[10-12] The authority of a public official to act "`cannot be supplied by estoppel.'" State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132, 140, 105 A. 519, 523 (1919) (citations omitted). The attempt to act by a government official, by itself, when ultra vires, does not remedy that official's lack of authority for estoppel purposes.

Although littoral owners have extensive rights in public waters, they are always subject to the paramount right of the State to control them reasonably in the interests of navigation, water storage and classification, health and other public purposes. Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71; State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132. Revised Laws, chapters 181, 182, 266, 267; Laws 1947, chapter 183 as amended. Since the State's rights in land and waters are not always enforced and protected with the same alacrity as private rights (State v. Company, 49 N.H. 240, 252), the Legislature has provided that no person can acquire title to State lands by adverse possession. R. L., c. 411, s. 6. For the same reason it has been decided that the State does not forfeit or lose its rights to public lands and waters by laches, estoppel or waiver. State v. Hutchins, supra; Trustees c. Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 495; St. Regis Co. v. Board, 92 N.H. 164, 169. Nor is the State estopped to assert public rights if its officers acted without authority.

Under New Hampshire law, there can be no estoppel by an unauthorized statement of an official, Rye Beach Village Dist. v. Beaudoin, 114 N.H. 1, 6, 315 A.2d 181, 184 (1974); Smith v. Town of Epping, 69 N.H. 558, 560, 45 A. 415, 416 (1899). Authority cannot be created by estoppel, State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132, 140, 105 A. 519, 523 (1919), and one cannot rely on asserted authority, Storrs v. Manchester, 88 N.H. 139, 142, 184 A. 862, 864 (1936), or apparent authority, Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 494, 27 A.2d 569, 586 (1940). This court has traditionally held that when a citizen deals with the government, one is charged with knowledge of the extent of the official's authority, Richards v. Columbia, 55 N.H. 96, 99 (1874); Tompkins, 124 N.H. at 470, 471 A.2d at 1156, and if one relies on an unauthorized representation, the law considers that no injury occurred, Smith v. Town of Epping, 69 N.H. at 560, 45 A. at 416.

While in a proper case estoppel may be a defense to an action by a municipality (see Bigwood v. Merrimack Village District, 108 N.H. 83, 87, 229 A.2d 341, 344 (1967)) failure to enforce an ordinance cannot furnish ground for estoppel against subsequent enforcement. Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 254 A.2d 898 (1969); Building Comm'r v. C H Co., 319 Mass. 273, 283, 65 N.E.2d 537, 543 (1946); see Town of Weare v. Stone, 114 N.H. 80, 314 A.2d 638 (1974); State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132, 105 A. 519 (1919). Nor will estoppel arise out of unauthorized acts or statements of a public official.

" Annot., Applicability of doctrine of estoppel against government and its governmental agencies, 114 A.L.R.2d 344 (1948). In State v. Hutchins, 105 A. 519, 523 (N.H. 1919), the court held that the public rights in public waters cannot be alienated or made subject to easements except by legislative action; neither can the state's right in public waters be prescribed against nor can these rights be impaired by an estoppel growing out of a mere failure to object to encroachment. See State v. George Staffords Sons, 105 A.2d 569, 573 (N.H. 1954).

In New Hampshire the right of the citizen to raise estoppel against the State likewise has been unsuccessful. State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132; St. Regis Co. v. Board, 92 N.H. 164, 169; Ham v. Interstate Bridge Authority, 92 N.H. 268; Smith v. Epping, 69 N.H. 558, 560; State v. Cote, 95 N.H. 428. Recent cases have adhered to this rule with one minor qualification. Where the equities weigh heavily in favor of the citizen or taxpayer, we have attempted to point out equitable solutions to the problem while at the same time adhering to the doctrine that the State is not bound by estoppel for the acts of its agents.

" State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 27. See also, State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132. We do not know the number of wild boar that have escaped from Corbin Park or the number presently at large.

When that question is to be determined, it will have to be considered along with the legislative and judicial recognition that appears to have been given to the private ownership of certain islands in the lakes and ponds of New Hampshire for more than a century. See State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132, 133; 296 Briefs Cases 147 and 327 Briefs Cases 563; Laws 1907, c. 161; 7 N.H. Laws 665; Cheever v. Roberts, 82 N.H. 289; Dana v. Craddock, 66 N.H. 593; Laws 1891., c. 51; Fry, New Hampshire as a Royal Province (1908) 312, 313; XXIX N.H. State Papers (Batchellor 1896) 585, 586, and appended map; XXVIII Id. preface 6; State v. 4.7 Acres of Land, 95 N.H. 291; Laws 1939, c. 191, as amended. If record or documentary title involving the Masonian proprietors should become material, reference may be had to the boundary dispute in Cushing v. Miller, 62 N.H. 517, 518, 519, in which case a portion of a copy of the James Hersey map of 1781 was used and reproduced. See generally, Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire (1936) c. 12; Akagi, The Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies (1924); 1 Powell, Real Property (1949), s. 57.

It may be estopped only by an act of the legislature where the legislature possesses the sole power to bind it in the transaction in which an estoppel is alleged to arise. * * *" Citing Jenness v. Payne, 81 N.H. 308, 125 A. 679; State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132, 105 A. 519, 2 A.L.R. 1685. The rule is generally followed.

But it was of overall importance to provide for the needs for which the legislation was enacted, and no provisions in it are found which express or evince a restriction on the Board's authority, in the plan and undertaking of project, to impair or destroy public uses of public waters, either as to all existing uses or as to any special use. Since the plaintiff's claim is in ultimate effect against the State, the rule of construction that a state grant to an individual is limited to its express terms and their necessary implications (Connecticut River c Co. v. Company, 65 N.H. 290, 380; Concord c. Co. v. Robertson, 66 N.H. 1, 6; State v. Hutchins, 79 N.H. 132, 134) does not govern. On the contrary, the legislation conferring upon the Board its powers and authority, and containing terms of forceful expression in its purpose to provide for a public need, is to be read in the light of its purposes and to uphold the public interest as superior to that of the private claim in any doubtful view of the extent of its delegation of authority. "Not to read in what the language implies is to amend or repeal" (State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 143), as much as to read in what is not implied.