We review this issue under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Smith , 993 S.W.2d 6, 32 (Tenn. 1999) ; State v. Jenkins , 845 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). "A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party."
The Defendant's challenge is two-foldโboth procedural and substantive. Regarding procedure, the Defendant, citing to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.1 and State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), maintains that "the jury was allowed to improperly focus on particular parts of the videos without any supervision from the trial court to protect [the Defendant's] right to a fair trial." Turning to substance, the Defendant avers that the jury was permitted to view items during their deliberation process that had not been properly authenticated and admitted into evidence, thereby exposing the jurors to improper "extraneous information.
This court has previously concluded that the decision to grant a jury's request to rehear or review evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court as limited by Standard 15-4.2 of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Trial by Jury (2d ed. 1980). State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1992). Standard 15-4.2 provided:
3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Sec. 15-4.2 (2d ed. 1986 Supp.). (2) The underlying rationale for this treatment of the question was recently restated in State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). "When a jury retires to consider their verdict, their discussion may produce disagreement or doubt or failure of definite recollection as to what a particular witness said in the course of his testimony. If they request enlightenment on the subject through a reading of his testimony, in the absence of some unusual circumstance, the request should be granted.
The assailants used the victim's money to purchase cocaine. State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 26, 1992). A jury convicted the defendant of felony murder and robbery, and the defendant was sentenced to life plus three years.
"); State v. Michaels, 264 N.J.Super. 579, 625 A.2d 489, 524 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1993) ("[W]e refuse to hold that it is never permissible, at a jury's request during deliberations, to replay a video-tape of testimony in its entirety for the jury, with the defendant present, in open court."); Bradley v. State, 561 P.2d 548, 553 (Okla. Crim.App. 1977) ("[T]he trial court [did not commit error] when it permitted the jury, after deliberation had begun, to return to the courtroom to listen to a tape recording of a witness."); State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1992) ("[T]he replaying of the recording of Mr. Kirby's testimony was the most accurate method available to comply with the jury's request. The trial court gave notice to the prosecutor and defense counsel regarding the request and the recording was played in open court"); State v. Morgensen, 148 Wash.App. 81, 197 P.3d 715, 719 (2008) ("[B]efore playing the audio-tape of the testimony in open court [to the deliberating jury], the trial court cautioned the parties not to make expressions of any kind during the playing of the tape.").
Id. (quoting State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)). Here, the testimony of interest to the jury was specifically identified and relevant to a factual matter at the heart of the case.
State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 202 (Tenn. 2016) (citing State v. Smith, 993 S.W.2d 6, 32 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)). Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.1 provides that "[u]nless for good cause the court determines otherwise, the jury shall take to the jury room for examination during deliberations all exhibits and writings, except depositions, that have been received in evidence."
(Tenn. 2016); see State v. Smith, 993 S.W.2d 6, 32 (Tenn. 1999). In State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 1992), this court stated: We believe that the decision to allow a jury to review any evidence submitted at trial, whether it be an exhibit or testimony
Strategic or tactical decisions are given deference on appeal if the choices are informed and based upon adequate preparation. See Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369; see also Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982); see also State v. Jenkins, 845 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Henry v. United States, 204 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir.1953) for the proposition that "[t]here is no iron-bound, copper-fastened, double-riveted rule against the admission of evidence after both parties have rested upon their proof and even after the jury has entered upon its deliberations.") This approach appears to have been successful because the Petitioner was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter rather than attempted first degree murder, and he avoided a potential sentence of life without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender under the three strikes law. T.C.A. ยง 40-35-120 (i) (2) (2019).