Opinion
No. 9812010921.
Submitted: November 13, 1900.
Decided: February 29, 2000.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 33
DENIEDRobert J. O'Neill, Jr., Esq. Attorney for the State of Delaware.
David Jones, Esq. and Mark S. Greenberg, Esq. Attorneys for defendant.
ORDER
Upon consideration of defendant's motion for a new trial and the record in this case, it appears that:
1. The defendant, Ronald L. Hunter, stood trial on charges of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, maintaining a vehicle for keeping controlled substances, possession of drug paraphernalia, two counts of criminal impersonation, failure to submit pedigree information, tampering with physical evidence, resisting arrest, criminal mischief, reckless driving, leaving the scene of an accident, and failure to stop at the command of a police officer. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all charges except for criminal mischief. On that charge, the defendant was found not guilty. Mr. Hunter has now moved for a new trial. He asserts five grounds in support of his motion — error in allowing the introduction of evidence that he had previously been fingerprinted under a different name, improper comments by the prosecutor in rebuttal summation, error in interpretation of the leaving the scene statute, error in allowing the indictment to be amended during trial, and error in not granting a judgment of acquittal on the two criminal impersonation counts. For the reasons which follow, the motion is denied.
2. The evidence presented by the state included the following. On December 10, 1998 the defendant was driving northbound on Route 13 in Kent County. At that time he was under surveillance by Delaware State Troopers who were following him. The defendant moved from the far left lane to a far right lane and then turned right off Route 13 without using his right turn signal. At that point police in three vehicles converged behind the defendant to stop him. The defendant made another right onto a county road. The officer directly behind the defendant was in a car which was unmarked but which had police lights in the front grill. He activated his lights. The second police vehicle behind the defendant was a fully marked state police cruiser. As the defendant made his second right, one of the officers noticed an object being thrown out the passenger side of the defendant's vehicle onto the shoulder. The defendant then sped up to get away. The officer in the first car gave chase. The officer in the marked cruiser stopped momentarily to pick up the object from the shoulder of the road and then gave chase. The object which had been thrown out of the defendant's vehicle was a napkin containing individually wrapped quantities of cocaine. As the parties raced down the county road, with the defendant in front and the officers in pursuit, they reached speeds of 70 to 80 miles per hour. Finally, the defendant crashed into another vehicle being driven by a female with a small child. The defendant broke or otherwise injured his hand in the accident but the occupants of the other car were unhurt. The defendant then jumped out of his vehicle and started to run away on foot. The officer in the first car exited his vehicle and chased the defendant. The officer in the marked cruiser joined in the foot chase. The first officer repeatedly yelled state police as he was chasing the defendant. Finally the officer caught up with the defendant and subdued him. The officers asked the defendant his name and he didn't answer. The officers patted the defendant down and found money and a wallet. The wallet contained a Massachusetts photo I. D. drivers license which identified the defendant as Anthony Jones.
The defendant was then taken to Kent General Hospital for treatment. One of the officers, Det. Rhodes, testified that while at the hospital the defendant identified himself as Anthony Jones. When they got the defendant back to Troop 3, he would not provide the pedigree information which is part of the normal processing after arrest. The defendant was fingerprinted. When the fingerprints were checked against the state's records, they matched prints of a Scott Brown. At some point while at the Troop, the defendant was confronted about his identity and identified himself as Scott Brown. When the prints were submitted to the F.B.I., they came back with the name Ronald Hunter.
3. "The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice." Defendant argues his right to a fair trial was denied when the Court permitted the State to introduce evidence that his fingerprints came back to an individual identified as Scott Brown, which obviously suggested to the jury that the defendant had been previously fingerprinted. The defendant argues that allowing the jury to hear that he had been previously fingerprinted was unfairly prejudicial because it allowed the jury to infer that he had a previous criminal record under the name Scott Brown. However, fingerprint evidence alone, when not introduced with a corresponding criminal record, is not in and of itself evidence of prior bad acts from which the jury could infer a criminal disposition. Rather, it is merely circumstantial evidence relating to an individual's identity. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the defendant suffered no prejudice to his right to a fair trial by the admission of this evidence.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 33.
Howard v. State, Del. Supr., 704 A.2d 278, 281 (1998).
Id.
4. Defendant further argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when, during closing arguments, it accused the defense of employing the "classic" defense of reasonable doubt and raising the consequences of an acquittal if the defendant "walked." At a point during the State's rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor argued, in substance, that the jury should search for truth, that they should not search for doubt, that the defense attorney was trying to throw up smoke and dust in their eyes, that the defendant was stating the classic case of reasonable doubt, but that the jury shouldn't be fooled, and should base its decision on the evidence. A few minutes later, the prosecutor again referred to the classic defense of reasonable doubt and argued that if the defense attorney could fool just one of the juror's that is all he needed. At that point the defense attorney objected, arguing that he wasn't trying to fool anybody. The Court then instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comment. The prosecutor then continued that if the defense attorney was successful in asserting reasonable doubt, then the defendant "walks." Defense counsel objected again. The Court instructed the prosecutor to confine his comments to the evidence and move on. The argument was completed without further incident.
