In his brief on appeal, the defendant notes that the motion to suppress relied on both the state and federal constitutions as legal support for his position. He concedes on appeal, however, that there is no distinction between the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut with respect to the scope of consent to search. See State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 261, 3 A.3d 806 (2010). The parties stipulated to a number of facts concerning the motion to suppress.
Id.; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (“one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search [or seizure] that is conducted pursuant to consent”). The state bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence; State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 249 n. 32, 3 A.3d 806 (2010); that “the consent was free and voluntary.... The state must affirmatively establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the state's burden.... The question whether consent to a search has in fact been freely and voluntarily given, or was the product of coercion, express or implied ... is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.... As a question of fact, it is normally to be decided by the trial court upon the evidence before that court together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.... We may reverse [the trial court's factual] findings on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous.... Thus, [w]hether there was valid consent to a search is a factual question that will not be lightly overturned on appeal.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 249–50, 3 A.3d 806.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 250–51, 3 A.3d 806 (2010). “In evaluating the voluntariness of the defendant's consent, we note that, while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.”
As we explain more fully in part III of this opinion, we have long held that article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution is the criminal due process clause of our state constitution and that it affords no greater protections than the protections afforded under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins , 298 Conn. 209, 259 n.39, 3 A.3d 806 (2010). The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
The fourth amendment has been made applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment.” State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 212 n. 1, 3 A.3d 806 (2010). of our state constitution, is made pursuant to a totality of circumstances test.... Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a felony has been committed.... The probable cause test then is an objective one....
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taupier , 330 Conn. 149, 175, 193 A.3d 1 (2018) ; see also State v. Jenkins , 298 Conn. 209, 262, 3 A.3d 806 (2010) (recognizing that these factors "may be inextricably interwoven [and] [n]ot every [such] factor is relevant in all cases" ( [internal quotation marks omitted] ). For example, because the issue before us concerns the protection of Miranda rights—rights that were first recognized in 1966—historical insights into the intent of the framers as to this particular issue is not a relevant consideration.
The questions posed during a traffic stop no longer need to be reasonably related to the initial justification of the stop in order to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment; the length of the stop, however, is limited by the time required to conduct a reasonable investigation into the initial justification for the stop. See id. at 488-89; Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 438; State v. Jenkins, 3 A.3d 806, 828-29 (Conn. 2010). {19} In sum, after an officer has made a stop based on at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, "[a]n officer's subsequent actions are not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that caused him to stop the vehicle if he detains its occupants beyond the time needed to investigate the circumstances that caused the stop, unless he develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity in the meantime."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 212 n. 1, 3 A.3d 806 (2010).
As our Supreme Court has held, "the defendant's reliance on this section is, in essence, superfluous, because, in the search and seizure context, article first, § 9, is our criminal due process provision that does not provide protections greater than those afforded by either the fourth amendment or its coordinate specific state constitutional provision, article first, § 7." State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 259 n. 39, 3 A.3d 806 (2010); see also State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 669 n. 1, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) ( Borden, J., dissenting). We begin with our standard of review and the governing legal principles.
"Whether an officer’s continued detention of a person is consistent with constitutional limits is a deeply factual question dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case." State v. Nieves, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CR10 169457 (August 25, 2010, Wenzel, J.) Our Supreme Court addressed the proper analysis for considering the constitutionality of the detention of a motorist during a routine traffic stop in State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209 (2010); see also State v. Sward, 124 Conn.App. 546 (2010). In State v. Jenkins, our Supreme Court stated that "[c]ourts considering the constitutionality under the fourth amendment of a police officer’s interaction with a motorist during a routine traffic stop apply the principles developed under the line of case law implementing the central holding of Terry v. Ohio, [ 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ] ... Under Terry, where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot ... the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions."