In State v. Irelan, 375 N.J.Super. 100, 106, 119 (App. Div. 2005), officers conducted a traffic stop after observing defendant commit several traffic violations and the ensuing "roadside investigation provided probable cause that defendant was intoxicated." Specifically, based on the officers' observations during the stop and defendant's performance on sobriety tests, it became evident defendant "reasonably appeared intoxicated," was arrested for DWI.

[Id. at 29.] In State v. Irelan, 375 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005), two officers observed the defendant quickly pull out of a toll plaza at 3:25 a.m., cut across several lanes, pass another vehicle on the shoulder, and exit the highway. The officers pulled the vehicle over and approached from opposite sides.

, the time limitations set forth in Rule 1:7-4(b) and Rule 4:49-2 have been applied in criminal matters. See State v. Irelan, 375 N.J. Super. 100, 105 n.1, 866 A.2d 1023 (App. Div. 2005) ; State v. Fitzsimmons, 286 N.J. Super. 141, 147, 668 A.2d 453 (App. Div. 1996). Pursuant to both Rules, a party seeking reconsideration of a final order must file a motion within twenty days of service of the order.

applied in criminal matters. See State v. Irelan, 375 N.J.Super. 100, 105 n.1 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Fitzsimmons, 286 N.J.Super. 141, 147 (App. Div. 1996). Pursuant to both Rules, a party seeking reconsideration of a final order must file a motion within twenty days of service of the order.

"Probable cause requires more than a mere hunch or bare suspicion." State v. Irelan, 375 N.J.Super. 100, 118 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 38687 (1964)).

"Probable cause requires more than a mere hunch or bare suspicion, but less than the legal evidence necessary to convict; it requires a well-grounded suspicion." State v. Irelan, 375 N.J.Super. 100, 118 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 386-87 (1964)).

The justification falls short of the constitutional mark, however, because establishing probable cause for a search requires more than a showing of what "may" have occurred. See State v. Irelan, 375 N.J. Super. 100, 118, 866 A.2d 1023 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 386-87, 201 A.2d 39 (1964) ) ("Probable cause requires more than a mere hunch or bare suspicion").

We have said, "[o]pen alcohol containers in the vehicle would have a tendency in reason to prove recent alcohol consumption . . . ." State v. Irelan, 375 N.J. Super. 100, 117 (App. Div. 2005). In our minds, Manning's testimony was clearly sufficient to permit the jury to infer that defendant had recently consumed alcohol.

Thus, defendant cannot show his suppression claim would have been meritorious. See State v. Irelan, 375 N.J. Super. 100, 113 (App. Div. 2005). "It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion, or as in this case, to waive the hearing on the motion to suppress."

We have previously stated that "the presence of an open alcohol container in an operated vehicle is itself prohibited, rendering the item contraband independent of [a] DWI prosecution." State v. Irelan, 375 N.J. Super. 100, 117 (App. Div. 2005) (citing N.J.S.A. 39:4-51a and -51b). Thus, prong two is also met. Our focus, therefore, is on the third Pena-Flores factor, whether exigent circumstances existed.