Further, the ICA noted, “[Vjolun-teered confessions or admissions, obtained independent of express police questioning or its functional equivalent, are admissible.” Kazanas, 134 Hawai'i at 126 , 336 P.3d at 226 (citing, inter alia, State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563 , 566, 698 P.2d 281 , 284 (1985)). The ICA then examined Ikaika, a case in which this court held that the defendant was not subjected to interrogation.

‘whether the police officer should have known that his or her words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response[.]’ ” State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘'i 107, 119, 34 P.3d 1006, 1018 (2001) (quoting State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 567, 698 P.2d 281, 284 (1985)). In this case, Plaintiff–Appellee State of Hawai‘i (State) charged Defendant–Appellant Gregory A. Kazanas (Kazanas) with first-degree unauthorized entry into a motor vehicle (UEMV) for allegedly grabbing and repeatedly punching the driver through the driver's side window.

‘whether the police officer should have known that his or her words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response[.]’ " State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘'i 107, 119, 34 P.3d 1006, 1018 (2001) (quoting State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 567, 698 P.2d 281, 284 (1985) ). In this case, Plaintiff–Appellee State of Hawai‘i (State) charged Defendant–Appellant Gregory A. Kazanas (Kazanas) with first-degree unauthorized entry into a motor vehicle (UEMV) for allegedly grabbing and repeatedly punching the driver through the driver's side window.

Alternatively, Lt. Rosa’s words could objectively be viewed as an attempt to establish himself as a confidante, off the record, so that when it became time to provide the Miranda warnings, Trinque would trust Lt. Rosa as someone who would not pull his chain and thus making it more likely that Trinque would waive his Miranda rights. The State relies on State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563 , 698 P.2d 281 (1985), in arguing that Lt. Rosa’s words and conduct were a mere pleasantry that did not amount to interrogation. The defendant in Ikaika confessed to a police officer, who was acquainted with the defendant, after the police officer asked, “What’s happening?

("Miranda imposed upon the prosecution the burden of demonstrating in any given case that these 'procedural safeguards' had been employed[.] . . . If these minimal safeguards are not satisfied, then statements made by the accused may not be used either as direct evidence . . . or to impeach the defendant's credibility[.]" (Citations and internal quotation signals omitted.); State v. Nelson, 69 Haw. 461, 467-68, 748 P.2d 365, 369 (1987) (noting that "the question [in Santiago] was the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation" and reaffirming the principle that, absent the procedural safeguards enumerated in Miranda and Santiago, "'statements made by the accused may not be used either as direct evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief or to impeach the defendant's credibility during rebuttal or cross-examination'" (quoting Santiago, 53 Haw. at 266, 492 P.2d at 664); State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 566, 698 P.2d 281, 283-84 (1985) ("It is well recognized that before the [prosecution] may use statements stemming from custodial interrogation, it must first demonstrate the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." (Citations and footnote omitted.))

Id. at 119, 34 P.3d at 1018 (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). See State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 567, 698 P.2d 281, 284 (1985) (holding that defendant's inculpatory statements were not the product of interrogation where a detective could not have known his words would elicit an incriminating response). In Ketchum, officers executing a search warrant for drug contraband detained the defendant in the master bedroom and asked him about his residential address. 97 Hawai‘i at 111–14, 34 P.3d at 1010–1013.

" Id. "Functional equivalent" refers to "any words or actions on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id.; see State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 567, 698 P.2d 281, 284 (1985). II.

The interrogation element depends on “ ‘whether the police officer should have known that his or her words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ from the person in custody.” Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i at 119, 34 P.3d at 1018 (quoting State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 698 P.2d 281 (1985)). As stated before, an “incriminating response” “refers to both inculpatory and exculpatory responses.”

That the defendant was in custody prior to being questioned by Officer Veneri and the questions asked of the defendant were designed to illicit [sic] responses which would "evoke an incriminating response". State v. Melemai [,] 64 Haw. 479, 643 P.2d 541 (1982); State v. Ikaika [,] 67 Haw. 563, 698 P.2d 281 (1985). The prosecution urges (1) that the foregoing COL is clearly erroneous and (2) that Kane's statements to Officer Veneri pertaining to what the explosive device was and what it was to be used for should be admitted under the "public safety" exception to Miranda.

We stress again that once an accused has expressed his desire to deal with police interrogators only through counsel, he cannot be further questioned until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981); State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 566, 698 P.2d 281, 284 (1985); State v. Brezee, 66 Haw. 162, [164,] 657 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1983). Although Brezee does not comment on the subject, the Ikaika decision expressly reflects that the defendant's custodial statement was transcribed.