State v. Hughey

46 Citing cases

  1. Stone v. State

    419 S.C. 370 (S.C. 2017)   Cited 8 times
    Stating "the law requires we presume counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment" and "the Strickland test ... requires that [the applicant] prove" otherwise (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690, 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695, 693 )

    Under South Carolina law, "victim impact evidence is relevant for a jury to ‘meaningfully assess the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness.’ " State v. Hughey , 339 S.C. 439, 457, 529 S.E.2d 721, 730-31 (2000) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 735 (1991) ), overruled on other grounds by Rosemond v. Catoe , 383 S.C. 320, 330, 680 S.E.2d 5, 10 (2009). The State may present victim impact evidence for the purpose of demonstrating "the ‘uniqueness' of the victim and the specific harm committed by the defendant."

  2. Stone v. State

    Appellate Case No. 2013-001968 (S.C. Feb. 8, 2017)

    Under South Carolina law, "victim impact evidence is relevant for a jury to 'meaningfully assess the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness.'" State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 457, 529 S.E.2d 721, 730-31 (2000) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 735 (1991)), overruled on other grounds by Rosemond v. Catoe, 383 S.C. 320, 330, 680 S.E.2d 5, 10 (2009). The State may present victim impact evidence for the purpose of demonstrating "the 'uniqueness' of the victim and the specific harm committed by the defendant."

  3. State v. Knoten

    347 S.C. 296 (S.C. 2001)   Cited 65 times
    Holding it is error to refuse a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter when in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is no evidence that a significant period of time elapsed between the attack of the defendant by the decedent and the defendant's fatal blows

    Even when a person's passion has been sufficiently aroused by a legally adequate provocation, if at the time of the killing those passions had cooled or a sufficiently reasonable time had elapsed so that the passions of the ordinary reasonable person would have cooled, the killing would be murder and not manslaughter. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 452, 529 S.E.2d 721, 728 (2000). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant, a charge of voluntary manslaughter was warranted here.

  4. Miscellaneous Orders

    531 U.S. 946 (2000)   Cited 102 times
    Noting that dismissal of habeas corpus petition is not proper when it would jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack

    00-5635 HUGHEY v. SOUTH CAROLINA. Sup.Ct. S.C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721. 00-5636 HARRIS v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

  5. State v. Rye

    375 S.C. 119 (S.C. 2007)   Cited 28 times
    Stating “[i]t was unnecessary for the trial court to use the proposed charge when his charge to the jury adequately covered the contents of the proposed charge.”

    While nothing in the court's charge mentioned the word "trespasser" or that the defendant "is not required to ask the trespasser to leave before using force," all that is required is that the substance of the law must be charged to the jury, not any particular verbiage. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 946, 121 S.Ct. 345, 148 L.Ed.2d 277 (2000). While the requested charge would not have been inappropriate, the trial court's charge, when considered as a whole, adequately covered the applicable law under the facts of this case.

  6. State v. Dickey

    380 S.C. 384 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 6 times
    Finding an action is “pending” for purposes of a savings clause where the crime occurred before the effective date of the new legislation

    To warrant reversal, a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 450, 529 S.E.2d 721, 727 (2000). If the instructions given to the jury afford the proper test for determining the issues, the failure to give one side's requested instructions is not prejudicial.

  7. State v. Vang

    353 S.C. 78 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 22 times
    Holding the trial court is not required to ask every voir dire question submitted by the attorneys

    The trial judge's additional sentence does not state the law any differently. The substance of the law is what must be communicated to the jury, not any particular words. State v.Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 450, 529 S.E.2d 721, 727 (2000). Therefore, we find no error in the charge.

  8. State v. Adkins

    353 S.C. 312 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 94 times
    Stating that appellate courts do not disturb a trial court's admissibility determinations absent a finding of prejudicial abuse of discretion

    To warrant reversal, a trial judge's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. State v.Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721 (2000); State v. Harrison, 343 S.C. 165, 539 S.E.2d 71 (Ct.App. 2000); see alsoPriest v. Scott, 266 S.C. 321, 223 S.E.2d 36 (1976) (in general, an alleged error in a portion of a charge must be considered in light of the whole charge, and must be prejudicial to the appellant to warrant a new trial). B. Jury Charge — Exercise of the Right to Remain Silent Adkins

  9. State v. Cherry

    348 S.C. 281 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 8 times
    Affirming trial court's denial of directed verdict “without passing on the weight of the evidence”

    This foundation is a necessary linchpin for Cherry's position because a charge must be read as a whole, and if it adequately expresses the required principles, there is no harm by the failure to include the specific language requested. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 450, 529 S.E.2d 721, 727 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 946 (2000). "The substance of the law must be charged to the jury, not particular verbiage."

  10. State v. Lacoste

    347 S.C. 153 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 16 times
    Finding there was ample evidence of disorderly conduct to support the trial court's denial of the motion for a directed verdict where the defendant shouted obscenities at officers, threw his hands up in a hostile manner, refused to comply with officers' demands, challenged the officers, and taunted the officers about their inability to get him under control

    Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion resulting in prejudice to the complaining party. Statev. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 453, 529 S.E.2d 721, 728-29 (2000); State v.Varvil, 338 S.C. 335, 340, 526 S.E.2d 248, 251 (Ct.App. 2000). Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by statute, the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, or other court rules.