However, "[i]f a conspiracy continues for any purpose, such as the concealing of the crime or taking measures to prevent or defeat prosecution, the declarations of one co-conspirator are admissible against the other, even if made after the completion of the crime which had been the objective of the conspiring." State v. Jacobs, 813 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991) (citation omitted); and see Moss v. State, 10 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. banc 2000) ("A witness may testify to statements of a co-conspirator that show the furtherance of the conspiracy and the fact that declarations are made by a conspirator after the crime has been consummated does not necessarily make such declarations inadmissible") (citation omitted).
A prosecutor has the right to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Jacobs, 813 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Mo.App. 1991). This includes the right to draw any inference from the evidence which he believes in good faith to be justified.
We disagree. First, in Missouri, Defendant's right to a fair cross-section of the community does not extend to the composition of the petit jury. West, 866 S.W.2d at 154[5]; State v. Jacobs, 813 S.W.2d 318, 321[7] (Mo.App. 1991). Defendant has no right to a jury of any specific racial composition.
In Missouri, although a defendant has the right to have the petit jury drawn from a venire that represents a fair cross-section of the community, the fair cross-section requirement does not extend to the composition of the petit jury. State v. Jacobs, 813 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo.App. 1991). In order to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement, the defendant must show:
The letter written during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy was properly admitted against Daniels and Minor. See State v. Cacic, supra (statement made by one co-conspirator at least seven months after the crime was committed was admissible against other co-conspirators); State v. Jacobs (Mo.App. 1991), 813 S.W.2d 318 (three letters written by appellant's co-conspirators after the crime had been committed were properly admitted into evidence). Cf. State v. Duerr (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 404, 8 OBR 526, 457 N.E.2d 843, certiorari denied (1983), 464 U.S. 816, 104 S.Ct. 74, 78 L.Ed.2d 86 (where the crime has already been committed, an out-of-court statement of a co-conspirator of the defendant which confesses his complicity in the crime and implicates the defendant is not a statement made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy).
Fleer's third contention is that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State's argument that on the day that Tyler and Price were murdered, Howlett received a collect phone call from Las Vegas at 10:26 St. Louis time. Again, the trial court is vested with broad discretion in controlling closing argument. State v. Jacobs, 813 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Mo.App. 1991). Wide latitude is accorded counsel in summation.
A trial court is to accord counsel for both sides wide latitude in making reasonable inferences from the evidence as they argue. State v. Jacobs, 813 S.W.2d 318 (Mo.App. 1991). We conclude that the state's argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence and that Allen's point is without merit.