[¶ 30.] A number of states have followed the constitutional analysis and policy considerations in Custis and recognized that constitutional considerations do not require courts to entertain collateral attacks on prior convictions used for enhancement purposes unless the defendant claims the predicate conviction was uncounseled. See, e.g., State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 (2004); State v. Veikoso, 102 Hawai‘i 219, 74 P.3d 575 (2003); State v. Hahn, 238 Wis.2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528 (2000); State v. Mund, 593 N.W.2d 760 (N.D.1999); State v. Chiles, 260 Kan. 75, 917 P.2d 866 (1996); State v. Janes, 141 N.H. 364, 684 A.2d 499 (1996); McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931 (Ky.1994), People v. Carpentier, 446 Mich. 19, 521 N.W.2d 195 (1994). Some states have examined Custis and explicitly declined to adopt the reasoning based on an interpretation that the state's constitution offers greater protection than that afforded by the federal Constitution.
only if the defendant was denied counsel; accordingly, those jurisdictions have declined to extend the right to collaterally attack convictions beyond what is mandated by the federal constitution or specifically provided for by statute. See, e.g., State v. Veikoso, 102 Haw. 219, 74 P.3d 575 (2003) (holding that a defendant may not collaterally attack prior counseled DUI convictions on the basis that they were obtained as the result of allegedly invalid guilty pleas); State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 90 P.3d 314 (2004) (holding that violation of provision of criminal rules governing the practice of accepting guilty pleas did not provide independent basis to collaterally attack validity of prior convictions used to enhance subsequent sentences); State v. Muni, 593 N.W.2d 760 (N.D., 1999) (holding that when guilty pleas are offered for enhancement purposes in subsequent criminal proceedings, collateral attacks are limited to an inquiry of whether defendant was denied assistance of counsel); State v. Janes, 141 N.H. 364, 684 A.2d 499 (1996) (holding that defendant could not collaterally attack prior out-of-state conviction on the ground that he was never advised of his rights to remain silent and confront adverse witnesses); Vester v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App.592, 593 S.E.2d 551 (2004) (holding that defendant was not entitled to collaterally attack the validity of his prior misdemeanor DUI convictions on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel); State v. Hahn, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528 (2000) (holding that defendant had no federal constitutional right to challenge in his third-strike proceeding as a repeater on the basis that his prior conviction was obtained from a guilty plea that was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary). But see People v. Soto, 46 Cal. App.4th 1596, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (1996) (stating that Custis set forth a federal procedural rule and was not intended to prohibit constitutional attacks on prior convictions in state courts).
For other states interpreting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), as we do, see Colorado v. Padilla, 907 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1995);Kansas v. Chiles, 917 P.2d 866 (Kan. 1996); McGuire v. Kentucky, 885 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1994); State v. Janes, 684 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1996). Custis does not bar states from allowing offenders to challenge prior state convictions in state enhanced sentence proceedings.
The State does not argue that the petitioner failed to raise a proper issue for a collateral challenge to a prior conviction. See State v. Weeks, 141 N.H. 248, 252-253, 681 A.2d 86, 89-90 (1996); State v. Janes, 141 N.H. 364, 366, 684 A.2d 499, 500 (1996). Therefore, we do not address the argument here.