Opinion
No. 05-08-01111-CR
Opinion Filed April 19, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 4, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MB08-50411-E.
Before Justices MOSELEY, Fitzgerald, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Edwin Lee Jackson was charged with possession of marijuana in an amount of two ounces or less. The trial court granted Jackson's motion to suppress evidence and the State appeals. In a single issue, the State argues the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law to the undisputed facts. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at the hearing are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings. The only witness to testify at the suppression hearing was Dallas police officer David Baker. Baker and other officers were patrolling a Dallas neighborhood at night in search of a robbery suspect. Baker was driving an unmarked car. During the patrol, Baker saw Jackson, who strongly resembled the robbery suspect, standing in the entryway of an apartment with two known prostitutes. Jackson began walking down a main street when a Chevrolet HHR pulled next to him and he got into the car. Police followed the HHR for several minutes. At one point, Jackson moved from the passenger seat to the driver's seat and drove off. The HHR came to a stop at an intersection, resting in both lanes of traffic. Baker stopped his unmarked vehicle three or four car-lengths behind the HHR. Jackson got out and began walking down the middle of the street toward Baker's vehicle. Baker testified there was a sidewalk adjacent to the street. Jackson appeared agitated, but walked at a normal pace. Baker thought it was very unusual that Jackson walked back to Baker's vehicle. When Jackson was at the driver's door, Baker got out, identified himself as a police officer, and, at gunpoint, took Jackson to the side of the street and handcuffed him. Baker testified he arrested Jackson for walking down the street when a sidewalk was available. Police also arrested the passenger in the HHR on an outstanding warrant and found a small bag of marijuana in plain view on the center console of the HHR. The passenger claimed ownership of the marijuana. Baker noticed a black leather jacket in the backseat of the HHR and asked if it belonged to Jackson. Jackson said it was his. Baker took the jacket over to Jackson and searched the pockets. Inside the pockets were clear plastic bags of marijuana. Baker explained it was standard procedure to search a suspect's clothing before they are booked and jailed. Jackson was charged with possession of the marijuana in the jacket. The trial court granted Jackson's motion to suppress the evidence, stating the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Jackson because their actions caused the traffic violation for which he was arrested. The trial court stated Jackson was in the roadway because he was being followed and had a reason to wonder what was going on. Whether a specific search or seizure was reasonable is a mixed question of law and fact and is reviewed de novo. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review giving almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports, and a de novo standard for the legal components of the trial court's decision. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). This case is similar in many ways to State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). There, based on a tip that Gray would be carrying narcotics, sheriff deputies staked out an intersection expecting Gray to pass through. Gray later stopped at the intersection and turned without signaling his intention to turn. The deputies stopped Gray for the traffic violation and over the next hour Gray consented to two searches of his vehicle. Even though the searches did not find narcotics, the deputies arrested Gray for the traffic violation and later found narcotics on his person. Id. at 467-68. The trial court granted a motion to suppress the evidence, making an express written ruling that the sheriff's department "engineered a pretext detention of Gray" for failing to signal a turn. Id. at 468. The court of appeals reversed. Gray argued the court of appeals did not defer to the trial court's factual finding that the stop was a pretext. The court of criminal appeals recognized that the court of appeals gave the appropriate respect to the trial court's findings of fact, but properly disagreed with the trial court on the legal consequences of those facts. The court stated that
[t]he undisputed fact that an officer saw Gray commit the offense of turning without signaling his intention gave the officer probable cause to believe he had committed an offense under the Rules of the Road statutes. Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.01(b) says, "A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view." More specifically, Section 543.001 of the Transportation Code says, "Any peace officer may arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation of this [Rules of the Road] subtitle." Such an arrest for a minor traffic offense is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the officer may have had another subjective motive for seizing Gray would not have made an objectively reasonable seizure unlawful under the constitutions of the United States or of this state. The officer lawfully arrested Gray at that point. Incident to such an arrest the officer could have lawfully searched Gray's person and the passenger compartment of Gray's vehicle and the containers in it. The officer who had arrested Gray had discretion to transport him to a magistrate or to release him with a notice to appear in court.Gray, 158 S.W.3d at 469-70 (footnotes omitted). Thus the court of criminal appeals affirmed the court of appeals. Id. at 470. The same analysis applies here. The trial court did not make written findings, but stated on the record that Jackson would not have been walking in the street if he had not been followed by the police. Thus, the trial court found Jackson committed the traffic violation as described by Baker, but that the traffic violation was caused by the officer's activities. We give deference to the factual findings. However, we review de novo the legal consequences of those findings. Jackson was arrested for violating the rules of the road regarding pedestrians using a sidewalk. Tex. Transp Code Ann. § 552.006(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009) ("A pedestrian may not walk along and on a roadway if an adjacent sidewalk is provided and is accessible to the pedestrian."). Performing an act prohibited by the rules of the road subtitle is a misdemeanor offense unless otherwise provided. Id. § 542.301(a), (b) (Vernon 1999) ("A person commits an offense if the person performs an act prohibited . . . by this subtitle."). A peace officer may arrest without a warrant a person found committing a violation of the rules of the road subtitle. Id. § 543.001; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2005) ("A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view."). Jackson's reason for being in the street has no legal significance to whether he committed the offense in Baker's presence, and thus was subject to arrest. Even if Baker intended to cause Jackson to commit a traffic offense, an officer's subjective intent cannot make what would otherwise be a reasonable seizure unreasonable. Gray, at 469-70. Thus, Baker had probable cause to arrest Jackson for the traffic violation. Incident to that arrest, the search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle and Jackson's jacket was reasonable. See Gray, 158 S.W.3d at 469-70. We conclude the trial abused its discretion by granting the motion to suppress. We sustain the State's issue. We reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.