From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

State v. Hurst

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Washington
Nov 15, 2024
2024 Ohio 5544 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024)

Opinion

23CA13

11-15-2024

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEANAN HURST, Defendant-Appellant.

Christopher Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant. Nicole Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelsey R. Riffle, Assistant Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta, Ohio, for appellee.


Christopher Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Nicole Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelsey R. Riffle, Assistant Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta, Ohio, for appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Washington County Court of Common Pleas judgment of conviction in which appellant, Keanan Hurst, pleaded guilty to one count of attempted endangering children, as a third-degree felony, and one count of intimidation of an attorney, victim or witness in a criminal case, also as a third-degree felony. The trial court imposed a prison term of 30 months for each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Hurst in two assignments of error challenges the imposition of a consecutive prison term and the validity of his guilty plea.

{¶2} In the first assignment of error, Hurst argues that the trial court erred in ordering the prison term for his two convictions to be served consecutively. Hurst maintains that the trial court merely recited the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C), and it abused its discretion by failing to incorporate the appropriate consecutive findings. We disagree. Our review of the issue pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G) mandates affirming the imposition of Hurst's consecutive sentence. The trial court complied with the consecutive sentence statutory factors in R.C. 2929.14(C), and its decision is not otherwise contrary to law or clearly and convincingly not supported by the record of the case.

{¶3} In the second and final assignment of error, Hurst asserts that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently because the trial court at the final pre-trial hearing denied his oral motion to substitute counsel. Thus, according to Hurst, he was forced to proceed with an attorney he did not trust. We disagree. At the final pre-trial hearing, Hurst failed to demonstrate that a conflict existed between him and his court-appointed counsel that was so great that "it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense." State v. Tingler, 2022-Ohio-3792, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). Moreover, at the change of plea hearing, the trial court complied with the mandatory colloquy requirements pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C). Wherefore, we find that Hurst knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily pleaded guilty to both offenses.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶4} In November 2022, Hurst was indicted on five counts of endangering children, one as a second-degree felony and the remaining four as misdemeanors in the first degree. Hurst was additionally charged with committing one offense of intimidation of an attorney, victim or witness in a criminal case as a third-degree felony.

{¶5} Hurst's offenses were based on his physical abuse of A.J.M., a child who was one year old. At the time of the abuse, Hurst was in a relationship with A.J.M.'s mother and would look after A.J.M. On October 31, 2022, Hurst was seen slamming the child on the ground, smacking him with a bag and squeezing the child when he was crying. A.J.M.'s mother, however, did not stop the abuse and even left the child in Hurst's care that night when she left with others to get alcohol. It was not until A.J.M.'s mother and the others returned and observed that A.J.M.'s face was swollen and had several bruises on his body that they took him to the hospital. Before leaving for the hospital and thereafter, Hurst threatened to kill A.J.M.'s mother if she notified anyone of his abuse of A.J.M. Hurst's threats continued through messaging and escalated with him threatening to kill A.J.M.'s family members and law enforcement.

{¶6} At the hospital, the medical staff observed bruises on A.J.M.'s chest and stomach area and other bruises in various stages of healing. A.J.M.'s head injury resulted in two black eyes, with one eye completely shut, and his head was swollen twice its size and felt mushy. The head injury affected A.J.M.'s mobility, in which after the abuse, A.J.M. could not use his left leg and would fall down when he tried to walk although he was walking prior to the abuse. The abuse also emotionally affected the one-year-old as when doors would open or close, A.J.M.'s "entire body will visibly shake," and he has separation anxiety and cannot sleep unless held by his grandmother.

{¶7} Hurst initially denied the abuse and claimed it was an accident. However, on April 12, 2023, Hurst took responsibility for his conduct by pleading guilty to an amended count of endangering children as a third-degree felony and as indicted to intimidation of an attorney, victim or witness in a criminal case. The remaining four counts were dismissed.

{¶8} Hurst at sentencing addressed the court and apologized for his conduct. Hurst's attorney also informed the trial court that Hurst was remorseful and requested a lenient sentence. In advocating for a lenient sentence, Hurst's attorney emphasized that Hurst was just 19 years old, and grew up in an unhealthy environment where both his parents were substance abusers.

{¶9} The trial court imposed a prison term of 30 months for each count and ordered that the offenses be served consecutively. It is from this judgment of conviction entry that Hurst appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.

II. HURST'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, OR INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT GRANTING HIS ATTORNEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶10} In the first assignment of error, Hurst requests that we reverse the trial court's decision ordering his prison terms to be served consecutively. According to Hurst, the trial court simply recited the consecutive sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.14(C) and failed to incorporate the factual findings in its judgment entry. Therefore, Hurst maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by failing "to incorporate those findings into its consecutive sentencing findings."

{¶11} In response, the State initially asserts that Hurst is applying the wrong standard of review and does not assert which findings the trial court failed to make. The State next contends that the trial court made the required findings which are supported by the record of the case. Moreover, the trial court incorporated the required findings in its judgment entry.

I. Law and analysis

{¶12} We must review Hurst's sentence pursuant to the dictates of R.C. 2953.08(G). See State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 16. "R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that 'the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under' certain specific statutory provisions." State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 28.

{¶13} "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty as is required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1957), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶14} Generally, a trial court is required to make certain findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before ordering a defendant to serve multiple prison terms consecutively. The trial court is required to make the consecutive-sentence findings at the disposition hearing and incorporate the findings in the sentencing entry. State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 23.

{¶15} R.C.2929.14(C)(4) provides that:

If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

{¶16} "The plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court's consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court's findings must be upheld unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record." State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5 (lead opinion). "The clear-and-convincing standard for appellate review in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is written in the negative." Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶17} The lead opinion in Gwynne continued:

an appellate court is directed that it must have a firm belief or conviction that the record does not support the trial court's findings before it may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify consecutive
sentences. The statutory language does not require that the appellate court have a firm belief or conviction that the record supports the findings. This language is plain and unambiguous and expresses the General Assembly's intent that appellate courts employ a deferential standard to the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) also ensures that an appellate court does not simply substitute its judgment for that of a trial court.
Id. at ¶ 15.

{¶18} In State v. Nolan, we noted that the lead opinion in Gwynne is not binding on this court but that even if we applied it, the result would be the same regardless of which standard of review we applied. 2024-Ohio-1245, ¶ 33, 34 (4th Dist.). Similarly, in the case at bar, regardless of the standard of review that we apply, we affirm the trial court's decision. The trial court made the required consecutive sentence findings at disposition and incorporated the findings in the judgment entry. Moreover, the record of the case supports the findings, in which Hurst physically abused one-year-old A.J.M. causing the child to have two black eyes, a large hematoma on his forehead, a swollen-mushy head, bruising on his chest and stomach areas, and post-traumatic stress.

In a previous decision, the Supreme Court held "that appellate review of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not require appellate courts to defer to the sentencing court's findings in any manner. Instead, the plain language of the statute requires appellate courts to review the record de novo and decide whether the record clearly and convincingly does not support the consecutive-sentence findings. State v. Gwynne, 2022-Ohio-4607, opinion vacated and superseded on reconsideration, 2023-Ohio-3851.

{¶19} At disposition, the trial court made the following findings:

So as far as the seriousness and recidivism factors, what makes this more serious is the physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense, due to the conduct of the defendant, which was greater because of the age of the victim. Obviously, we've got a, a baby here.
Also, the defendant's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense. That's what left him in charge of the baby.
As far as less serious, the Court finds there's nothing that makes it less serious than the norm.
As far as likely to commit future, crimes in the future, you know, I know he shows remorse now that he's been caught, but obviously after doing the offense, he didn't show remorse. He actually threatened to kill the mother, the child, the law enforcement that arrested him. So I'm going to find that he shows no genuine remorse for the offense.
He did have a firearm, and I believe it was a handgun, when he was taken into custody, which he is a 19-year-old, so I'm not sure what he's doing with a handgun, since you have to be 21. So I do find that he is a danger to the public as well as law enforcement.
He does have a - - well, I guess he's got one delinquency and one unruly on his record. It looks like the delinquency was unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. And he just had an unruly.
As far as adult convictions, he was 19 at the time, probably didn't have enough time to get much of an adult record. But he has no adult record.
. . .
The Court does find that a prison term is consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing. Defendant is not amenable to any available community control sanctions.
So you're ordered to serve a term of imprisonment at the Correctional Reception Center at Orient, Ohio. For amended Count 1, it's going to be a definite 30 months. The Court notes it's not a mandatory prison term and it's going to be consecutive to Count 6. As far as Count 6, again, it's going to be definite 30 months prison term. It's going to be consecutive to Count 1. Again, it's not a mandatory prison term.
The Court is going to run them consecutively, for a total of 60 months.
. . .
The Court does find that imposition of consecutive sentences is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the defendant, and imposition of consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, the danger the defendant poses to the public, and that at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct; the harm caused was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the course of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of that conduct.

