Sierah's Law established a statewide Violent Offender Database along with a legal presumption that offenders convicted of certain violent crimes must enroll therein for a period of ten years following their release from prison. See R.C. 2903.41 through R.C. 2903.43; State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.), appeal allowed, 161 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2021-Ohio-120, 161 N.E.3d 711. Of relevance here, R.C. 2903.41(A) defines a "violent offender" to include, among others, any person convicted of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02. {¶ 5} On October 9, 2019, Garst, pro se, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on the new Violent Offender Database requirements under Sierah's Law. Garst stated that he was not notified about the Violent Offender Database requirements at his plea hearing and they were not part of his plea agreement.

{¶ 2} Following our opinion in State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388 (2d Dist.), the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury regarding the allocation of the self-defense burden of proof. Irvin was subsequently reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court on the authority of State v. Brooks, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2478,___ N.E.3d __.

Prior to trial, Barker requested a jury instruction on self-defense consistent with the changes to R.C. 2901.09 enacted in Am.S.B. 175 (the "stand your ground" law), effective April 6, 2021. Relying on State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388 (2d Dist.), the trial court denied the request, reasoning that there was no language in R.C. 2901.09 that expressly indicated that the General Assembly intended the statute to apply retroactively. Decision (June 7, 2021).

{¶ 128} Senate Bill 231, known as Sierah's Law, established a statewide violent offender database, along with the legal presumption that offenders convicted of certain violent crimes must enroll in the database for a period of 10 years following their release from prison. See R.C. 2903.41 through R.C. 2903.43 (effective Mar. 20, 2019); State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.). For purposes of Williams's case, the term "violent offender" includes a "person who on or after the effective date of this section is convicted of or pleads guilty to" aggravated murder.

The language simply does not address whether application of H.B. 228 is required at a trial involving an offense occurring before March 28, 2019 but coming to trial on or after that date. (Citation omitted.) State v. Irvin , 2d Dist. Montgomery, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 24, quoting R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). In his dissent in Irvin , Judge Froelich stated that he agreed with the Twelfth District's interpretation of the applicability of H.B. 228. Id. at ¶ 56.

(Footnote omitted.) State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), vacated, 169 Ohio St.3d 276, 2022-Ohio-3587, 203 N.E.3d 709.

Stiltner, 2021-Ohio-959, ¶ 55. See also State v. Williams, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-19-39, 2019-Ohio-5381, ¶ 12, fn. 1 ("[w]e apply the version of R.C. 2901.05 in effect at the time the defendant committed the offense"); State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.), vacated, State v. Irvin, __Ohio St.3d__, 2022-Ohio-3587, __N.E.3d__, ¶ 1. This court reached the same conclusion and determined that, "inasmuch as the amended self-defense statute creates a new burden of proof on the state, we find that it is substantive and cannot be applied retroactively."

At the time of Dixon's July 2021 trial, the law in this appellate district was that the burden-allocating change in R.C. 2901.05 did not apply to a defendant like Dixon whose offenses pre-dated March 28, 2019. See State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶17-27 (2d Dist.). In State v. Brooks, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2478, N.E.3d, however, the Ohio Supreme Court recently held that the burden-allocating change in the self-defense statute does apply to trials occurring on or after March 28, 2019 even if the alleged offenses occurred prior to that date.

{¶ 89} One line of cases determined that the pre-2019 amendment version applied "if the accused committed the alleged offense before the effective date of March 28, 2019." State v. Cobb, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-20-43, 2021-Ohio-3877, ¶ 48, citing State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.); State v. Brooks, 2020-Ohio-4123, 157 N.E.3d 387, ¶ 38 (5th Dist.); Stiltner, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 19CA3882, 2021-Ohio-959, at ¶ 56-57; State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 19AP0004, 2020-Ohio-529, ¶ 23; State v. McEndree, 2020-Ohio-4526, 159 N.E.3d 311, ¶ 46 (11th Dist).

The jury as the trier of fact is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it. State v. Irvin, 2020-Ohio-4847, 160 N.E.3d 388, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.), motion to certify allowed, 161 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2021-Ohio-120, 161 N.E.3d 709, ¶ 42, and appeal allowed, 161 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2021-Ohio-120, 161 N.E.3d 711, ¶ 42. Further, because the jury as factfinder "had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that substantial deference be extended to the factfinder's determinations of credibility."