Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct.App. 2007). Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from evidence in a criminal prosecution of the person whose rights were violated. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 920, 155 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2007). The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home for a routine, non-exigent arrest, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380-81, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 659 (1980); Jenkins, 143 Idaho at 920, 155 P.3d at 1159; State v. Christiansen, 119 Idaho 841, 843, 810 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Ct.App. 1990), but it does not forbid warrantless arrests of individuals in a public place based upon probable cause.
An officer may make a warrantless arrest if the officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a felony. I.C. Β§ 19-603(2)-(3); State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 921-22, 155 P.3d 1157, 1160-61 (2007). Probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty.
An officer may make a warrantless arrest if the officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a felony. I.C. Β§ 19-603(2)-(3); State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 921-22, 155 P.3d 1157, 1160-61 (2007). Probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty.
Relatedly, when courts have extended protection to a garage, often great emphasis is given to the fact that the garage was closed. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 155 P.3d 1157, 1160 (2007) (extending Fourth Amendment protection to the garage because it "was part and parcel of the structure constituting his home, and was secured with a door closed at the time police arrived at the home") (emphasis added); Bies v. State, 76 Wis.2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461, 464 (1977) ("It is not disputed that the interior of defendant's garage was within the Fourth Amendment's protection. The garage was located within the curtilage of his dwelling, and it was not in any sense a semi-public area.
See United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Arresting officers have probable cause to make warrantless arrests if, at the moment of arrest, facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an offense."); State v. Jenkins, 155 P.3d 1157, 1161 (Idaho 2007) ("Judicial determination of probable cause focuses on the information and facts the officers possessed at the time.") (citation omitted). Because probable cause existed here, there was no violation of Mr. Wilson's constitutional rights.
For probable cause to exist, "an officer must have information that would lead a person of ordinary care to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty." State v. Jenkins , 143 Idaho 918, 922, 155 P.3d 1157, 1161 (2007). "In analyzing whether probable cause existed, this Court must determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the search warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate."
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 519 (3d Cir. 2003). See also State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 155 P.3d 1157, 1160 (2007) (noting "police with legitimate business, like other citizens, are entitled to enter areas of curtilage impliedly open to public use, such as sidewalks, driveways, and pathways to an entry"); 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure Β§ 2.3(f), at 600-02 (4th ed. 2004) (footnotes omitted) ( Fourth Amendment does not cover situations "when the police come on to private property to conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches)"); 1 W. Ringel, Searches Seizures, Arrests and Confessions Β§ 8:17, at 8-46 (2d ed. 2009) (footnote omitted) ("Officers are allowed to knock on a residence's door or otherwise approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants just as any private citizen may, without probable cause, a warrant, or exigent circumstances"); cf. State v. DeCoteau, 1999 ND 77, ΒΆ 19, 592 N.W.2d 579 ("It is not a Fourth Amendment seizure for a police officer to appro
Id. When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals. State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 920, 155 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2007) (citing State v. Benefiek 131 Idaho 226, 228, 953 P.2d 976, 978 (1998)). When reviewing a motion to suppress, the standard of review is bifurcated.
In doing so, the State has the burden of proving the facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Jenkins , 143 Idaho 918, 920, 155 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2007). To prove that the search fell within an exception or was otherwise reasonable, the State must determine which of the exceptions it intends to argue as the basis for admitting the evidence, admit the evidence that is relevant to that exception, and then argue the exception to the district court.
In doing so, the State has the burden of proving the facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 920, 155 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2007). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that "issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court."