Opinion
2015 KA 1710
04-15-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MAURICE LEON JACKSON
Warren L. Montgomery District Attorney Matthew Caplan Assistant District Attorney Covington, LA Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee State of Louisiana Frederick H. Kroenke, Jr. Louisiana Appellate Project Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Maurice Leon Jackson
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana
No. 558903 "E" The Honorable William J. Burris, Judge Presiding Warren L. Montgomery
District Attorney
Matthew Caplan
Assistant District Attorney
Covington, LA Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
State of Louisiana Frederick H. Kroenke, Jr.
Louisiana Appellate Project
Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Maurice Leon Jackson BEFORE: GUIDRY, HOLDRIDGE, AND CHUTZ, JJ. HOLDRIDGE, J.
The defendant, Maurice Jackson, was charged by bill of information with second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Following a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for new trial. The defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labor. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the constitutionality of the sentence, and to the trial court's failure to dispose of the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal prior to sentencing. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 9, 2014, during the early morning hours, a complainant arrived at the Slidell Police Department to report a loud disturbance by his neighbors at the Long Stay Motel. The complainant suspected that a female neighbor (Shametris L. Wittington, the victim herein) was being attacked by a male neighbor, the defendant. Based on the complaint, Detective Thomas McNulty and Sergeant Jeffrey Kahrs went to the scene to investigate. The officers went to the room number specified by the complainant, and the victim answered the door. She had apparent severe injuries to her face and head, including multiple lacerations, swelling, and bruising, indicating that she had been severely beaten. The victim invited the officers into the room which was in disarray and there was evidence of a struggle. Sergeant Kahrs photographed the scene and the victim. Droplets of blood were located on the floor by the sink in a bathroom area. During questioning at the scene, the victim indicated that she had been in a physical altercation with the defendant, her husband, whom she identified by name. She stated that the defendant grabbed her, threw her to the ground, grabbed her hair, and punched her in the face. She did not mention any other altercation. The interview was recorded on Detective McNulty's personal body camera and was played at trial. The police persuaded the initially reluctant victim to go to the hospital due to the severity of her injuries. At the trial, the victim was declared a hostile witness. When asked if she recalled the incident in question, she initially stated, "I plead the Fifth." The victim then indicated that her injuries were the result of a fight that she had with a female in a club, later stating that it was more than one female. She denied that she was beaten at her hotel room by the defendant.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In assignment of error number one, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is unconstitutionally excessive. The defendant notes that he grew up in the projects of New Orleans, which he describes as a traumatic environment that included drug dealers, drug users, and "an inordinate amount of crime." The defendant notes that at the age of ten, he witnessed the murder of a man. He further notes that despite these circumstances, he graduated from high school, maintained employment, and has always supported his family consisting of five children. The defendant argues that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors and that while he needs some incarceration and anger management, the imposed sentence is disproportionate.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive or cruel punishment. Although a sentence may fall within statutory limits, it may nevertheless violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266, 267 (La. 1982). A trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982); State v. Fairley, 97-1026 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/98), 711 So.2d 349, 352-53.
The Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth, in Article 894.1, items that must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence. Generally, the trial court need not recite the entire checklist of factors, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the criteria. Fairley, 711 So.2d at 352. However, the failure to articulate reasons for the sentence as set forth in Article 894.1 when imposing a mandatory life sentence is not an error; articulating reasons or factors would be an exercise in futility since the court has no discretion. State v. Felder, 2000-2887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 360, 371, writ denied, 2001-3027 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1173.
At the time of the offense, the defendant's conviction for second degree battery was punishable by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or both. La. R.S. 14:34.1(C) (prior to amendment by 2014 La. Acts, No. 722, § 1, increasing the statutory maximum years of imprisonment to eight). Therefore, the defendant's sentence for second degree battery, although within the applicable sentencing range, was the maximum sentence allowed under the law at the time of the offense. As a general rule, maximum sentences are to be reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. James, 2002-2079 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 574, 586.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion. As reiterated on appeal, the defense attorney informed the trial court that the defendant grew up in a harsh environment, witnessed a murder at a young age, graduated from high school, maintained employment, has five children, supported his family, and wanted to reconcile with his wife. The State argued that the defendant's witnessing of a murder did not justify his violent acts, and noted that the victim needed protection from the defendant. Before imposing the sentence, the trial court noted that the presentence investigation report (PSI) showed that the defendant had other arrests, including one for domestic abuse battery by strangulation that was pending at the time of the sentencing, and one involving possession of marijuana. The PSI also showed that the defendant had been convicted of possession of controlled dangerous substances in Texas, and had a charge of possession of marijuana for which there was no disposition. The trial court further noted that the defendant used threats and actual violence in the commission of the instant offense, which resulted in very significant injuries suffered by the victim. See La. Code Crim. P. arts. 894.1(B)(6) and (B)(9). The trial court also noted that the defendant should have considered his children before committing the offense. The trial court found that there was an undue risk that during any period of probation the defendant would commit another crime; that the defendant was in need of correctional treatment that could most effectively be provided by commitment to the correctional institution; and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. See La. Code Crim. P. arts. 894.1(A)(1), (A)(2) & (A)(3). The trial court adequately considered the statutory guidelines and stated for the record the mitigating and aggravating factors considered in imposing the sentence. Given the particular circumstances of this case, including the defendant's background and the extent of the victim's injuries revealed in the video and photographs taken at the scene, the record provides ample justification for the sentence imposed by the trial court. We find that the trial court reasonably considered the defendant one of the worst offenders and the instant crime one of the worst offenses of its kind. The sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or shocking to the sense of justice. Therefore, the sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive in this case. Accordingly, the first assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In assignment of error number two, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not disposing of the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal prior to sentencing. The defendant cites State v. Magee, 496 So.2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) in concluding that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion is an error patent on the face of the record and requires that the sentence be vacated. The defendant contends that this Court should vacate the sentence, remand for a ruling on the motion and sentencing, reserving the defendant's right to appeal the sentence anew.
