendant testified in his own defense, denying that the two plastic bags he had in his cart upon entering the store were, in fact, empty but, rather, contained various items that he planned on returning. He explained that he had filled the bags with merchandise, including a Duke t-shirt and pair of sweatpants, which he had not taken from TJ Maxx that day but had previously purchased. Defendant testified that items remained in the bags when he left the store because customer service refused to accept them back as the thirty-day refund period for returns had expired.
On 7 May 2010, the jury found Defendant guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses and misdemeanor larceny. The trial court then entered judgment on the convictions, imposing a suspended sentence of six to eight months with 36 months of supervised probation. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal.
I.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of obtaining property by false pretenses on the ground of insufficient evidence. Specifically, Defendant contends that the State failed to provide substantial evidence that he ever made a false representation of a subsisting fact to TJ Maxx. We disagree.
When a defendant in a criminal trial makes a motion to dismiss a charge against him on the ground that there is not sufficient evidence, the appropriate standard of review "is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied." State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 595, 573 S.E.2d 866, 868 (2002) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)). "`Substantial evidence' is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion." State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 412, 597 S.E.2d 724, 746 (2004) (internal citations omitted); see also Scott, 356 N.C. at 597, 573 S.E.2d at 869 ("Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion.").
This "test for sufficiency of the evidence is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial or both," and "[c]ircumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence." Scott, 356 N.C. at 596, 573 S.E.2d at 869 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Williams, 184 N.C. App. 351, 355, 646 S.E.2d 613, 616 (2007) ("The trial court is not required to determine that the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence prior to denying a defendant's motion to dismiss."). Where evidence is circumstantial in nature,
the court must consider whether a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. Once the court decides that a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt may be drawn from the circumstances, then it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy [it] beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.
Scott, 356 N.C. at 596, 573 S.E.2d at 869 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted. "When determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a charged offense, we must view the evidence `in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences'" which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Ridgeway, 185 N.C. App. 423, 433, 648 S.E.2d 886, 893-94 (2007) (quoting State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1992)). "`Any contradictions or discrepancies arising from the evidence are properly left for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal.'" State v. Parker, 185 N.C. App. 437, 440-41, 651 S.E.2d 377, 380 (2007) (quoting State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 36, 468 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1996)). "In addition, the defendant's evidence should be disregarded unless it is favorable to the State or does not conflict with the State's evidence[,]" and such "evidence that does not conflict `may be used to explain or clarify the evidence offered by the State.'" Scott, 356 N.C. at 596, 573 S.E.2d at 869 (internal citations omitted). "When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court should be concerned only about whether the evidence is sufficient for jury consideration, not about the weight of the evidence." Id. at 596-97, 573 S.E.2d at 869.
The elements of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses are: "(1) a false representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another." State v. Parker, 354 N.C. 268, 284, 553 S.E.2d 885, 897 (2001) (citation omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100 (2009) ("If any person shall knowingly and designedly by means of any kind of false pretense whatsoever, whether the false pretense is of a past or subsisting fact or of a future fulfillment or event, obtain or attempt to obtain from any person within this State any money, goods, . . . or other thing of value with intent to cheat or defraud any person of such money, goods, . . . or other thing of value, such person shall be guilty of a felony. . . .").
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the first element, and we accordingly limit our review of his motion to dismiss to the same. Defendant argues that any evidence presented was insufficient to show that he ever "made a false representation of any sort while in TJ Maxx on the date in question" such that the State failed to provide substantial proof that Defendant "did anything with the intent to deceive or defraud TJ Maxx of its property." Defendant alleges that the State's only evidence consisted of Ms. Ruffin's interpretation of some scenes in the video, and that Ms. Ruffin, without having recorded Defendant the entire time or viewing him personally, "opined that she witnessed him putting some items in bags as he walked through the store." However, Ms. Ruffin's testimony that she had kept an eye on Defendant during his entire time in the store directly contradicts these contentions. Moreover, her testimony reflects that she did indeed personally view Defendant, from five feet away, place merchandise that he had removed from the racks, rolled up, and put in his shopping cart into two plastic TJ Maxx shopping bags which Defendant had with him upon entering the store and which were empty at that time. Thus, Ms. Ruffin did not opine anything but, rather, relayed her factual observations made at the time she went to the sales floor to watch Defendant more closely.
