Opinion
ID. No. 0009015005 (R-5).
Submitted: November 1, 2010.
Decided: December 10, 2010.
James St. Louis, SBI# 00, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, DE.
Dear Mr. St. Louis:
Defendant James St. Louis ("defendant") has filed his fifth motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). Because the Court and defendant are well-aware of the procedural history of his case and the substance of the decisions on his previous Rule 61 motions, I will not outline all of that information. Instead, I will turn directly to his current contentions. Defendant's current motion is procedurally barred on every prong of Rule 61(i). Defendant attempts to place at least two of his three arguments within exceptions to the procedural bars, although he does not specify which exception(s) apply(ies) to his case. To the extent defendant fails to clarify his arguments so that the Court cannot discern them, defendant's arguments fail for lack of clarity.
The version of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) applicable to defendant's case provides as follows:
Bars to relief. (1) Time limitation. A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than three years after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court.
(2) Repetitive motion. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding, as required by subdivision (b)(2) of this rule, is thereafter barred, unless consideration of the claim in warranted in the interest of justice.
(3) Procedural default. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows
(A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and
(B) Prejudice from violation of the movant's rights.
(4) Former adjudication. Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
(5) Bars inapplicable. The bars to relief in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subdivision shall not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.
Defendant makes conclusory statements, cites some cases, and expects this Court to develop his arguments for him. It is defendant's job to clearly state an argument and if he does not do so, then he has failed to establish his claim(s).
Defendant's first argument is as follows:
Ground one: FAILURE TO FOLLOW 3507 REGULATIONS/NEW RULING IN 3507 CASES PER: BLAKE/STEVENS/WATERMAN — MADE RETROACTIVE THROUGH TEAGUES AND THE DELAWARE STATE LAWS IN RESENTLY [sic] RULED CASES
Supporting facts . . .: UNDER 3507 STATEMENTS OF THE DECLARANT MUST BE INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE NO LATER THAN AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DIRECT TESTIMONY OF THE DECLARANT. IN CASE AT HAND THE TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS WERE OFFERED INTO EVIDENCE THROUGH BUSTER RICHARDSON THUS GIVING UNDO [sic] EMPHASIS TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.
In this case, the victim, who was eight years old at the time of trial, testified, as did her younger sister. Both were interviewed at the Children's Advocacy Center ("CAC") by Ralph ("Buster") Richardson concerning the events that led to defendant's charges. Those interviews were taped and the videotapes were admitted, over defendant's objections, into evidence pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 3507.
In 11 Del. C. § 3507, it is provided in pertinent part as follows:
(a) In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent testimonial value.
(b) The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply regardless of whether the witness' in-court testimony is consistent with the prior statement or not. The rule shall likewise apply with or without a showing of surprise by the introducing party.
For purposes of the pending motion, it is appropriate to note the following facts. The victim testified on direct examination and the Superior Court ruled the foundational requirements of 11 Del. C. § 3507 were met. Docket Entry 37, Transcript of April 26, 2001, Proceedings at B-33 — 38. This determination was made at the end of the victim's direct testimony. At that time, the § 3507 statements were allowed to come in. They had to come in through Mr. Richardson as he laid the foundation for their entry. Id. at B-40 — B-52. Thereafter, defense counsel cross-examined the victim. Docket Entry 69, Transcript of April 26, 2001, Proceedings at BB-51 — BB-59. Then, the State of Delaware ("the State") conducted its redirect examination. Id. at BB-59-61.
The victim's sister also testified and the Superior Court ruled that the foundational requirements of 11 Del. C. § 3507 were met. Id. at BB-73-4. This determination was made at the end of the sister's direct testimony. At that time, the taped statements were allowed to be introduced, and the foundation for their introduction had to be laid through Mr. Richardson. Id. at BB-75 — 78. The sister was cross-examined, id. at BB-81 — 82, and then examined on redirect, id. at BB-82 — 83.
The procedures for admission of the videotapes under 11 Del. C. § 3507 were followed properly, as the Supreme Court previously has ruled. St. Louis v. State, 2010 WL 3860624, * 2 (Del. Oct. 4, 2010). There is no dispute on this issue.
