Opinion
May 21, 2001
Memorandum of Decision on Defendant Juvenile's Motion to Reopen
The question before this Court is whether in a juvenile delinquency proceeding the State of Connecticut can unilaterally modify the conditions of a plea agreement. Under the circumstances of this case, because the juvenile detrimentally relied upon the agreement, public confidence in the integrity of the juvenile justice system requires immediate action.
I. Procedural and Factual History
On June 9, 2000 the juvenile defendant Israel S. was arrested and charged with a series of narcotics, larceny and motor vehicle offenses. He was immediately remanded to the custody of the State of Connecticut and placed in the New Haven Detention Center where he remained for two months.
Shortly after the defendant's arrest the State, through the Office of Juvenile Probation, contacted the Department of Children and Families (the department). The purpose of this communication was to initiate a search for an appropriate juvenile residential facility for this delinquent child. The department assessed available residential facilities and eventually allowed the defendant to apply for residential placement at the Haddam Hills Academy (Haddam Hills). A position in that facility became available in January 2001.
Connecticut General Statutes 46b-140 (f), amended by Public Act 99-26, provides:
If the court further finds that its probation services or other services available to the court are not adequate for such child, the court shall commit such child to the Department of Children and Families in accordance with the provisions of section 46b-141. Prior to making such commitment, the court shall consult with the department to determine the placement which will be in the best interest of such child.
The defendant fully cooperated with the department's referral procedure. At the department's request, he submitted to psychological CT Page 7339-e testing that was used to evaluate his appropriateness for the various residential facilities within the department's control.
On January 18, 2001, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the CT Page 7339-b defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell; Connecticut General Statutes 21a-277 (a); and breach of peace; Connecticut General Statutes 53a-18. As a result of his plea, the defendant was committed to the custody of the department for a period not to exceed eighteen months, with direct placement at Haddam Hills. All other charges were nolled. The defendant arrived at Haddam Hills the following day.
Connecticut General Statutes 21a-277 (a) provides:
Any person who manufactures, distributes, sells, prescribes, dispenses, compounds, transports with the intent to sell or dispense, possesses with the intent to sell or dispense, offers, gives or administers to another person any controlled substance which is a hallucinogenic substance other than marijuana, or a narcotic substance, except as authorized in this chapter, for a first offense, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years and may be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars or be both fined and imprisoned; and for a second offense shall be imprisoned not more than thirty years and may be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars, or be both fined and imprisoned; and for each subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned not more than thirty years and may be fined not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, or be both fined and imprisoned.
Connecticut General Statutes 53a-181 provides:
(a) A person is guilty of breach of the peace when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof; he: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public place; or (2) assaults or strikes another; or (3) threatens to commit any crime against another person or his property; or (4) publicly exhibits, distributes, posts up or advertises any offensive, indecent or abusive matter concerning any person; or (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene gesture; or (6) creates a public and hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which he is not licensed or privileged to do; or (7) places a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive or incendiary device in a public place. For purposes of this section, "public place" means any area that is used or held out for use by the public whether owned or CT Page 7339-f operated by public or private interests.
On May 14, 2001 defendant's counsel filed the instant Motion to Re-Open. Counsel alleged that on May 11, 2001 the department removed the defendant from Haddam Hills and placed him in the Blue Hills Residential Treatment Center (Blue Hills). Counsel further alleged that the department did not notify the defendant, his parents, counsel of record or the Court prior to the move. Finally, counsel alleged that said transfer "resulted in Defendant being inappropriately placed in a treatment facility where his health and safety are in jeopardy."
The court scheduled this motion for a hearing on May 16, 2001. At the hearing there was no evidence that the department's actions were justified by exigent circumstances. There was no evidence that the defendant was afforded a hearing prior to his transfer to this mental health facility. Based upon the information presented, this Court granted the defendant's Motion to Re-Open and ordered that the State comply with the plea agreement The matter was set down for further in court review on May 25, 2001.
The department did not present any evidence.
Connecticut General Statutes 17a-12 provides, in relevant part:
(a) When the commissioner, or his designee, determines that a change of program is in the best interest of any child or youth committed or transferred to the department, he, or his designee, may transfer such person to any appropriate resource or program administered by or available to the department, to any other state department or agency, or to any private agency or organization within or without the state under contract with the department.
(b) Unless ordered by the Superior Court at the time of commitment, no child or youth committed to the commissioner shall be placed in or transferred to a state-operated residential mental health facility under the jurisdiction of the commissioner without a hearing before the commissioner or his designee. Such hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54.