Defendant's arguments further ignore the fact that the actual video surveillance recordings were shown to the jury and that Ms. Ruffin presented detailed testimony in correlation therewith. While Defendant emphasizes the undisputed fact that he approached the customer service desk with "receipts for all the items he produced to be returned," the video evidence and eyewitness testimony constituted evidence that: Defendant did not have the Duke t-shirt and pants he ultimately sought to return when he entered the store on 15 February 2009; he picked those items off the rack as he walked through the store that day; the second receipt he handed to Ms. Zimmer was not for the same Duke t-shirt and pair of pants he purported to have purchased and then returning; but Defendant represented to the TJ Maxx employee that he indeed purchased the items just over the thirty-day limit for cash returns; and as a result, he received cash from TJ Maxx.
Defendant also makes much of his understanding that "all the items in the store priced over $19.99 had a security tag on them," and the fact that "[n]o security alarms went off as [he] left the store." However, Ms. Ruffin testified that Home Goods did not have a tagging system at that time, so any item from the Home Goods side of the store that cost over $19.99 would not, in fact, have a security tag. Many of the nineteen items found in the tied up shopping bags indeed had Home Goods price tags on them, and Ms. Ruffin testified that there was not otherwise "anything that should have triggered an alarm," based on the pricing of the remaining items. Defendant further explains, as he asserted at trial, that he left with some of those items because the store would not accept them over thirty days after purchase. To the contrary, there was also testimony that TJ Maxx does indeed accept returns for items purchased over thirty days earlier but that gift cards, rather than cash refunds, are given in that case. Where Defendant himself testified that TJ Maxx is one of his favorite stores, the jury could easily question why, if he indeed tried to return merchandise he previously purchased, Defendant would rather keep unwanted items than receive credit at a store he frequently patronizes.
Accordingly, Defendant's argument that the State failed to present substantial evidence is merely one of credibility, which was properly left for resolution by the jury. Where the testimony and video evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, showed that Defendant did not previously purchase the Duke t-shirt and pants he returned but took them from the store's racks that day, and that Defendant therefore made a false representation to TJ Maxx when he presented Ms. Zimmer with a receipt purporting to represent his prior purchase of those items, we conclude that the State presented substantial evidence that Defendant made a false representation of a subsisting fact. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the State presented insufficient evidence of this first element of obtaining property by false pretenses.
II.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the admission of various photographs of the interior of Defendant's car, introduced by the State as exhibits 12-19.
Defendant contends that these photographs did not pass the "initial threshold of relevancy" and, therefore, were inadmissible at trial under Evidence Rules 401 and 402. He argues, alternatively, that if relevant, the probative value of the photographs was substantially outweighed by their danger of unfair prejudice.
Evidence must be relevant to be admissible, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 402 (2009), and even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2009). While "a trial court's rulings on relevancy technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403, such rulings are given great deference on appeal." State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991). "`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2009); see also State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 154, 322 S.E.2d 370, 384 (1984) ("Relevant evidence is admissible if it `has any logical tendency however slight to prove the fact at issue in the case.'").
It is not required that evidence bear directly on the question in issue, and evidence is competent and relevant if it is one of the circumstances surrounding the parties, and necessary to be known, to properly understand their conduct or motives, or if it reasonably allows the jury to draw an inference as to a disputed fact.
State v. Stevenson, 136 N.C. App. 235, 240, 523 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court has "interpreted Rule 401 broadly and [has] explained on a number of occasions that in a criminal case every circumstance calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible and permissible." State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 735, 440 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1994).
Initially, we note that when the State sought to introduce the photographs challenged by Defendant, Detective Worth Brown of the Apex Police Department had already testified, without objection, that he executed a search warrant for Defendant's car and described that he found "a wide array of property in the vehicle," including: "[n]ew clothing," "[a] large number of receipts from various stores," "[a] lot of returned — returned receipts." See State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 334, 561 S.E.2d 245, 254 (2002) ("Photographs are usually competent to be used by a witness to explain or illustrate anything that is competent for him to describe in words."). Detective Brown indicated that "[s]ome were returns made with receipts, others were returns made without receipts" and then testified that
[t]here were two large plastic shopping bags. One was a TJ Maxx bag and it was — it was full of empty other — other empty plastic TJ Maxx bags. So it was just one plastic bag full of other empty store bags. There was another store bag I believe from Marshall's that was full of empty plastic Marshall's department store bags.
The State moved to introduce the photographs depicting exactly that which Detective Brown "describe[d] in words" without objection, namely pictures of new clothing, numerous receipts from various stores, and the shopping bags filled with other bags that were discovered in Defendant's vehicle. At this point, however, Defendant objected on the basis of relevance, and the trial court heard the arguments of counsel outside the presence of the jury. Defendant argued, as he does on appeal, that the photographs had nothing to do with the charges of larceny or obtaining property by false pretenses. Where the State "did not contend at trial that any of these items or receipts were brought into the store on the date in question to attempt to exchange" or "that these items were stolen from TJ Maxx or any other store," Defendant contends they were irrelevant and greatly prejudiced him at trial.
