Opinion
No. COA12–1242.
2013-05-21
STATE of North Carolina v. Yanncie Asbury HUNT.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Scott A. Conklin, for the State. Gilda C. Rodriguez, for Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 30 April 2012 by Judge Eric L. Levinson in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Scott A. Conklin, for the State. Gilda C. Rodriguez, for Defendant.
McGEE, Judge.
Yanncie Asbury Hunt (Defendant) was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and of having attained the status of an habitual felon. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Defendant did not strive to preserve this argument for review. “In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.” N.C.R.App. P. 10(a)(1).
In State v. Jones, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 734 S.E.2d 617, 623 (2012), disc. review allowed,––– N.C. ––––, 736 S.E.2d 186 (2013), the defendant “merely asked that all charges against him be dismissed without noting a specific basis” at the close of all evidence. This Court concluded that the defendant, “having failed to make the argument he now makes on appeal in support of his motion to dismiss in the trial court, has not preserved it for our review.” Id. (citing State v. Tellez, 200 N.C.App. 517, 521, 684 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2009)).
In the present case, Defendant moved to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence. Defendant did not argue the motion. He stated only: “I'll move to dismiss. I don't wish to be heard at this time.” Defendant again moved to dismiss at the close of all evidence and again failed to state a basis for the motion, stating only: “I move to dismiss at the end of all the evidence. I don't wish to be heard.” Because Defendant failed to preserve the issue, we invoke N.C.R.App. P. 2 to reach the merits.
On appeal, Defendant argues for the first time that the evidence was insufficient under the corpus delicti rule. We review the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). The “trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90, ––––, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
The “trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in the State's favor.” Bradshaw, 366 N.C. at ––––, 728 S.E.2d at 347. “All evidence, competent or incompetent, must be considered. Any contradictions or conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State, and evidence unfavorable to the State is not considered.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to ... possess ... any firearm[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–415.1 (2011). Defendant does not challenge evidence that he was previously convicted of a felony.
In State v. Sweat, 366 N.C. 79, 727 S.E.2d 691 (2012), our Supreme Court recently stated that the corpus delicti rule “imposes different burdens on the State depending on whether there is independent proof of loss or injury.” Sweat, 366 N.C. at ––––, 727 S.E.2d at 695. “[I]f there is no independent proof of loss or injury, there must be strong corroboration of essential facts and circumstances embraced in the defendant's confession.” Sweat, –––N.C.App. at ––––, 727 S.E.2d at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant confessed as follows:
Jon Wright stole a rifle from a house near the Family Dollar. He kept the gun in a shed behind an empty house. I found out Jon got locked up today and I went and got the gun. I brought it to Vincent [Shorter (Mr. Shorter) ]. He was going to sell it to me for an 8 ball of cocaine. He was going to buy it tomorrow. I usually smoke cocaine a couple times a week. I was going to smoke the 8 ball Vincent was going to sell me. Jon broke into the house down the street and I found the gun under the mattress in the shed.
Defendant stated in his confession that he brought the rifle to Mr. Shorter to exchange for cocaine. The rifle, cocaine, drug paraphernalia, Mr. Shorter, and Defendant were all in the house when officers entered. This evidence strongly corroborates essential facts and circumstances in Defendant's confession. The State's argument concerning Defendant's testimony that he stayed in an abandoned house does not corroborate an essential fact, being one that is related to the commission of the crime. Sweat, 366 N.C. at ––––, 727 S.E.2d at 695.
Defendant cites State v. Cox, ––– N.C.App. ––––, 731 S.E.2d 438 (2012), disc. review allowed,––– N.C. ––––, 736 S.E.2d 184–85 (2013). However, the present case, with the relatively detailed confession, is distinguishable from Cox, in which the confession “contained no details; the entirety of the confession ... was that [the] defendant owned the gun.” Cox, ––– N.C.App. at ––––, 731 S.E.2d at 443. Although the gun “came from inside the car” in which the defendant was seated, this Court focused on evidence that “there were three other people inside the car.” Id. The confession in the case before us is more detailed, and the State presented evidence corroborating the confession.
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.
No error. Judges STEPHENS and HUNTER, JR. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).