The State had advised the Court that the defendant could not return to Haddam Hills. It implied that the facility had closed. Indeed, this court was aware of news reports indicating problems with the facility. See Hartford Courant, May 5, 2001 page 1. The Court was also aware, however, that at the time of the hearing over thirty juveniles still remained at Haddam Hills.
It is regrettable that the department did not have a representative at the hearing. Unfortunately the department's agent, the parole officer who had accompanied the defendant to the courthouse, left with the defendant before a judge could hear the motion. No one notified the Court prior to this departure. The State did not request a continuance.
The department returned to court the following morning and requested clarification of the May 16th order. This court repeated its ruling that based upon uncontested testimony, the defendant had been illegally removed from Haddam Hills. The State had an option. It could either return the defendant to Haddam Hills or return the defendant CT Page 7339-g home, awaiting the May 25th hearing. Although at this point the department objected to the ruling, it did not request a stay of that order.
II. Legal Analysis
There is no doubt that properly executed plea agreements are an essential part of the administration of justice. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971). Further, there is no question that valid plea agreements, once accepted by a trial court, are binding. "[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." State v. Andrews, 253 Conn. 497, 504, ___ A.2d ___ (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) The constitutional standards governing plea agreements apply to juvenile proceedings. In re Jason C., 255 Conn. 565, 576 ___ A.2d ___ (2001).
The issue before the court is whether the defendant's guilty plea was a CT Page 7339-c voluntary act. Although there is no requirement that the defendant be advised of every possible consequence of a plea, State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369, 383, 521 A.2d 547 (1987), "[i]n order to make a knowing and voluntary choice, the defendant must possess an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, including "all relevant information concerning the sentence." State v. Collins, 176 Conn. 7, 9, 404 A.2d 871 (1978). A defendant also must be aware of the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court. State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 310, 699 A.2d 921 (1997). In this case the state, through the department, made promises to the defendant concerning the conditions of his juvenile commitment. There was a specific assurance that if the defendant waived his constitutional rights and pleaded guilty, he would be sent to Haddam Hills. "When a guilty plea is induced by promises arising out of a plea bargaining arrangement, fairness requires that such promises be fulfilled by the state. . . . The same concept of fairness ordinarily impels the court, in its discretion, either to accord specific performance of the agreement or to permit the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea." State v. Niblack, 220 Conn. 270, 283, 596 A.2d 407 (1991);Medley v. Commissioner of Correction, 35 Conn. App. 374, 377, 646 A.2d 242 (1994).
Because of the fundamental rights that have been waived, all guilty pleas must be knowing and voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); In re Jason C., 255 Conn. at 571; Connecticut Practice Book 39-20.
In State v. Nelson, 23 Conn. App. 215, 579 A.2d 1104 (1990), the Appellate Court explained the state's obligations in the plea bargaining process. The Court commented that plea bargaining, an "essential tool of the criminal justice system" would be meaningless "if the state's performance of the agreement is contrary to the reasonable expectations of the defendant." State v. Nelson, 23 Conn. App. at 218.
Simply stated, if the state makes promises to the defendant in order to induce a guilty plea, those promises must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262. Here there is no dispute concerning the terms of the plea agreement. The defendant was committed to the department for eighteen months, with the location of the commitment Haddam Hills. If the state reserved the right to transfer the defendant unilaterally, that understanding should have been placed on the record. Instead the state remained silent. This silence strongly implies that it shared the defendant's interpretation of the plea agreement. State v. Nelson, 23 Conn. App. at 219.
The department cannot rely on the argument that the commitment was for rehabilitative purposes. The specific terms of the commitment were not "inconsequential adjuncts of the sentence imposed that can be ignored or, like castor oil, be considered to have been administered for the defendant's own good." State v. Reid, 204 Conn. 52, 55, 526 A.2d 528 CT Page 7339-d (1987). In the present case, the department was intimately involved with the ultimate decision to place the defendant at Haddam Hills. The department's approval was needed prior to the plea agreement.
The state's sudden "inability to comply with this agreement constitutes a failure of consideration in the plea bargaining process." State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92, 107, 503 A.2d 136 (1985).
The resolution of this matter will not be easy. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, "Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned."Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 70 (1977). This presupposes, however, that all parties will fulfill their promises. Attorneys for various agencies within the state "have the burden of "letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing' or has done." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262. "That the breach of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its impact." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262.
At the next hearing, all parties should be prepared to argue an appropriate disposition. Options include specific performance, resentencing, withdrawal of the defendant's plea, or any other appropriate relief. The primary consideration should be fairness for all parties concerned.
Julia DiCocco Dewey, Judge May 21, 2001