Opinion
CD-CR-19-980
09-28-2020
State of Maine, Plaintiff, v. Jeramie Isler, Defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
VALERIE STANFILL, JUSTICE
This matter came before the court for hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress on September 24, 2020, AAG Darcy Mitchell was present for the State, and Defendant was present with his attorney, Adam Sherman, Esq.
Following two controlled purchases of cocaine in March 2019, the Lewiston Police Department obtained a search warrant for 141 Bartlett Street, 1st floor in Lewiston. They executed the warrant on March 29, 2019, as a result of which drugs, firearms and other items were seized. Defendant was at the apartment, arrested and charged with 2 counts of Aggravated Trafficking in Scheduled Drags as well as Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person. Defendant has moved to suppress from use. as evidence all statements he made while at the apartment that day, claiming such statements were obtained as a result of custodial interrogation, without benefit of Miranda warnings, and arc involuntary. After hearing and upon consideration of the evidence, the court finds and orders as follows.
Defendant's written alleged the arrest was without probable cause and moved to suppress physical evidence obtained as a result, but did not press that motion at the hearing. The court notes there was ample probable cause to arrest Defendant.
The confidential informant conducted two controlled purchases of cocaine from the first-floor apartment at 141 Bartlett Street. One purchase was from "Greedy" and another from "Sayso", both black males from Delaware, The search warrant issued in this case permitted the police to enter without knocking first. There were approximately eight officers involved in the search. They went in with guns drawn and discovered four people in the apartment. Defendant was in the kitchen, coming from "Bedroom 2" or the bathroom, dressed in his undershorts and a tee shirt. Defendant is a black male, A woman, Shaima Naji, was in Bedroom 2 with only a tee shirt on. Another woman and a man were also found in the apartment. The police immediately secured all four occupants in handcuffs and conducted a safety sweep of the premises. In doing so they saw a rifle in Bedroom 2. Following the safety sweep, Officer Gagne conducted a K-9 search of the premises, and the dog indicated the presence of drugs at least four times. The officers then conducted a more thorough search. They found crack cocaine, heroin, a digital scale, two firearms, and a Delaware identification belong to Defendant in Bedroom 2. They also found drugs .firearms and ammunition in the other bedroom, as well as a smaller quantity of drugs in the living room.
The police designated the bedroom on the right, next to the bathroom, as "Bedroom 2" and the bedroom on the left as they entered as "Bedroom 1" for purposes of the search inventory.
While the police were searching the apartment, Defendant and Ms. Naji were being watched by Officer Cloutier. At some point both Ms. Naji and Defendant said they were dating each other and were staying in Bedroom 2. None of the officers who testified could recall how these statements came about or whether Defendant was asked any questions. No one identified any other statements made by Defendant. Although there was no specific evidence as to how or why Defendant made these statements, it seems unlikely to the court that they were completely spontaneous. The burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were not the product of interrogation or questioning, and it has not done so. See State v. Hassan, 2007 ME 77 ¶ 13.
After the search was concluded, Defendant was formally placed under arrest. He indicated that he did not wish to answer any questions, and was transported to the police department. The other male found on the premises was also arrested pursuant to a preexisting warrant. The two females were released.
There is no question that Defendant was in handcuffs and was not free to leave when he made the statements. He had not been given Miranda warnings. And, as indicated above, the State has failed to prove that the statements were not the result of interrogation, however brief. Nonetheless, the State argues Defendant was subject only to investigative detention and not in custody when he made the statements for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings, and thus the statements were admissible.
The State has the burden of proving Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Prescott, 2012 ME 96 ¶ 10. Clearly in this case Defendant was not free to leave. Indeed, application of the factors outlined by the Law Court in State v. Hassan, 2007 ME 77 ¶ 14 and other cases lean toward a finding of custody. Nonetheless, a person may be detained for purposes of investigation without being under arrest or "in custody" for Miranda, purposes. State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102 ¶ 9.
"To qualify as a mere Terry stop, a detention must be limited in scope and executed through the least restrictive means." Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, ¶ 12, 995 A.2d 238 (quotation marks omitted). Brief investigatory detentions are justified when they are based on "specific and articulable facts," and can be solely for safety concerns as part of the "community caretaking function[J" of police officers, which includes "investigating] vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability." State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319-20 (Me. 1989) (quotation marks omitted). As we said in State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 10 n.4, 759 A.2d 1085, "[a] brief restriction on a citizen's right to walk (or drive) away is usually referred to as a detention or a stop in order to distinguish the more limited restriction from a restriction commensurate with arrest, "Bragg, 2012 ME 102 ¶ 10.
Clearly the detention in this case was more significant than a brief detention at the side of the road. Defendant was handcuffed and detained as much as two hours before he was placed under formal arrest. It is unclear how far into the detention the statements were made. However; whether a detention is "brief" for Terry purposes must be based on the nature and purpose of the detention, and may be lengthier if necessary. See United States v. Chaney, 647 F.3d 401, 410 (1st Cir. 2011). In this case, the detention for both safety and investigation were warranted. As the United States Supreme Court has said,
If the evidence that a citizen's residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704-05 (1981). In so holding, the Court looked at the legitimate law enforcement interests in preventing flight if incriminating evidence is found, officer safety, the safety of the occupants, and possibly facilitating occupant cooperation in the search. Id. at 702-03. Indeed, an "execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence" justifying the detention of the occupants. Id. at 702.
The fact that the officers entered the apartment with guns drawn and handcuffed Defendant and the other apartment occupants does not transform a detention clearly done for safety and investigatory reasons into custody for purposes of Miranda, Chaney, 647 F.3d at 409. Indeed, the very reasons for doing so were justified by the results of the search which included four loaded firearms as well as drugs which are easily disposed of.
Furthermore, this court is satisfied that this was no pretext; all four occupants were treated the same, and those for whom the search did not yield evidence of involvement in drug trafficking were released when Defendant, was formally arrested. Defendant was not subjected to extensive or formal interrogation during the investigatory detention; it appears that at most the officers may have asked who lived in the apartment or the bedroom. See United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 1995).
For these reasons, the motion to suppress is denied. This order may be incorporated on the docket of the case by reference.