While the motion for new trial was filed on July 1, 2015, several weeks before the sentencing hearing, the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal and motion for appeal were filed on the day of the sentencing, August 14, 2015. At the commencement of the hearing, the State noted that the case was set for the motion for the new trial and the sentencing. The defense stated its desire to submit the motion for new trial on the pleading. After the trial court denied the motion for new trial, the court asked if the defendant was waiving the twenty-four hour delay between the ruling on the motion for new trial and sentencing. One of the defense attorneys responded, "Yes, Your Honor." The trial court noted that it received and provided counsel on both sides with the PSI and asked the following, "Are there any matters other than -- that you-all would like to bring forward?" In response, one of the defense attorneys stated that they would like to make a brief argument before sentencing and proceeded to present mitigating factors consistent with the circumstances noted on appeal in assignment of error number one. After listening to a response by the State, the trial court stated the basis and considerations for sentencing and imposed the sentence. The defense generally objected to the sentence, followed by an oral motion to reconsider which was denied. There was no mention of a postverdict judgment of acquittal and no indication as to whether it was filed before the hearing or later that same date. On August 17, 2015, three days after the sentencing, the trial court denied the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal and signed the order of appeal.
We note that pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 916, a trial court is divested of jurisdiction upon the granting of a defendant's motion for an appeal. The motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal and the motion for appeal were filed on August 14, 2015, the same day as the sentencing. Also, the denial of the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal and the order of appeal were signed on August 17, 2015, three days after the sentencing. A defendant can appeal from a final conviction only where sentence has been imposed. State v. Chapman, 471 So.2d 716 (La. 1985) (per curiam); State v. London, 316 So.2d 743 (La. 1975). Based on the record before us, including the fact that the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was not mentioned at the sentencing hearing, it appears that the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was filed along with the motion for appeal, after the trial court imposed the sentence and denied the motion to reconsider sentence. Even assuming that the motion for appeal was premature or that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction at the time of the sentencing or denial of the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal, the error would be harmless in this case and dismissal of the appeal would not be warranted. See
A motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal must be made and disposed of before sentence. La. Code Crim. P. art. 821. Assuming the defendant filed the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal later that day after the sentence was imposed, the motion was untimely and no error occurred in imposing the sentence before the motion was denied. La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(A); see also State v. Jones, 345 So.2d 1157, 1160 (1977). Alternatively, assuming the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal was timely filed prior to the sentencing, as opposed to later that day after sentencing, we note the following. In this case, the defendant expressly waived the twenty-four hour delay between the ruling on the motion for new trial and the sentencing. The defendant did not enter an objection when the trial court indicated it would sentence the defendant and declined to raise any additional matters, indicating a readiness for sentencing. See Felder, 809 So.2d at 372; State v. Hilton, 99-1239 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/31/00), 764 So.2d 1027, 1038, writ denied, 2000-0958 (La. 3/9/01), 768 So.2d 113; State v. Roberts, 98-1706 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/14/99), 739 So.2d 821, 829; State v. Lindsey, 583 So.2d 1200, 1205-06 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 588 (La. 1992). Further, the defendant did not object to the trial court's failure to rule on his motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal before sentencing. Therefore, the defendant's failure to enter a contemporaneous objection precludes him from complaining of this error on appeal. La. Code Crim. P. art. 841.
While the defendant relies on Magee on appeal in arguing that the trial court's denial of the motion after the imposition of sentence was patent error, the instant case is distinguishable as follows. In Magee, the trial court never ruled on the posttrial motion at issue therein, the motion for new trial. Thus, the case had to be remanded to allow consideration of the motion for new trial and a ruling thereon. In the instant case, the trial court ruled on the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal, albeit three days after imposing sentence. Thus, there is no need to remand for a ruling in this case. Further, the defendant has not raised the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Considering the foregoing, any error with respect to the timing of the motion and its denial is harmless. See State v. Robinson, 98-0005 (La. App. 4th Cir. 9/29/99), 743 So.2d 814, 815-16; see also Lindsey, 583 So.2d at 1206 (wherein this Court similarly distinguished the ruling in Magee). Finally, the defendant has not alleged, nor do we find, any prejudice resulting from the denial of his motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal after sentencing. Therefore, any error that occurred is not reversible. La. Code Crim. P. art. 921; State v. Steward, 95-1693 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 1007, 1019. Assignment of error number two lacks merit.
DECREE
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
State v. Lampkin, 2012-391 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/16/13), 119 So.3d 158, 162, writ denied, 2013-2303 (La. 5/23/14), 140 So.3d 717; State v. Sims, 2009-509 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/12/10), 33 So.3d 340, 343, writ denied, 2010-0596 (La. 10/8/10), 46 So.3d 1264.