Opinion
2 CA-CR 2022-0111-PR
11-03-2022
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. John William Inman, Petitioner.
Law Office of Emily Danies, Tucson By Emily Danies Counsel for Petitioner
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20161781 The Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore
Law Office of Emily Danies, Tucson By Emily Danies Counsel for Petitioner
Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Vice Chief Judge Staring concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BREARCLIFFE, JUDGE
¶1 Petitioner John Inman seeks review of the trial court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). Inman has not sustained his burden of establishing such abuse here.
¶2 After a jury trial, Inman was convicted of molestation of a child, and the trial court imposed a fourteen-year term of imprisonment. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Inman, No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0199 (Ariz. App. May 18, 2018) (mem. decision).
¶3 Inman thereafter sought post-conviction relief, arguing in his petition that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel "failed to obtain an independent forensic expert," allowed a law student certified pursuant to Rule 39(c)(4), Ariz. R. Sup. Ct., "to cross-examine key witnesses" and give closing argument, and "used a flawed 'all or nothing' defense." Concluding Inman had not established that counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards, see State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 21 (2006), the trial court denied relief and dismissed the petition.
¶4 On review, Inman contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his claims "without an evidentiary hearing." He maintains that he "presented a colorable claim" based on expert-opinion affidavits he had filed and that the court inappropriately "adopted" defense counsel's affidavit in reaching its conclusion. "To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant." Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 21; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
¶5 But, "[disagreements as to trial strategy or errors in trial [tactics] will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as long as the challenged conduct could have some reasoned basis." State v. Meeker, 143 Ariz. 256, 260 (1984). Only if a decision is the product of "ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation," State v. Goswick, 142 Ariz. 582, 586 (1984), will the usual, "strong presumption" that counsel provided effective assistance potentially give way, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Whether to call an expert witness, the manner of cross-examination, and questions of trial strategy are generally tactical decisions that rest with counsel. See Meeker, 143 at 262 (witnesses); State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 198 (1983) (cross-examination); State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, ¶ 17 (2021) (strategy).
¶6 On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Inman's expert affidavits failed to show that counsel's challenged decisions were the result of "ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation" and not reasoned, tactical choices. Goswick, 142 Ariz. at 586. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. The court clearly identified Inman's claims and resolved them correctly in a thorough, well-reasoned minute entry, which we adopt. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993) (when trial court has correctly ruled on issues raised "in a fashion that will allow any court in the future to understand the resolution[, n]o useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing the trial court's correct ruling in a written decision").
¶7 We grant the petition for review but deny relief.