Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2919-14T1
06-03-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VALENTINO IANETTI, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Andrew P. Slowinski, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Francis A. Koch, Sussex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shaina Brenner, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Ostrer and Haas. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County, Indictment No. 10-05-0160. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Andrew P. Slowinski, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Francis A. Koch, Sussex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shaina Brenner, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Valentino Ianetti appeals from the February 6, 2015 Law Division order denying his motion to amend a prior order dismissing the indictment against him to indicate that the dismissal was with prejudice. We affirm.
We derive the following facts from the record. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on December 8, 2009, defendant called 9-1-1 to report a stabbing at his home. When the police arrived, they found defendant's wife on the floor of the bedroom covered in blood. She had multiple stab wounds to her chest, neck, and abdominal area. Defendant was dressed only in his underwear, had blood on his hands, appeared very excited, and was shaking uncontrollably. Defendant told the police that his wife had stabbed herself. He stated he found a knife lying next to her body, but he picked it up and placed it on the kitchen counter before he called the police.
While crime scene officers collected evidence at the home, other officers took defendant to the police station for questioning. After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant told the police that he had been at a gun club meeting that evening, and returned home around 10:30 p.m. His wife was in bed, so he kissed her goodnight, watched television for awhile, and then fell asleep on the couch. Defendant stated that he woke up and saw a shadow on the floor of the bedroom. When he investigated, he found his wife on the floor. Defendant stated that he moved the knife because he was afraid she might use it again. He then called 9-1-1.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
While defendant continued to tell the officers that his wife had stabbed herself, he also stated he might have done it and that he might have been sleepwalking. Defendant told the police his wife had an evil streak. He stated that she had "the eyes of a shark" and when he looked at her, he could see death staring back at him. Defendant explained that if he did stab defendant, his post-traumatic stress would have contributed to it. He asked the officers to help him figure out whether he had stabbed his wife and, when left alone in the interrogation room, he began crying and saying, "what did I do, what did I do."
The police found no sign of a forced entry into the home. It had been snowing, and only defendant's footprints were found in the snow. The police also learned that defendant owned the knife found in the kitchen.
The medical examiner performed an autopsy later in the day on December 8, 2009, and he ruled the death was a homicide. Defendant's wife suffered forty-seven stab wounds. Of these, twenty-two were to the left side of her neck, seventeen were to the right side of her neck, and eight were in her lower chest, upper abdominal area. Some of the stab wounds were two inches in depth and there was one, six-inch deep stab wound that punctured her lung. When the police advised defendant of the medical examiner's conclusions, he stated that if no one else did it, he must have. The police then arrested defendant and charged him with murder.
On December 16, 2009, the State received a toxicology report indicating that defendant's wife had Oxycodone in her system at the time of her death.
On May 6, 2010, a Sussex County grand jury issued a two-count indictment, charging defendant with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and/or (2) (count one); and third-degree possession of a butcher knife, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d).
Over the next three years, there were several conferences concerning the case. According to the prosecutor, defendant's attorney stated that he was going to argue that the wife's death was a suicide. However, the attorney did not supply the State with an expert's report concerning this theory until May 2013. In the report, defendant's expert opined that the death was a suicide, not a homicide. The expert stated that most of the stab wounds were "superficial ('hesitation cuts')," indicative of a suicide. Defendant's wife had no "defensive wounds[]" and there were "no blood trails . . . ." The expert also concluded that defendant's wife had taken a lethal dose of Oxycodone as "'insurance' that the suicidal intent [would] be successful."
Upon receiving this report, the State retained three experts to review it. Based upon the information received from the experts, the prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. The parties have not provided us with a copy of these motion papers. However, the prosecutor subsequently explained that, in making this motion, he
never declared that [he] believed [defendant] was innocent. We never declared that there was no evidence of his guilt. What we said at the time was that there was a reasonable doubt as we looked at the evidence and it would be morally and ethically wrong to go forward with the prosecution when we see a reasonable doubt in the case.Defendant did not object to the motion.
We did not then, and we do not now necessarily feel that [defendant] is, in fact, innocent of these charges.
Defendant's wife's death certificate continues to list homicide as the cause of her death.
Following oral argument on August 14, 2013, the trial judge granted the motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. The judge stated:
I've been presented with a proposed order that by its terms dismisses the pending indictment and it appears at this time based on continuing investigation and assessment, that the State has determined that it's not appropriate at this time that the prosecution go forward . . . . I am prepared
based on that indication to enter the order dismissing the indictment.Defendant was released from jail later that day. He had been incarcerated for three years, nine months, and twenty-six days.