Defendant apparently is "arguing" that his first argument falls within the "newly recognized rights" exception based on the propositions set forth in Waterman v. State, 956 A.2d 1261 (Del. 2008) (" Waterman"); Stevens v. State, 3 A.3d 1070 (Del. 2010) (" Stevens"); and Blake v. State, 3 A.3d 1077 (Del. 2010), that a police officer may not opine on a witness's credibility and any such opinion statements should be redacted before a jury hears and/or views a tape containing such. This is not new law, as it has been established since 1998. Holtzman v. State, 718 A.2d 528, 1998 WL 666722, at **4-5 (Del. July 27, 1998)(TABLE). Thus, the exception to the Rule 61 procedural bars based upon recently recognized rights does not apply.
Blake v. State, 3 A.3d 1077 (Del. 2010) is an inappropriate citation for this proposition.
Even if the Court ruled that an exception to the bars existed, defendant's claim, as set forth, fails on its merits. The propositions to which defendant cites is not the argument he makes. In other words, the law of Waterman and Stevens does not support defendant's argument. Defendant's argument is that introducing the tapes through Mr. Richardson made the statements of the victim and her sister appear to be more truthful. That is a meritless argument. The rules of evidence required that the tapes be introduced through Mr. Richardson. This claim fails.
Defendant's second argument is as follows:
IN SEPTEMBER OF 2009 THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT REDRESSED THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY ORDERING THE PROSECUTOR TO BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING THE TRIBUNAL OF ANY MITIGATING EVIDENCE THAT HAS PRESENTED ITSELF SO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING CAN BE HELD TO FIND THE TRUTH. IN CASE AT HAND THE PROSECUTOR WAS TOLD OF WITNESS BRIBERY AND TAMPERING YET TO THIS DAY HAS NOT NOTIFIED THE TRIBUAL WHICH UNDER THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT HAS NO TIME OR PROCEDURAL BAR.
Defendant does not provide any citations to his argument. However, he repeatedly has made this vague, conclusory argument about witness bribery and witness tampering and it has been denied each time. State v. St. Louis, 2008 WL 601630 (Del. Super. March 6, 2008), aff'd, 963 A.2d 139, 2008 WL 5264417 (Del. Dec. 18, 2008) (TABLE); State v. St. Louis, Del. Super., Def. ID# 0009015005, Stokes, J. (Jan. 19, 2010), aff'd, 2010 WL 2164596 (Del. May 18, 2010). See also St. Louis v. Marshall, 2007 WL 1202845 (D. Del. April 16, 2007), app. den., 248 Fed. Appx. 343, 2007 WL 2683021 (C.A. 3 Sept. 13, 2007), cert. den., 552 U.S. 1233 (2008), reh. den. 552 U.S. 1333 (2008). He has failed to provide any valid reason for it to be considered now.
Defendant's third argument, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, is as follows:
FAILURE TO PROTECT THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS BY ALLOWING THE JUDGE TO ALLOW THE TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS THAT WERE VIDEOTAPED INTO JURY DELIBERATION WHEN THE JURY WAS DEADLOCKED AND THE VIEWING OF THIS VIDEO PLACED UNDO [sic] EMPHASIS ON THE TESTIMONY AND WAS A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THEIR DECISION//FAILURE TO TELL THE TRIBUNAL OF THE WITNESS BRIBERY AND TAMPERING TO THE TRIBUNAL//FAILURE TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT UNDER 3507 ON REDACTING AND INTRODUCTION OF THE 3507 STATEMENTS// FAILURE TO FILE SUPPRESSION OF THE ILLEGAL STATEMENTS UNDER 3507// FAILURE TO OBJECT AT CRUCIAL TIMES.
As defendant is well aware, these same arguments, except for the redacting argument under § 3507, have been made and addressed before and, in some cases, multiple times before. Defendant makes absolutely no attempt to place these arguments within the parameters of the exceptions to the procedural bars. To the extent the redacting argument might fall within the "newly recognized right" exception, the decision on the first argument establishes there is no merit to the underlying argument. Thus, defendant cannot establish either ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice. This argument fails.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's fifth motion for postconviction relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.