While the trial judge indicated that he might agree with Defendant if he was being tried for larceny only, he distinguished obtaining property by false pretenses on the ground that the crime "involves an intent to deceive." The trial judge continued:
[I]t appears that there is a bunch of receipts from Marshall's on this — on the floor and on the seat which might explain — because I was sort of curious as who how — if he hadn't paid for those items to begin with, how you end up with a receipt for those items to return them. And if you got a car full of receipts that seems like that goes forward to answer the question of how it happened.
Where the State's evidence was that Defendant "walked out without paying for the items and then he returned them at some point and magically had a receipt to return them and obtain a refund for them," the trial judge explained, that "the question [was] not how he got the items, but how he got a receipt to show that those items were in fact once again — they were purchased."
And so the question is — and leaving the — the obvious question, so how do you do that? And the only way — the only explicable way to do that is that either you are somehow manufacturing receipts or you have receipts for items you purchased and you are actually taking items to match the receipt that you have and then bringing them back in and returning them. I mean there is only one of two explanations that. It only has to be one of two things. So for one person to have the number of receipts from Marshall's — I am sorry — TJ Maxx in your car and there is — there is not only TJ Maxx. There is a bunch of from Marshall's. I mean for you to have a whole bunch of receipts from all different stores in your car from all different dates is as irregular as it gets. I mean why would you be running around with the receipts in your car for a whole bunch of these different stores unless there was some point to it.
Where a false representation must be "calculated and intended to deceive", Parker, 354 N.C. at 284, 553 S.E.2d at 897, to support a conviction of obtaining property by false pretenses, we agree with the trial court that the photographic evidence of the items in Defendant's car was reasonably calculated to throw light upon the crime charged. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in deeming the State's exhibits relevant and therefore admissible under Evidence Rules 401 and 402.
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Defendant argues that the prejudicial nature of the State's exhibits was enhanced because the police had moved some of the receipts strewn about Defendant's car to the front seat to take the photographs. Defendant alleges that this "arrange[ment] [of] the return receipts out on the seat of the vehicle for the picture . . . ma[d]e it look like he had laid them out as if to be able to compare them to what he was going to take from the store." Not only do we fail to see how simply relocating the receipts found throughout the car would have an "undue tendency to suggest decision [by the jury] on an improper basis," N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (Commentary), but Detective Brown's own testimony assuaged any fear that the jury would think Defendant arranged the receipts in the manner depicted. In fact, Detective Brown specified that Defendant did not do so, stating that the receipts photographed "were found in the front passenger area of the vehicle" and that he (Detective Brown) "laid them there in the front seat to photograph them all together." Therefore, we conclude that the photographs were not only admissible as relevant evidence but also that the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to exclude them under Rule 403.
III.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the misdemeanor larceny indictment to reflect that the victim's name is "The TJX Companies, Inc." rather than "TJX Companies, Inc.," as originally alleged. Specifically, Defendant contends that the indictment failed to allege one of the essential elements of larceny because the entity denominated therein was not a legal entity capable of owning property. We disagree.
As this case was called for trial, the State moved to amend count two of the indictment, alleging misdemeanor larceny, which named the corporation that owned the TJ Maxx Store as "TJX Companies, Inc." Prior to trial, the district attorney discovered that the company was actually registered in North Carolina as "The TJX Companies, Inc.," at which time he informed defense counsel of the discrepancy. Defense counsel acknowledged that he was made aware of the inaccuracy earlier that week and that he was not "articulating any prejudice" thereby but objected on the grounds that the omission constituted a fatal variance in the misdemeanor charge. The trial court, however, allowed the State's motion to amend that particular charge by inserting the word "The" prior to the letters "TJX Companies, Inc." Defendant contends that the fatal variance required the trial court to dismiss this count of the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We review de novo the question of whether an indictment was fatally defective. State v. Marshall, 188 N.C. App. 744, 748, 656 S.E.2d 709, 712 (2008). "[O]ur Supreme Court has held that [a] bill of indictment is insufficient to confer jurisdiction unless it charges all essential elements of a criminal offense.'" State v. Chillo, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 705 S.E.2d 394, 396 (2010) (quoting State v. Benton, 275 N.C. 378, 381, 167 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1969)). Where one of "[t]he essential elements of larceny [is] that the defendant . . . took the property of another," State v. Skinner, 