It is of course by law and by the terms of the order without prejudice because jeopardy has not attached and that is the situation.
On February 21, 2014, defendant filed a motion to amend the August 14, 2013 order to indicate that the dismissal should be with prejudice. The State opposed the motion. Following oral argument on July 17, 2014, the trial judge denied defendant's motion.
In his oral decision, the judge found that jeopardy had not attached, and therefore, a new indictment would not be barred by double jeopardy. The judge also rejected defendant's contention that a future prosecution should be barred by the doctrine of fundamental fairness. The judge noted that there is no statute of limitations for murder. The judge found that the prosecutor appropriately reviewed defendant's expert's report and determined not to proceed with the prosecution at that time. The judge stated:
So what happened was, based on having reached the point of their being, in the view of the prosecuting authority, a reasonable doubt as to the guilt or innocence of . . . defendant, they withdrew the prosecution, secured his release from
jail. There was not a declaration of innocence. Of course, there was not a finding of guilt.Under these circumstances, the judge concluded there was no basis for dismissing the indictment with prejudice. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT WITH PREJUDICE SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A. The Indictment Should Be Dismissed with Prejudice Barring Any Future Prosecution of Defendant Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9(b).
B. The Prosecution Failed to Come Forward With Any Evidential Basis to Oppose Dismissal of the Indictment With Prejudice.
C. Dismissal of the Indictment with Prejudice is Warranted on the Grounds of Fundamental Fairness.
A trial judge's decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 55 (2015) (citing State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 229 (1996)). Accordingly, the judge's "exercise of discretionary authority ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal unless it has been clearly abused." Hogan, supra, 144 N.J. at 229. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we detect no abuse of discretion in the judge's sound ruling to dismiss the indictment without prejudice.
The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707, 716 (1969). New Jersey's Constitution provides, "No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense." N.J. Const. art I, § 11. "[T]he double jeopardy clause protects criminal defendants (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989) (citing State v. Biegenwald, 110 N.J. 521, 532 (1988)).
As the trial judge correctly found, none of these harms are present in this case because defendant had not been placed in "jeopardy" at the time of the dismissal of the indictment. Defendant was not acquitted of the charges in the indictment, and the State was not attempting to try him twice for the same offenses following a conviction, or to impose multiple punishments. Thus, the double jeopardy clause would not bar a new prosecution or require that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant now argues, however, that a second prosecution would be barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9(b) and, therefore, the indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice. We disagree.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9(b) provides:
A prosecution of a defendant for a violation of the same provisions of the statutes based upon the same facts as a former prosecution is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
. . . .
. . . The former prosecution was terminated, after the complaint had been filed or the indictment found, by a final order or judgment for the defendant, which has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and which necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the offense. This subsection shall not apply to an order or judgment quashing an indictment prior to trial.
Collateral estoppel is embodied in the double jeopardy clause and "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 501 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L. Ed. 2d 475, 477 (1970)). The party asserting the bar must show:
(1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
[Brown, supra, 394 N.J. Super. at 502 (emphasis omitted) (quoting First Union Nat'l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007)).]
Defendant asserts that in order to obtain a conviction, the State is required to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 99 (1997). Defendant notes that when the State filed its motion to dismiss the indictment, it did so because it had doubts at that time whether it could establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that the State's "determination" that "the evidence would not support a finding that [he] was guilty of the charges in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt" was "inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the offense" within the intendment of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9(b). Therefore, defendant contends the indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice.
This argument lacks merit. The trial judge never made a determination or finding that the State was unable to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt when he granted the State's motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. Indeed, the State has consistently asserted throughout this proceeding that defendant's wife's death was a homicide and that defendant was involved. Thus, the issue of the strength of the State's proofs has never been litigated and no final order concluding that the State's proofs were insufficient has ever been rendered. Therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9(b) is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case.
In addition, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9(b) specifically states that it does "not apply to an order or judgment quashing an indictment prior to trial."
Defendant next contends that in response to his motion, the State was required to come forward with new evidence implicating him in his wife's death. Because it did not, defendant argues that the judge was required to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. This argument lacks merit.
Defendant's contention ignores the fact "the crime of murder has always been regarded as a special offense to which no limitation period applies." State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. 101, 114 (1977). N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(a)(1) clearly states that a prosecution for murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 "may be commenced at any time." Thus, the State did not have to present defendant with any new evidence it may have obtained, or leads it might be investigating, in response to his motion.
