Opinion
No. 30066-4-II.
Filed: February 10, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Pierce County. Docket No: 02-8-01970-3. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 01/31/2003.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Lise Ellner, Attorney at Law, PO Box 2711, Vashon, WA 98070-2711.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Kathleen Proctor, Pierce County Prosecuting Atty Ofc Rm 946, 930 Tacoma Ave S Tacoma, WA 98402-2102.
Arron Troy Huffman appeals his adjudication of criminal trespass in the second degree, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
On September 5, 2002, Pierce County Deputy Sheriff Jessie Hotz responded to a 911 call from a mobile home park in Puyallup. Huffman had called 911 to report that his neighbor's ex-husband, Everett Robbins, had threatened him. Robbins told the 15-year-old Huffman to stay away from his daughters and threatened to beat up or shoot Huffman if he did not comply.
Hotz talked to Robbins and Huffman and told them to cease communicating with one another. He also told Huffman several times to stay away from the Robbins family. After Hotz left, Huffman told some friends about Robbins's threat, and three of them approached Robbins at his ex-wife's trailer.
While Robbins and the three men talked, his ex-wife Kristal argued with Huffman and his grandmother. During the argument, Huffman stood in the Robbins's driveway. A family member called 911.
Deputy Hotz responded to the second 911 call and arrested Huffman for trespassing. The State charged him in juvenile court with second degree criminal trespass. During the bench trial that followed, two neighbors testified that they saw Huffman standing in the Robbins's driveway before the deputy arrived a second time. His grandmother testified that Huffman stood on `the common property of the driveway[,]' and his great-aunt said that he stood in the street. Huffman testified that he did not go onto the Robbins's property because he knew that to do so would be trespassing.
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 65, 71.
The trial court concluded that Huffman was guilty as charged after finding that he walked onto the Robbins's property while knowing that he was not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to enter or remain on that property. Huffman now appeals, arguing that these findings are erroneous and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Evidence is sufficient if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it permits a rational trier of fact to find each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact.
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
The trespass charge required the State to prove that Huffman knowingly entered or remained unlawfully upon the premises of another. `Premises' include any real property. A person enters or remains unlawfully upon premises when he is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain.
Huffman argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding that he entered the Robbins's property because he stood on that part of the driveway that was a `shared common area.' Huffman asserts on appeal that his grandmother and the Robbins family shared the driveway, but Everett Robbins testified that Huffman's grandmother lived across the street. Huffman does not supply this court with any of the exhibits showing the configuration of the neighborhood and the record before this court does not support his claim that the driveway was shared. Although Huffman's grandmother testified that Huffman stood on `the common property of the driveway[,]' two independent witnesses testified that Huffman stood on the Robbins's driveway after the deputy's first visit. The trial court's decision to accept the latter testimony was a credibility determination that is not subject to review on appeal.
Br. of Appellant at 9.
RP at 65.
Morse v. Antonellis, 149 Wn.2d 572, 574, 70 P.3d 125 (2003).
The State contends that it is evident that Huffman was not licensed, invited, or privileged to enter the Robbins's property. Robbins had told Huffman to stay away from his daughters and had threatened harm if he disobeyed. The deputy had also told Huffman to stay away from the Robbins family. Although Huffman asserts that no one ever told him to stay off Robbins's property, he testified that he ignored a `dare' to enter the property, knowing that to do otherwise would constitute trespassing. It is evident that Huffman knew he could not lawfully enter the Robbins's property.
RP at 81.
Huffman points out, however, that it is a defense to criminal trespass if `[t]he premises were at the time open to members of the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises[.]' This defense is one of privilege and negates the `unlawful entry' element of criminal trespass. Once the defendant raises the public premises defense, the burden shifts to the State to prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. R.H., 86 Wn. App. 807, 812, 939 P.2d 217 (1997).
State v. Finley, 97 Wn. App. 129, 138, 982 P.2d 681 (1999), review denied, 139 Wn.2d 1027 (2000).
Huffman contends that a driveway is impliedly open to members of the public and that no one ever told him not to enter it. He asserts further that he stepped onto the driveway only for the legitimate purpose of retrieving his grandmother.
See State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333, 337, 890 P.2d 1088 (1995) (driveway part of curtilage impliedly open to public).
The State responds that Robbins's threat and the deputy's instructions effectively eliminated any conditions under which Huffman could have entered the Robbins's driveway, even if it was impliedly open to the public. Moreover, Kristal Robbins testified that Huffman argued with her as he stood in the driveway, and she said nothing about him attempting to coax his grandmother away. Here again, the trial court resolved this factual dispute in the State's favor.
There was substantial evidence showing that Huffman could not have entered the Robbins's driveway under any condition, thus disproving the public premises defense. The trial court did not err in finding that Huffman entered his neighbor's property and that he did so knowing that he did not have any license, invitation, or privilege to do so.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, J. and HUNT, C.J., concur.