Under South Carolina law, "victim impact evidence is relevant for a jury to ‘meaningfully assess the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness.’ " State v. Hughey , 339 S.C. 439, 457, 529 S.E.2d 721, 730-31 (2000) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 735 (1991) ), overruled on other grounds by Rosemond v. Catoe , 383 S.C. 320, 330, 680 S.E.2d 5, 10 (2009). The State may present victim impact evidence for the purpose of demonstrating "the ‘uniqueness' of the victim and the specific harm committed by the defendant."
Under South Carolina law, "victim impact evidence is relevant for a jury to 'meaningfully assess the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness.'" State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 457, 529 S.E.2d 721, 730-31 (2000) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 735 (1991)), overruled on other grounds by Rosemond v. Catoe, 383 S.C. 320, 330, 680 S.E.2d 5, 10 (2009). The State may present victim impact evidence for the purpose of demonstrating "the 'uniqueness' of the victim and the specific harm committed by the defendant."
Even when a person's passion has been sufficiently aroused by a legally adequate provocation, if at the time of the killing those passions had cooled or a sufficiently reasonable time had elapsed so that the passions of the ordinary reasonable person would have cooled, the killing would be murder and not manslaughter. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 452, 529 S.E.2d 721, 728 (2000). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant, a charge of voluntary manslaughter was warranted here.
00-5635 HUGHEY v. SOUTH CAROLINA. Sup.Ct. S.C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721. 00-5636 HARRIS v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
While nothing in the court's charge mentioned the word "trespasser" or that the defendant "is not required to ask the trespasser to leave before using force," all that is required is that the substance of the law must be charged to the jury, not any particular verbiage. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 946, 121 S.Ct. 345, 148 L.Ed.2d 277 (2000). While the requested charge would not have been inappropriate, the trial court's charge, when considered as a whole, adequately covered the applicable law under the facts of this case.
To warrant reversal, a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 450, 529 S.E.2d 721, 727 (2000). If the instructions given to the jury afford the proper test for determining the issues, the failure to give one side's requested instructions is not prejudicial.
The trial judge's additional sentence does not state the law any differently. The substance of the law is what must be communicated to the jury, not any particular words. State v.Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 450, 529 S.E.2d 721, 727 (2000). Therefore, we find no error in the charge.
To warrant reversal, a trial judge's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. State v.Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721 (2000); State v. Harrison, 343 S.C. 165, 539 S.E.2d 71 (Ct.App. 2000); see alsoPriest v. Scott, 266 S.C. 321, 223 S.E.2d 36 (1976) (in general, an alleged error in a portion of a charge must be considered in light of the whole charge, and must be prejudicial to the appellant to warrant a new trial). B. Jury Charge — Exercise of the Right to Remain Silent Adkins
This foundation is a necessary linchpin for Cherry's position because a charge must be read as a whole, and if it adequately expresses the required principles, there is no harm by the failure to include the specific language requested. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 450, 529 S.E.2d 721, 727 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 946 (2000). "The substance of the law must be charged to the jury, not particular verbiage."
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion resulting in prejudice to the complaining party. Statev. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 453, 529 S.E.2d 721, 728-29 (2000); State v.Varvil, 338 S.C. 335, 340, 526 S.E.2d 248, 251 (Ct.App. 2000). Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by statute, the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, or other court rules.