The prosecutor's remarks certainly go beyond arguing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record. They appear to trivialize the burden of proof. The Court does not feel, however, that they rise to the level of warranting a new trial. The Court does not think that the comments caused jury prejudice, misled the jury, or diverted the jury from its proper duty to decide the case based on the evidence and the law, including the law of reasonable doubt. There were other parts of the prosecutor's argument where he did correctly state the burden of proof and the correct meaning of reasonable doubt. The State actually had a very strong case. The Court does not think that the comments were so prejudicial as to compromise the fairness of the trial process."
Id.
5. Defendant argues the Court erred when it allowed the jury to consider injury to the defendant sufficient to constitute "injury to any person" within the meaning of 21 Del. C. § 4202 (a). The defendant argues that he could be found guilty only if injury was sustained by some person other than him. 21 Del. C. § 4202 (a) reads, in its entirety, as follows:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident. The driver shall give the driver's name, address and the registration number of the driver's vehicle and exhibit a driver's license or other documentation of driving privileges to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying of such person to a hospital or physician or surgeon for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person.
A Court charged with interpreting statutory language is obligated to give effect to the legislative intent. Therefore, the Court begins this process by reference to the express language of the statute. "In divining legislative intent, it is said that where the statute as a whole is unambiguous, the Court's role is limited to giving effect to the literal meaning of the words used." The statute has two apparent purposes. One is to see that injured people receive treatment. The other is to require the exchange of information concerning the identity of each driver and the vehicles involved in the accident. This second purpose assists the parties and their insurance companies in asserting and resolving any claims that may arise out of the accident. I find that the statutory language is clear. The plain import of the code section in issue is that whenever there is a vehicular accident involving personal injuries to anyone, involved persons are to remain at the scene of the accident. The Court does not feel obligated to address hypothetical scenarios which may yield absurd results, such as where a single vehicle accident is involved. I find that where there is a two vehicle accident, both drivers are required to remain at the scene of the accident if there is injury to any person in the accident, including either driver. The fact that the defendant was attempting to elude police officers at the time the accident occurred is not a legal justification for failing to remain at the scene of the accident.
Rodgers v. Erickson Air-Crane Co., L. L. C. v. Gallagher-Kaiser Corp., Del. Super., C.A. No. 98C-07-014 WTQ, Quillen, J. (July 30, 1999) (Mem. Op.).
Id.
Id.
6. Next, defendant argues the Court committed error by granting the State's motion to amend Count 3 of the indictment during trial. Count 3 of the indictment charged the defendant with failing to stop at the command of a police officer. It's language charged that Ronald L. Hunter ". . . did unlawfully operate a motor vehicle on Rising Sun Road, Rising Sun, Delaware, and after having received a visual or audible signal from a uniformed police officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operated his vehicle in disregard of said signal." The statute involved, 21 Del. C. § 4103 (b), is broader. It requires a driver to stop his vehicle if he receives a "visual or audible signal from a police officer identifiable by uniform, by motor vehicle or by a clearly discernible police signal." Here the State's evidence indicated that the defendant received a visual or audible signal by a police officer identifiable by motor vehicle, not uniform. The signal was in the form of grill lights in the first car and full markings and lights in the second police car. The Court permitted the indictment to be amended during trial to substitute "from a police officer identifiable by motor vehicle or by a clearly discernible police signal to bring his vehicle to a stop" in place of "from a uniformed police officer to bring his vehicle to a stop."
The Court remains convinced that the allowance of the amendment was proper. Failure to stop at the command of a police officer is not a charge required to be prosecuted by indictment. It is a misdemeanor traffic charge. Therefore, the Court does not think that the constitutional provision concerning prosecution by indictment is implicated. The motion to amend was governed by Rule 7(e). That rule allows an amendment to the indictment or information if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. Here the amendment merely goes to the manner in which the officers identified themselves. It does not alter the State's theory of the case. The State's evidence unfolded in the manner that was anticipated. It was no surprise to the defense that the State's case was that the signal to stop was in the form of lights and markings on the police cars, as opposed to the uniform of the police officer. The State's evidence did not take on any unexpected twists or turns which jeopardized the defendant's ability to prepare his defense. There was no unfair prejudice to the defendant in granting the motion to amend.
7. Finally, the defendant argues that his motion for judgment of acquittal on the two criminal impersonation counts should have been granted. The defendant argues that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because he did not affirmatively identify himself as Scott Brown or Anthony Jones, but did so only after being confronted by the police with these identities. However, I find nothing in the statute which attaches legal significant to whether the defendant affirmatively impersonates another, versus impersonates another after being asked or confronted about his identity. There was sufficient evidence that the defendant impersonated another, and that he did an act in his assumed character, intending to obtain a benefit, to allow the counts to go to the jury; the benefit to the defendant being to avoid or frustrate prosecution due to confusion over his identity.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's motion for a new trial is denied . ________________ Resident Judge
oc: Prothonotary cc: Order Distribution