Finally, defendant argues that "fundamental fairness" requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. Again, we disagree.
It is well established that, "[i]n applying the prohibition against double jeopardy, the emphasis should be on underlying policies rather than technisms. The primary considerations should be fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in the light of the constitutional and common law goals." State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 539 (1964). Thus, the doctrine of fundamental fairness protects defendants "in cases where the rights implicated do not squarely fall within the scope of an identifiable constitutional protection. In this way[,] a defendant may be protected from a second prosecution even if never placed in jeopardy." State v. Fullard, 251 N.J. Super. 45, 50 (Law Div. 1991) (citing State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989)).
In reviewing a fundamental fairness claim, a court must
consider a defendant's reasonable expectations based upon the nature and extent of the proceedings against him. . . . The logical extension of this concept is that a second prosecution is far more likely to infringe upon a defendant's rights to fundamental fairness when: 1) the State initially had an opportunity to present a substantial amount of evidence against [the] defendant and [the] defendant did not have adequate representation; 2) [the] defendant has been subjected to the prosecution for a far greater time than usually required for the charges to be tried; and 3) [the] defendant's reasonable anticipation as to the punishment he is exposed to is not commensurate with the State's action in re-prosecuting him.Nevertheless, "the doctrine of fundamental fairness is to be sparing applied. 'It is appropriately applied in those rare cases where not to do so will subject the defendant to oppression, harassment[,] or egregious deprivation.'" Ibid. (quoting Yoskowitz, supra, 116 N.J. at 712 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
[Id. at 51.]
In Fullard, the court declined to apply the doctrine of fundamental fairness under circumstances that are similar to those presented in this case. On January 5, 1990, the police charged the defendant with the December 23, 1989 stabbing murder of a man, who had been seen drinking with him at a bar earlier in the evening. Fullard, supra, 251 N.J. Super. at 48-49. At a January 18, 1990 probable cause hearing, the State conceded that it had not yet "discovered the quantum of evidence sufficient to establish [the murder] charge[] beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. In April 1991, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Id. at 50. The defendant asserted "that the State ha[]d placed him in a state of anxiety and insecurity for a period of one and a half years" and that the doctrine of fundamental fairness required that the possibility of a future murder charge be permanently foreclosed. Id. at 53.
In rejecting the defendant's contention under the fundamental fairness doctrine, the court noted that "in considering the public interest in having the perpetrators of certain crimes brought to justice, murder has been deemed such an evil and invidious offense so as to entirely overcome the countervailing concern of protecting defendants from the prosecution of murders committed in the distant past." Id. at 52 (citing Zarinsky, 75 N.J. at 107). The court found that defendant had not yet been "subjected to the quantum of oppression, harassment[,] or egregious deprivation necessary to warrant a dismissal of the charges against him with prejudice." Id. at 53. Thus, the court concluded that
[t]o bar the State from ever re-prosecuting defendant for this murder based solely upon the limited amount of evidence that was presented at the probable cause hearing less
than two weeks after the charges were lodged would be grossly unfair to the State. This is especially true in light of the special treatment that the prosecution of murder is given in New Jersey.
[Ibid.]
We are persuaded by the Fullard court's cogent analysis. Although it appears that the defendant in Fullard had not been incarcerated on the murder charge, and defendant here spent almost four years in jail, both cases involved murder charges which, as stated above, are not subject to any statute of limitations. Given the nature of the charge, the conclusions reached in the medical examiner's report, and defendant's own statements concerning his possible involvement in a crime, we discern no basis for applying the doctrine of fundamental fairness to bar a future prosecution of defendant.
Like the defendant in Fullard, defendant was "dilatory" in taking action to challenge the indictment. See Fullard, supra, 251 N.J. at 49-50, 53-54 (defendant failed to bring motion to dismiss until nearly four months after the complaint for murder). Defendant did not submit an expert report supporting his claim that his wife's death was a suicide until May 2013. Once he did so, the prosecutor reviewed it and, within three months, made his motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. --------
As in Fullard, however, our decision upholding the dismissal of the indictment without prejudice does not foreclose defendant from reasserting his constitutional rights should the State again charge him with murder. "The [trial] court at that time may more precisely assess the nature and degree of any harm defendant has suffered based upon the specific circumstances underlying the State's action in renewing its prosecution." Id. at 54. In this fashion, "both society's interest in prosecuting murder cases and defendant's interest in protecting his rights [will be] maintained." Ibid.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION