Opinion
No. 91S03837DI (R3)
July 10, 2002
Dear Mr. Jackson:
On July 10, 2002, the Court received your third Motion for Postconviction Relief. I find it is procedurally barred and it must therefore be denied.
In April of 1992, you were found guilty of attempted murder in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy in the second degree. You received a sentence of 25 years at Level 5 to be followed by probation. Following your sentence, problems developed with your trial attorney and another attorney was appointed for purposes of prosecuting the appeal. On the direct appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to Superior Court for purposes of resolving a claim that your trial attorney was ineffective. This was unique and I think done on an experimental basis. On remand, it was alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in ten separate claims.
On June 15, 1993, this Court issued a decision which held that your trial attorney was not ineffective. Thereafter, the Supreme Court reviewed both the alleged trial errors (i.e., direct appeal) and the Rule 61 application concerning ineffective assistance of trial counsel and affirmed your conviction. Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 648 A.2d 424 (1994).
Subsequently, on June 19, 1996, you filed a second Motion for Postconviction Relief alleging that your appellate counsel had been ineffective. On September 10, 1996, I denied this application and this ruling was subsequently affirmed on appeal. George Jackson v. State of Delaware, Del. Supr., No. 410, 1996, Veasey, C. J. (April 16, 1997) (Order).
Now in 2002, you've filed a third Motion for Postconviction Relief alleging that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory information and also that your trial attorney was ineffective in his manner of cross-examination, or lack of cross-examination of a State's key witness.
Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1), you have three years following a determination that your conviction is final. It has been 8 years since the Supreme Court affirmed your conviction. Clearly, you are outside the window permitted under Rule 61. I find that there is no miscarriage of justice because of the constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to your conviction under Rule 61(i)(5). You allege that the original probable cause affidavit, the warrant sheet, the preliminary hearing testimony, and the victim's prior statement along with supplemental reports, made no mention or reference to her fear for her life, i.e., her trial testimony. There is nothing in your allegations that states that there was a failure to provide you exculpatory information. All of the information claimed by you was public record. Therefore, the three-year bar is applicable and this ground is dismissed.
As to the ground alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it is likewise dismissed as it is procedurally barred. Not only do you fall within the same time limitation bar of Rule 61(i)(1), but the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel has also been litigated by you previously and therefore there is a former adjudication under 61(i)(4). In other words, you attacked your attorney's performance earlier and now many, many years later, you wish to attack him again. Since you have had the benefit of a Superior Court ruling and a Supreme Court ruling on an ineffective assistance of counsel, I find that you are barred from proceeding with this claim.
Therefore, under the bars of 61(i)(1) and 61(i)(4), your existing Rule 61 application is denied. Furthermore, I do not find there is any reason to revisit any of your claims based upon the interest of justice.
SO ORDERED.