162 N.C. App. 434, 443, 590 S.E.2d 876, 884 (2004), "the State is required to prove ownership," State v. Woody, 132 N.C. App. 788, 790, 513 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1999); see also State v. Patterson, 194 N.C. App. 608, 613, 671 S.E.2d 357, 360 (2009) (noting that this element "requires a showing that `the other' is a natural person or legal entity from whom property can be taken"). Thus, "`[t]o be sufficient, an indictment for larceny must allege the owner or person in lawful possession of the stolen property.'" State v. Phillips, 162 N.C. App. 719, 720-21, 592 S.E.2d 272, 273 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Woody, 132 N.C. App. at 790, 513 S.E.2d at 803 (noting that "a proper [larceny] indictment must identify as victim a legal entity capable of owning property," where one "that insufficiently alleges the identity of the victim is fatally defective and cannot support [the] conviction"). "If the entity named in the indictment is not a person, it must be alleged `that the victim was a legal entity capable of owning property.'" Phillips, 162 N.C. App. at 721, 592 S.E.2d at 273 (citation omitted). Thus, "[i]f a larceny indictment names a corporation as the owner, the name of the corporation should be given, and the fact that it is a corporation stated, unless the name itself imports a corporation." State v. Brown, 184 N.C. App. 539, 542, 646 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2007) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
Defendant argues the indictment insufficiently identifies "The TJX Companies, Inc.," the actual entity capable of owning property, and cites State v. Cathey, 162 N.C. App. 350, 353-54, 590 S.E.2d 408, 411 (2004), for the proposition that "a larceny indictment which does not indicate the legal entity is a corporation or the name of the legal entity does not import a corporation is fatally defective." In Cathey and its progeny, however, the indictments at issue were fatally defective because the manner in which the victims were identified therein did not suggest that they were legal entities capable of owning property. See, e.g., id. at 354, 590 S.E.2d at 411 (holding the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the larceny indictment to read "Faith Temple Church-High Point, Incorporated" rather than "Faith Temple Church of God"); State v. Thompson, 6 N.C. App. 64, 66, 169 S.E.2d 241, 242 (1969) (arresting judgment where "Belk's Department Store" in the indictment did not import a corporation; the indictment did not allege that Belk's Department Store was a corporation, proprietorship, or partnership; and "Belk's Department Store" certainly did not suggest a natural person).
In this case, however, the indictment identified the victim-corporation as "TJX Companies, Inc.," which clearly imports a corporation capable of owning property, but merely left off the word "The" from the entity's name. See Patterson, 194 N.C. App. at 613, 671 S.E.2d at 360 ("If the name of the corporation itself indicates that the entity is a corporation, through use of the word `incorporated' or the like, then the requirement . . . has been satisfied."). Thus, this case is not governed by the Cathey line of cases; rather, we review the larceny charge pursuant to our general principles involving the sufficiency of indictments. See State v. Davis, 253 N.C. 224, 226, 116 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1960) ("The fact that the property was stolen from T. A. Turner Co., Inc. rather than from T. A. Turner Co., a corporation, as charged in the bill of indictment, is not a fatal variance.")
While Defendant argues "[a] bill of indictment may not be amended," N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-923(e) (2009), this statutory proscription against amendment "has been construed to mean only that an indictment may not be amended in a way which `would substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment.'" State v. Brinson, 337 N.C. 764, 767, 448 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1994) (quoting State v. Carrington, 35 N.C. App. 53, 58, 240 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1978)). "A change in an indictment does not constitute an amendment where the variance was inadvertent and [the] defendant was neither misled nor surprised as to the nature of the charges." State v. Campbell, 133 N.C. App. 531, 535-36, 515 S.E.2d 732, 735 (1999). Where defense counsel conceded that his client was not prejudiced by the State's omission of the word "The" from the legal entity name, we conclude that this case is analogous to those deeming any variance a minor discrepancy that did not defeat the indictment or require dismissal of the case. See Davis, 253 N.C. at 226, 116 S.E.2d at 383; see also, e.g., State v. Wilson, 264 N.C. 595, 597, 142 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1965) (no fatal variance between "one B. M. Hancock Son, a corporation" in indictment for larceny of chattels and trial references, including "B. M. Hancock Son's Feed Mill, Inc.," "B. M. Hancock Son, Inc.," and "B. M. Hancock Son's"); State v. Wyatt, 254 N.C. 220, 221, 118 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1961) (no fatal variance between "Pestroy Exterminating Co." in embezzlement indictment and "Pestroy Exterminators, Inc." in bill of particulars). Accordingly, we hold that the ownership of property alleged to be stolen by Defendant was properly laid in the indictment for larceny and that the insertion of the word "The" into the name already identified as a corporation was not a substantial alteration of the charge. Thus, the trial court did not err in allowing the amendment.
No error.
Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).