It seems clear that counsel's strategy—based on a misunderstanding of the law—was objectively unreasonable, resulting in deficient performance. See Bowers, 929 So. 2d at 1201 ("In that there was no physical evidence linking [the defendant] to the instant crime, and in that the State's case rested solely on [the victim's] testimony, informing the jury of [the defendant's] prior convictions on similar offenses was prejudicial to [the] defense and, as such, was not a reasonable defense strategy."); State v. Jackson, 204 So. 3d 958, 964 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (concluding that counsel rendered deficient performance where she misunderstood the law on insanity as a defense); cf. Lamb v. State, 124 So. 3d 953, 957 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("Trial counsel's explanation for failing to file the motion reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between a motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial. We conclude that counsel's decision to forego a motion for new trial was not reasonable trial strategy.").

The failure to present any evidence that Campbell was not the only person in the vehicle that day, and thus to rebut the inference of Campbell's knowledge of and control over the drugs, falls below the standard of reasonably effective counsel. See State v. Plummer, 228 So.3d 661, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (concluding that counsel performed deficiently by failing to present evidence as to the nature of the gun—BB or airsoft—where the defendant was charged with carrying a weapon); Kruse v. State, 222 So.3d 13, 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (concluding counsel performed deficiently in failing to request a self-defense instruction where self-defense was the only proffered defense to the charge); State v. Jackson, 204 So.3d 958, 964 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (concluding that counsel rendered deficient performance where she misunderstood the law on insanity as a defense). Campbell established deficient performance of trial counsel.