{¶20} In the judgment of conviction entry, the trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively finding:

that imposition of consecutive sentences is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the defendant; and imposition of consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, the danger the defendant poses to the public; and that at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct; the harm caused was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of that conduct.

{¶21} Contrary to Hurst's assertion, the trial court's statements at disposition and the language in the judgment entry comply with the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Moreover, the trial court's findings are supported by the record of the case. Additionally, we emphasize that the trial court "has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings." Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, at ¶ 37. Accordingly, we overrule Hurst's first assignment of error.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶22} Under this assignment of error, Hurst challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea on the basis that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to substitute counsel. Hurst maintains that the uncontradicted evidence is that his court-appointed counsel missed a lot of appointments and Hurst lost trust in his representation. And that when the trial court denied Hurst's motion to substitute counsel, Hurst "was prejudiced" since he was forced to continue with an attorney he did not trust.

{¶23} In response, the State contends that Hurst has no legal authority for his assertion that there is a presumption of prejudice and that he was forced to plead guilty after the trial court denied his motion to substitute counsel. Additionally, the State maintains that Hurst failed to meet his burden in demonstrating there was a complete breakdown in the communication. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for substitution of counsel. Finally, the State emphasizes that at the guilty plea hearing, Hurst answered affirmatively that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation before pleading guilty.

I. Law

A. Substitution of counsel

{¶24} The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const., amend. VI. In Thurston v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "[t]he right of an accused to select his own counsel is inherent only in those cases wherein such accused is employing the counsel himself. The right to have counsel assigned by the court does not impose a duty on the court to allow the accused to choose his own counsel; the selection is within the discretion of the court. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 982(5), p. 962." 3 Ohio St.2d 92, 92 (1965).

{¶25} Decades later, the United States Supreme Court held that "[w]hile the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). Then in 2006, the United States Supreme Court explained that "[w]e have recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar. The court has, moreover, an 'independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.'" (Cleaned up.) U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006), quoting Wheat at 160.

{¶26} Accordingly, the" 'important right to counsel of choice is not absolute; it must be balanced against the court's authority to control its own docket, and a court must beware that a demand for counsel may be utilized as a way to delay proceedings or trifle with the court.'" State v. Cobb, 2005-Ohio-1974, ¶ 32 (4th Dist.), quoting United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir. 1988).

{¶27} In State v. Tingler, we applied these legal principles and overruled Tingler's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to substitute counsel. 2022-Ohio-3792, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.). In rejecting the argument, we outlined that the:

[f]actors to consider in deciding whether a trial court erred in denying a defendant's motion to substitute counsel include "the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and whether the conflict between the attorney and client was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense." United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1996). In addition, courts should "balanc[e] * * * the accused's right to counsel of his choice and the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice." Id; State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 342-43, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001).
Generally, a defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that substitute counsel is warranted. State v. Carter, 128 Ohio App.3d 419, 423, 715 N.E.2d 223 (4th Dist.1998).
Id. at ¶ 18, 19.

B. Guilty Plea

{¶28}" 'When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.'" State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). To determine whether a guilty plea was entered "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a de novo review of the record to ensure that the trial court complied with constitutional and procedural safeguards." State v. Willison, 2019-Ohio-220, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Cooper, 2011-Ohio-6890, ¶ 35 (4th Dist.).

