We conclude simply by stating that the law governing voluntary manslaughter should have been charged. See, State v. Hughes, 107 S.C. 429, 93 S.E. 5 (1917). Following the guilt phase of the trial, when the jury returned the guilty verdict, the trial judge conducted a jury poll.
The rule is well established in this jurisdiction that on a trial for murder growing out of the use of a deadly weapon, it is unnecessary to charge the law relating to manslaughter where the testimony fails to suggest any theory upon which a verdict of manslaughter could rest. Statev. Edwards, 194 S.C. 410, 10 S.E.2d 587; Statev. Bealin, 201 S.C. 490, 23 S.E.2d 746; State v. Takis, 204 S.C. 140, 28 S.E.2d 679; State v. Martin, 216 S.C. 129, 57 S.E.2d 55. It is equally well settled that to warrant the Court in eliminating the offense of manslaughter, it should very clearly appear that there is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. State v. Norton, 28 S.C. 572, 6 S.E. 820. Also, see State v. Hughes, 107 S.C. 429, 93 S.E. 5. Voluntary manslaughter is usually defined as the unlawful killing of a human being in sudden heat of passion upon a sufficient legal provocation.
As to what constitutes involuntarymanslaughter: 45 S.E., 9. As to duty of trial judge tocharge the jury on the law of involuntary manslaughter: 107 S.C. 429, 93 S.E., 5; 26 Am. Jur., 542; 30 C.J., 396, 406-7-8; 23 S.E.2d 746, 201 S.C. 490. Messrs.