Opinion
2210001670
08-13-2024
STATE OF DELAWARE v. NEHEMIAH P. JACKSON Defendant.
IPEK KURUL, ESQ., DAG NEHEMIAH JACKSON
IPEK KURUL, ESQ., DAG NEHEMIAH JACKSON
ORDER DENYING MOTON FOR APPOINTMENT OF POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL
Jan R. Jurden, President Judge
AND NOW TO WIT, this 7th day of August, 2024, the Court having duly considered Nehemiah P. Jackson's ("Jackson") Motion for Appointment of Counsel and the Record, IT APPEARS THAT:
(1) On September 22, 2023, Jackson pled guilty to one count of Manslaughter and one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony ("PFDCF"). On October 3, 2023, the Court sentenced Jackson as follows: for Manslaughter, 12 years at Level V, suspended after 5 years at Level V for 3 years at Level IV, suspended after 6 months at Level IV for 18 months and Level III; and for PFDCF, 10 years at Level V, suspended after 5 years at Level V for 2 years at Level III. Jackson was sentenced to a total of 10 years of unsuspended Level V time.
D.I. 32.
D.I. 36.
Id.
(2) Jackson did not file a direct appeal.
(3) On June 21, 2024, Jackson filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
D.I. 37.
D.I. 38.
(4) Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(2):
The judge shall appoint counsel for an indigent movant's first timely postconviction motion and request for appointment of counsel if the motion seeks to set aside: (i) a judgment of conviction after a trial that has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review and is for a crime designated as a class A, B, or C felony under 11 Del. C. § 4205(b); (ii) a judgment of conviction after a trial that has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review and resulted in the imposition of a life sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214; or (iii) a sentence of death.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(2).
(5) Because Jackson pled guilty and did not file a direct appeal he fails to satisfy Rule 61(e)(2)(i).
Jackson does not meet the criteria set forth in Rule 61(e)(4) for the same reasons. See Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(e)(4) ("The judge may appoint counsel for any other first postconviction motion only if the judge determines that: (i) the motion is an indigent movant's first timely postconviction motion and request for appointment of counsel; (ii) the motion seeks to set aside a judgment of conviction after a trial that has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate review; (iii) the motion sets forth a substantial claim that the movant received ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel; (iv) the motion sets forth a substantial claim that the movant is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or the Delaware Constitution; (v) granting the motion would result in vacatur of the judgment of conviction for which the movant is in custody; and (vi) specific exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel.") (emphasis added).
WHEREFORE, Jackson's Motion for Appointment of Postconviction Counsel is DENIED.