{¶29} "Crim.R. 11 (C) governs the process that a trial court must use before accepting a felony plea of guilty[.]" Veney at ¶ 8. The trial court must address the defendant and strictly comply with the provisions in Crim.R. 11 (C)(2)(c) in which the court advises a defendant of all of the constitutional rights he waives by pleading guilty. See Id. at syllabus; Crim.R. 11(C)(2).

{¶30} Strict compliance is not the standard with regard to the nonconstitutional notifications. Rather, "with respect to the nonconstitutional notifications required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and 11(C)(2)(b), substantial compliance is sufficient." Veney at ¶ 14, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86 (1977)." 'Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.'" Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).

II. Analysis

{¶31} We begin by first noting that Hurst does not argue that the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory notifications pursuant to Crim.R. 11 (C). Our review of the guilty plea form and the colloquy at the change of plea hearing demonstrates the trial court's compliance. Hurst was advised of the nature of his offenses, the maximum sentence he faced and the constitutional rights he waives by pleading guilty. Hurst in each instance responded that he understood and that he wished to proceed with pleading guilty.

{¶32} Thus, the pertinent issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Hurst's motion to substitute counsel. We hold that it did not.

{¶33} On November 17, 2022, Hurst's arraignment was held and at that hearing, attorney Shawna Landaker was appointed as Hurst's counsel. At the March 24, 2023 final pre-trial hearing, two attorneys appeared on behalf of Hurst, including attorney Landaker. At the start of the hearing, attorney Landaker informed the trial court that she

was speaking to Mr. Hurst at the county jail last night. He indicated that he did want to fire me and seek the appointment of new counsel. He'd indicated that I had missed multiple appointments with him, that he has no trust in me at all to effectively represent him going forward, Your Honor. So he would ask for the Court to dismiss me and allow new counsel to be appointed.

{¶34} The trial court then addressed Hurst and inquired whether he wished to elaborate on the issue. Hurst responded: "No, sir." The State responded to the substitution of counsel motion:

that Attorney Landaker has been out to see him, I don't know how many times, but she communicates with me every time after she's met with him, and we've been negotiating this case. So I know that she's at least been out to see him a handful of times, based on our negotiations.

{¶35} After the State's assertion, neither Hurst nor his counsel made any additional argument in support of the motion. The trial court denied the motion finding

that there's been no actual evidence of an actual conflict presented. I know with Attorney Murdock assisting with the case, that may solve some of the issues the defendant has, so the Court's going to deny the motion to fire the public defender.

{¶36} As the record demonstrates, Hurst's motion was made orally at the March 2023 final pre-trial hearing, which was four months after attorney Landaker was appointed and approximately three weeks prior to Hurst pleading guilty. And during the four months of representation, attorney Landaker met with Hurst at least a handful of times, filed a motion to preserve evidence, a demand for discovery, and a request for a bill of particulars.

{¶37} The trial court gave Hurst the opportunity to articulate the reasons for his motion to substitute counsel. Hurst, however, declined to elaborate beyond his counsel's initial statement. Thus, Hurst failed to meet his burden in demonstrating that a conflict between him and his attorney existed that was so great as to result in a total lack of communication.

{¶38} What is more, at the guilty plea hearing, Hurst informed the trial court that he reviewed the guilty plea form with his counsel, that counsel answered his questions, and that Hurst was satisfied with the service and advice of his counsel. Additionally, by pleading guilty, Hurst's first count was amended to a third-degree felony and four of his first-degree misdemeanor offenses were dismissed.

{¶39} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hurst's motion to substitute counsel and find that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in ensuring that Hurst voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty.

CONCLUSION

{¶40} Having overruled Hurst's two assignments of error, we affirm the trial court's judgment entry of conviction.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay the costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.


Summaries of

State v. Hurst

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Washington
Nov 15, 2024
2024 Ohio 5544 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024)
Case details for

State v. Hurst

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEANAN HURST, Defendant-Appellant.

Court:Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Washington

Date published: Nov 15, 2024

Citations

2024 Ohio 5544 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024)